Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Thursday, May 22, 2025

Leading appellate attorneys review the Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Thursday, May 22. 

In re Marriage of Tronsrue, 2025 IL 130596 

By Amelia Buragas, Illinois State University 

In the case of In re Marriage of Tronsrue, a case involving a judgment for dissolution of marriage entered more than 30 years ago, the Illinois Supreme Court considered issues of statutory interpretation, federal preemption, and jurisdiction. The court ultimately affirmed the lower courts, concluding that a marital settlement agreement between the parties that was incorporated into the judgment of dissolution was not preempted by federal law. The court also concluded that the circuit court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the judgment of dissolution, meaning that it could award attorneys fees to petitioner for respondent’s failure to comply with the terms of the agreement.

In 1992, the Du Page County circuit court entered a judgment for the dissolution of marriage between the petitioner, Elsa Tronsrue, and the respondent, George Tronsrue. The judgment incorporated a marital settlement agreement that obligated the respondent to pay the petitioner one-half of the marital portion of his federal veterans’ disability payments as a property distribution. Twenty-seven years later, in 2019, respondent filed a petition to terminate the veterans’ disability payments, contending that the division of benefits was void under federal law. The circuit court dismissed the petition, found respondent in contempt for failing to make the payments, and ordered that he pay petitioner’s attorneys fees. In separate appeals, the appellate court affirmed both orders. The supreme court then granted respondent’s petitions for leave to appeal from both cases and consolidated them pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315.

The supreme court noted that there were two issues for it to resolve: 1) whether the provision in the marital settlement agreement incorporated into the 1992 judgment of dissolution of marriage was void and unenforceable because state law authorizing the division was preempted by federal law and 2) whether the attorney fee award must be vacated if it was based on a void order. On the question of preemption, the court noted that it would focus its inquiry on answering whether federal preemption divested the circuit court of jurisdiction and, if so, whether this rendered the judgment of dissolution void. 

The court then answered both questions in the negative, rejecting respondent’s argument that the agreement regarding division of the veterans’ disability payments was contrary to section 5301(a)(1) of the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, which prohibits assignment of veterans benefits. The supreme court explained that the court did not order the respondent to make the payments to the petitioner. Instead, the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement, which is a contract. The court explained that federal law did not prevent respondent from agreeing to use his disability benefits “how he saw fit after receiving them,” and that the circuit court was not preempted from entering an order incorporating the agreement reached between the parties. The court also noted that the Veterans Benefits Act expressly grants to veterans broad liberty in the use of their disability payments and summarized its holding as follows: “Put simply, federal law does not prohibit a veteran from using the disability payments he receives in any way he chooses, as long as the funds are first paid to the veteran.” The court noted that this conclusion is consistent with that of other jurisdictions and reveals “the importance of contract law” and that it reinforces the “value of allowing divorcing spouses to agree to certain terms, regardless of whether those terms reflect what a court could or would be able to order.”

The court then moved on to the question of whether the circuit court retained jurisdiction to enforce the judgment through the entry of sanctions, noting that a final judgment generally is conclusive 30 days after it is entered. The supreme court explained, however, that a court in divorce proceedings retains jurisdiction after 30 days for the purpose of enforcing its decrees under the doctrine of res judicata and that the circuit court retained jurisdiction of the cause to enforce all terms of the judgment of dissolution of marriage. This included the marital settlement agreement, which the court described as a “valid, unambiguous, and legally binding contract.” The court then explained that where federal preemption is not applicable, res judicata bars re-litigation of agreed-upon obligations. The court then noted that the circuit court has the authority under section 502(e) of the Marriage Act to order the recovery of costs and legal fees from a party who, without compelling cause or justification, refuses to comply with an order or judgment and that the circuit court did not err in entering an attorney fee award for the respondent’s failure to comply with the agreement entered into between the parties. The supreme court then affirmed the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Neville.

Andrews v. Carbon on 26th, LLC, 2025 IL 130862 

By Amanda J. Hamilton, Konicek & Dillon, P.C.

In the matter of Andrews v. Carbon on 26th, the Court considered the question of a distributor’s obligation to notify a wholesaler of its claim of breach of implied warranty of merchantability pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-607(3)(1). Justice Cunningham authored the Court’s unanimous opinion.

During the week of June 28, 2016, a group of individuals became ill with E. coli. The Chicago Department of Public Health’s investigation determined that the source of the E. coli outbreak was contaminated cilantro served at two Chicago restaurants: Carbon on 26th, LLC and Carbon on Chicago, LLC (collectively, “Carbon”). During the relevant time period, Carbon had purchased its cilantro from a distributor, Martin Produce, Inc. (the “distributor”), which in turn had purchased the cilantro from two wholesalers: Jack Tuchten Wholesale Produce, Inc., and La Galera Produce, Inc. (the “wholesalers”).

From July 2016 through 2017, more than 50 plaintiffs filed personal injury complaints against Carbon alleging claims of strict product liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. The cases were ultimately consolidated. On January 19, 2017, the plaintiffs added claims against the distributor. On May 8, 2017, Carbon filed a counterclaim for contribution against the distributor. On October 27, 2017, Carbon filed a third-party complaint against several wholesalers, including Tuchten, and on March 1, 2018, Carbon amended its third-party complaint to add wholesaler La Galera as a third-party defendant. However, on June 20, 2018, Carbon abandoned its third-party claims against the wholesalers and left the distributor as the sole third-party defendant. On April 16, 2019, the distributor filed its own third-party complaint for contribution against the wholesalers, which became the complaint at issue in the Court’s opinion. On March 2020, on the eve of trial, the plaintiffs reached a global settlement with all defendants. The litigation continued between Carbon, the distributor, and the wholesalers. 

Carbon amended its counterclaim against the distributor, alleging a breach of implied warranty of merchantability and sought consequential damages for lost revenue. The distributor responded, denying that the cilantro it sold was contaminated and denying that it breached an implied warranty of merchantability but also amended its claims against the wholesalers alleging breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The distributor also alleged that the wholesalers had “actual notice of the alleged defect of the cilantro in or around June 2018 as a result of being named as a defendant in the Individual Complaints.” 

The wholesalers filed Motions for Summary Judgment, alleging that the distributor failed to notify them directly of its claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability as required by section 2-607(3) of the UCC, which states: “the buyer must[,] within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach[,] notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy.” Alternatively, the wholesalers alleged that the distributor failed to provide notice within a reasonable period of time after it discovered or should have discovered the alleged breach. 

The circuit court denied the wholesalers’ motion for summary judgment, finding that questions of fact existed as to the amount of time and whether it was reasonable, but then reversed itself on a motion to reconsider and granted summary judgment in favor of the wholesalers, finding that the distributor had failed to give “direct notice.” On appeal, the First District Appellate Court reversed the circuit court, instead finding that “by naming everyone in the supply chain, the personal injury suits filed here necessarily gave each of those entities actual knowledge that the cilantro they sold was alleged to be defective.”

The Supreme Court granted the wholesalers’ petitions for leave to appeal and discussed its prior decision in Connick v. Suzuki Motor Co., where it acknowledged that the general rule is that a buyer “must directly notify the seller of the troublesome nature of the transaction or be barred from recovering for a breach of warranty,” but also noted two exceptions: “First, a buyer can fulfill the notice requirement without giving direct notice to the seller where the seller has actual knowledge of the defect of the particular product. Second, a consumer buyer who has suffered personal injuries from a defective product can satisfy the notice requirement simply by filing a complaint alleging a breach of warranty against the seller.” The court noted that in this case, there was no question that the distributor did not directly notify the wholesalers of its claim and further could not rely on the second Connick exception because the distributor was “not a consumer plaintiff who suffered personal injuries.” Rather, the issue turned on the first Connick exception – whether the wholesalers had “actual knowledge” of the alleged product defect, excusing the distributor’s requirement to provide direct notice.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s finding that the wholesalers in this case did have “actual knowledge of the defect of the particular product because they learned of the allegedly contaminated cilantro, at the latest, when the personal injury plaintiffs filed suit against them on June 13, 2018.” The Court further stated: “We agree that Tuchten and La Galera had actual knowledge of the problems with the cilantro well in advance of Martin filing its third-party complaint on April 16, 2019. At least 10 months before Martin filed its third-party complaint, the wholesalers were apprised of ‘the trouble with the particular product purchased by a particular buyer.’ Connick, 174 Ill. 2d at 494. They knew that the specific shipments of cilantro they sold to Martin during the relevant period in 2016 were allegedly contaminated with E. coli, and they knew that the cilantro was the suspected cause of the E. coli outbreak that caused personal injuries to consumers and economic losses to Carbon. This is all the notice that section 2-607 requires.”

The Supreme Court rejected the wholesalers’ arguments that “mere allegations in a personal injury complaint are insufficient to confer actual knowledge,” stating “We reject that argument. The comments to section 2-607 in the UCC make clear that a buyer’s allegations concerning a defective product serve as sufficient notice to the seller… In Connick, we held only that the seller must be ‘somehow apprised of the trouble with the particular product purchased by a particular buyer.’” 

The Supreme Court also rejected the wholesalers’ argument that they lacked actual knowledge because they did not have the opportunity to personally observe and inspect the defect, stating: “In fact, there is no Illinois caselaw holding, as a matter of law, that a seller must have the opportunity to observe or inspect the defect to have actual knowledge of the defect. Actual knowledge can arise from any number of sources. In this case, before Martin filed its complaint on April 16, 2019, the wholesalers were aware of the buyer, the particular product, the alleged defects, and the specific transactions at issue, based on being named as defendants in the personal injury complaints.”

Last, the Court clarified the second Connick exception: “the wholesalers argue that the appellate court’s ruling renders meaningless Connick’s second exception that allows only consumer buyers who suffer personal injuries to satisfy the UCC notice requirement by filing a complaint. They argue, ‘[i]f a buyer that did not suffer personal injuries cannot rely upon the filing of its own complaint as a basis for establishing UCC notice it surely cannot rely on the filing of a complaint by another for establishing UCC notice.’ This argument confuses the two exceptions outlined in Connick, which are independent of one another. The second Connick exception means that Martin [the distributor] could not rely on the filing of its own complaint to satisfy the notice requirement. In other words, Martin’s [the distributor’s] third-party complaint filed against Tuchten and La Galera [the wholesalers] on April 16, 2019, did not excuse it from providing direct notice under section 2-607(3)(a). This does not rule out applying the first Connick exception, however, because Martin [the distributor] presented evidence that the wholesalers had actual knowledge of the particular transactions at issue because of their involvement in the personal injury litigation that occurred before Martin [the distributor] filed its claim.” The Court concluded that under the totality of the circumstances in this case, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the wholesalers based on a lack of notice under section 2-607(3)(a) of the UCC and affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. 

People v. Dyas, 2025 IL 130082 

By Jay Wiegman, Office of the State Appellate Defender

In 2016, Robert D. Dyas, who was initially represented by the Bureau County Public Defender and then was allowed to proceed pro se, pleaded guilty to unlawful possession with intent to deliver more than 900 grams of methamphetamine, in exchange for an 18-year sentence of imprisonment. Alleging ineffectiveness of counsel, Dyas timely moved to withdraw the plea, and counsel from the LaSalle County Public Defender’s Office stepped in to represent the defendant, though ultimately Dyas again proceeded on his own. After the circuit court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea, defendant filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his postjudgment motion and then filed a notice of appeal. The circuit court struck defendant’s motion to reconsider for lack of jurisdiction and appointed the Appellate Defender. Dyas then moved to dismiss his appeal so that the circuit court could rule on the motion to reconsider the denial of his post judgment motion. The court granted the motion, dismissed the appeal and ultimately denied an amended motion to reconsider.

On direct appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court denied him his right to counsel for postplea proceedings, and that the circuit court failed to admonish him in accord with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401(a). The Appellate Court did not consider whether it had jurisdiction over the appeal. Considering the second argument, but not the first, the Third District vacated and remanded for further proceedings, holding that Rule 401(a) admonishments are required even after a defendant is sentenced following a guilty plea. The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal.

In People v. Dyas, 2025 IL 130082, a unanimous Illinois Supreme Court vacated the Appellate Court’s decision and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment after determining that the Appellate Court lacked jurisdiction. Writing for the Court, Justice Rochford found that this case is controlled by People v. Walls, 2022 IL 127965, in which the Court held that a successive postjudgment motion to reconsider the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d), or to reconsider the sentence, does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, even though the failure to file a 604(d) certificate constitutes error. As it did in Walls, the Court in the instant case rejected the defendant’s argument that the time for filing a notice of appeal could be extended by a motion for rehearing of the denial of his postjudgment motion. As a result, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant’s appeal because the appeal was dismissed on his own motion. The Court therefore vacated the judgment of the Appellate Court and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. The Court did not address the issue concerning Rule 410(a) admonishments.

Additionally, the Court rejected the request, made by both parties, to exercise its supervisory authority assuming it found a lack of jurisdiction. Justice Rochford wrote that the Court generally will issue a supervisory order only when the normal appellate process fails to provide adequate relief and either the issue in dispute is a matter important to the administration of justice or the Court’s intervention is necessary to keep a lower court from acting beyond the scope of its authority, neither of which applied in the instant case.  

People v. Cooper, 2025 IL 130946

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

On March 30, 2024, which was a Saturday, Tyrell Cooper was charged with aggravated battery, aggravated discharge of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. That same date, the State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1, alleging that Cooper posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community. Also on the morning of March 30, Cooper appeared in court at which time the charges were read, counsel was appointed, and the court found probable cause for the charges based upon the testimony of a police officer. 

The State then noted it had filed a petition to detain and requested that the hearing be set for the following Monday, April 1, at 1:30 p.m. Defense counsel responded, “for the record, we’d ask for immediate, but did receive notice of the hearing for Monday.” Counsel did not object to the Monday afternoon setting at that time, but on the afternoon of April 1, counsel argued that the hearing was untimely under the 48-hour requirement of 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(2). Specifically, counsel noted that the petition was filed in the morning on March 30 and more than 48 hours had passed by the time of the 1:30 p.m. hearing on April 1. Accordingly, counsel asserted that Cooper was required to be released with conditions. The court denied that request, held a detention hearing, and ordered that Cooper be detained.

In the appellate court, Cooper challenged only the timeliness of the detention hearing. While both the appellate court majority and dissent agreed that the hearing was untimely, the majority concluded that the untimeliness required remand to the circuit court for a hearing to determine the least restrictive conditions of release, while the dissent would have held that the 48-hour requirement is directory, not mandatory, and that the short delay here did not require a remedy because Cooper suffered no loss of substantive rights.

The Supreme Court allowed leave to appeal. While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Cooper entered a guilty plea and was sentenced. Accordingly, he filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot because he was no longer subject to pretrial detention or release. In footnote one of today’s opinion, the Court explained that it was reviewing the issue under the public interest exception to mootness.

The Court went on to find that Cooper had forfeited his timeliness claim by not objecting to the Monday afternoon setting at the time the court scheduled that hearing. It was not enough for counsel to ask for an “immediate” hearing; he needed to object specifically that the hearing was being scheduled outside of the 48-hour time limit.

Noting that forfeiture is a limitation on the parties and not the Court, however, the Court went on to consider on the merits whether section 110-6.1(c)(2)’s 48-hour requirement is mandatory or directory and whether the remedy of conditional release conflicts with the Pretrial Fairness Act (“the Act”). As to the first question, the Court determined that the 48-hour time limit is directory, not mandatory, because the statute does not specify any consequence for noncompliance. Moreover, delay beyond 48 hours does not generally injure a defendant’s liberty interest. The Act serves to protect both the rights of the accused and the rights of the community such that “courts always have the obligation to consider the danger” posed by an accused individual when deciding whether to release him or her into the community while awaiting trial. Requiring automatic release for a minor timing violation would undermine the purpose of the Act. 

The Court acknowledged, though, that a defendant may be entitled to relief due to delay if he can demonstrate that he was prejudiced. Here, Cooper did not dispute that he was subject to detention and did not claim any prejudice from the hours-long delay of the detention hearing. Accordingly, the appellate court’s judgment was reversed, and the circuit court was affirmed.

People v. Cousins, 2025 IL 130866

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Antonio Cousins was charged with various weapons offenses in two separate cases in December 2021. At that time, cash bond was set, and Cousins remained in custody. In November 2023, Cousins filed several motions, including motions for pretrial release. In response, the State filed petitions to detain in each case, using preprinted form motions. 

At the hearing on the motions for pretrial release, the court noted Cousins had one prior failure to appear and that a pretrial services bond report indicated Cousins had scored a risk of 9 out of 14 for pretrial misconduct. The report also showed a 93% probability to appear for future court hearings and a 90% probability of no new offenses. Ultimately, the report listed Cousins’s risk level as “high,” and deemed him inappropriate for release. Cousins acknowledged prior convictions for residential burglary and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, but countered that if released he would get a job and enroll in school. Ultimately, the court denied release, noting Cousins’s criminal history and prior failure to appear. The court stated that Cousins was a flight risk because he was non-probationable on the current charges. 

On the written detention order, the court checked the boxes indicating that the proof was evident or the presumption great that Cousins had committed a detainable offense, that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, and that no conditions could mitigate that threat. No written findings were included. 

On appeal, Cousins argued that the State failed to meet its burden of proving no conditions could mitigate any risk posed by his release, and the appellate court agreed. In reaching that decision, the court noted that the detention hearing had proceeded in a “nontraditional manner” with the judge engaging with defendant throughout and disputing defendant’s contentions, the State offering no evidence or argument on the matter of detention except in response to the court’s requests for information, and the State making no argument. The State’s petition to detain also failed to assert that no conditions could mitigate any risk posed by Cousins’s release. Accordingly, the court held that the circuit court had abused its discretion and remanded the matter for a new detention hearing.

Cousins filed a petition for rehearing, arguing that the appropriate remedy was remand for a hearing on conditions of release given that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof to detain. When that petition was denied, Cousins sought leave to appeal, which the Supreme Court allowed.

 The Supreme Court agreed that the State failed to meet its burden. The State presented no evidence or argument on the conditions element at the hearing, and the court did not address that issue. Indeed, in briefing in the Supreme Court, the State did not assert it had presented sufficient evidence or identify any evidence the circuit court could have relied on with regard to the conditions element. And, while the State suggested during oral argument that the court actually had been presented with sufficient evidence, the State’s failure to argue that point in its brief deprived Cousins of the opportunity to respond, and thus the Court declined to consider it. 

The Court also noted that while the detention hearing may have occurred in a “nontraditional manner,” the State was not prevented from putting forth evidence or argument at that hearing. The hearing took place on two separate dates, and the State had “multiple opportunities...to make known its reasons to justify pretrial detention.” Given the failure to present clear and convincing evidence on the question of conditions, the State failed to meet its burden to detain.

On the question of remedy, the Court disagreed with the appellate court’s decision to remand for a new detention hearing. The Court noted that providing a second hearing would present little incentive for the State to meet its burden the first time around, giving the State a “second bite at the apple.” Further, it would subvert the purpose of the Pretrial Fairness Act. Instead, the appropriate remedy is remand for a hearing on the conditions of release.

Hulsh v. Hulsh, 2025 IL 130931

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Smyth LLC

Addressing the dismissal of a common law action asserting allegations of a parent’s international abduction of his children, the Illinois Supreme Cout adhered to precedent declining to create a cause of action for tortious interference with a parent’s custodial rights. In upholding the dismissal of plaintiff’s Cook County complaint, the supreme court characterized plaintiff’s argument as “seeking a sweeping policy change” and deferred to the legislature to decide whether to create an action for interference with the parent-child relationship. 

According to the complaint, after the divorce of Plaintiff Viera Hulsh, a citizen of Slovakia and Israel, and Jeremy Hulsh, a citizen of the United States and Israel, their two children resided in Slovakia with Viera as the parent with primary custody. Without Viera’s consent, Jeremy transported the children through several countries and ultimately to Chicago. Viera regained custody of the children in a federal action against Jeremy under article III of the Hague Convention and obtained an order requiring Jeremy to pay a portion of Viera’s attorney’s fees and costs for the federal lawsuit. Jeremy, unsuccessful in persuading the district court that exceptions to the treaty justified his conduct, filed for bankruptcy; however, the bankruptcy court ruled that Jeremy’s fee and costs obligation was nondischargeable. 

Viera filed a Cook County action against Maya Hulsh, Jeremy’s mother, and his brother, Oren Hulsh. Alleging Jeremy will likely claim he cannot pay the federal district court awards, Viera sued Maya and Oren for knowingly interfering with Viera’s custodial rights by financially assisting Jeremy in abducting the children and concealing their location from Viera. Viera’s lawsuit initially included claims for tortious interference with custodial rights, aiding and abetting Jeremy’s tortious conduct, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After Maya and Oren prevailed in the trial court on motions to dismiss the tortious interference claims, Viera voluntarily dismissed the emotional distress count and appealed the dismissal of the tortious interference counts. Deferring to the supreme court or the General Assembly to recognize the tort of interference with custodial rights, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal order.   

In her supreme court appeal, plaintiff acknowledged the court’s prior decisions declining to recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with the parent-child relationship but urged that her case presented the issue in a distinct context in that she sought only to recover purely economic loss incurred in regaining custody after a kidnapping. Plaintiff also argued that the court should adopt section 700 of the Restatement  (Second) of Torts, which imposes liability for intentionally, without consent from a parent legally entitled to the child’s custody, abducts the child.  

Unpersuaded by plaintiff’s damage-related distinction, the supreme court cited a basic tenet of tort law: that the damages sought must arise from a recognized tort. The court then recounted the case law leading it to affirm the appellate majority’s conclusion that Illinois recognizes no action for tortious interference with custodial rights. The supreme court focused on three of its opinions to guide its decision: two involving claims for loss of society for nonfatal personal injury to a child (Dralle v. Ruder, 124 Ill. 2d 61 (1988); Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76 (2004)), and one involving allegations of psychiatric therapy interfering with a parent-child relationship (Doe v. McKay, 183 Ill. 2d 272 (1998)). In these cases, the supreme court had reasoned that no statutory basis supported the actions alleged. It applied the same reasoning to determine that it should in this case defer to the legislative branch. The court noted the General Assembly’s enactment of statutes that impose criminal sanctions but not civil penalties. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/10-5 (West 2022) (defining the offense of child abduction as including the intentional concealment of a child from the lawful custodian).    

Noting sister state precedent weighing on both sides of the issue, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that it should follow other states’ recognition of the tort of interference with the parent-child relationship. The supreme court closed with the observation that the legislature had not taken action to allow civil recovery in this area during the nearly 40 years that have passed since the Illinois Appellate Court, in deference to the legislature, rejected adoption of the tort urged by plaintiff.   

The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, which had affirmed dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint.   

People v. Wallace, 2025 IL 130173

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

In 2019, Deshawn Wallace was charged with being an armed habitual criminal after a handgun was found in his jacket pocket during a protective pat-down. At trial, the State offered certified copies of Wallace’s two prior felony convictions: a 2008 armed robbery with a firearm and a 2015 unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. The court found Wallace guilty.

At issue in the Supreme Court was whether Wallace’s 2008 conviction for armed robbery was a qualifying predicate offense because Wallace was just 17 years old at the time of that offense. More specifically, Wallace argued that while he had been convicted in adult court in 2008, the 2014 amendments to the Juvenile Court Act raised the age of eligibility for juvenile court from 16 years old to 17 years old. Accordingly, Wallace argued that the conduct that led to his adult conviction in 2008 would have resulted in a juvenile adjudication had it been committed in 2019, the date of his armed habitual criminal arrest, and thus the 2008 offense could not serve as a predicate for armed habitual criminal because it was not a qualifying “conviction.”

Under 720 ILCS 5/25-1.7(a), a person commits the offense of being an armed habitual criminal if he or she possesses any firearm “after having been convicted” two or more times of certain specified offenses. Looking to this plain language, the Supreme Court rejected defendant’s argument. The armed habitual criminal statute requires only that the defendant “hav[e] been convicted” at least twice of any combination of the predicate offenses listed therein. Here, on the night of Wallace’s arrest, he had been convicted twice previously of qualifying offenses. It was of no consequence that the conduct which resulted in his 2008 conviction might have instead resulted in a juvenile adjudication in 2019. The armed habitual criminal act is not concerned with how defendant’s prior conduct would be treated at the time of the current conduct, but rather specifically addresses whether at the time of the current conduct the individual had previously been convicted, at least twice, of qualifying predicates.

The Court also pointed to the legislature’s amendment of the Class X recidivism statute as evidence that the legislature knows how to amend a statute to include a minimum age for qualifying offenses. The 2021 amendment to the recidivism statute, which is also based on an individual having certain prior convictions, specifically provides that the individual’s first qualifying offense must have been committed when the individual was 21 years or older, making clear that the convictions of juveniles in adult court were not to be considered qualifying offenses. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b)(4). The absence of similar language in the armed habitual criminal statute is an indication that the legislature has not intended a similar result.

Village of Lincolnshire v. Olvera, 2025 IL 130775

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

In May 2021, Daniel Olvera was a 16-year-old high school sophomore enrolled in driver’s education class at his high school. After one of his driving sessions, the instructor reported to the program director that there was “something going on here, I think you should check this out.” The program director referred the matter to the dean, who then involved the school resource officer. Following questioning and the administration of field sobriety tests, Olvera was ultimately charged with driving under the influence of drugs, specifically cannabis. He was convicted following a jury trial.

Two issues were raised on appeal. First, Olvera argued that he was improperly prosecuted by the Village of Lincolnshire for a violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code, and second he argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court addressed each issue in turn.

Under 625 ILCS 5/16-102(c), a municipality may prosecute violations of the Illinois Vehicle Code occurring within its boundaries only “if written permission to do so is obtained from the States Attorney.” Olvera argued that the Village had an affirmative duty to introduce proof of its written authority to prosecute and that the failure to do so was error. The Village countered that the statute did not impose any duty on a municipality to provide evidence of its written permission on the record. The Supreme Court agreed with the Village. 

The plain language of section 16-102(c) makes no reference to introducing written permission into the record, and the Court declined to read any such requirement into the statute. The only statutory requirement is that the municipality have written permission from the State’s Attorney, and the parties here agreed that the Village did have such permission. Thus, the fact that the written permission was absent from the record did not mean that the Village lacked authority to prosecute the DUI violation. 

And, the evidence was sufficient to prove Olvera guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of DUI. While the driving instructor detailed incidents of Olvera weaving and driving “a little erratically,” he also testified that he had seen similar driving from other student drivers, often attributable to a lack of sufficient practice and nerves. The instructor testified that he would not have let Olvera operate the vehicle if he thought he was “high.” Olvera admitted smoking cannabis the previous night, and a cannabis cigarette was recovered from his wallet, but the instructor did not smell an odor of cannabis on Olvera on the date in question.

Olvera argued that because the instructor was the only witness to testify about his actual driving, the evidence was insufficient to show he was under the influence of drugs to a degree that rendered him incapable of driving safely. The Supreme Court observed, however, that taking all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The dean testified that Olvera’s speech was slow, slurred, and confused, that he was walking more slowly than normal, and that he was not able to maintain his balance during the field sobriety tests. The school resource officer also observed slurred speech and confusion and testified that Olvera performed poorly on field sobriety tests. And, another officer described significant findings from the subsequent field sobriety tests administered at the police station. Finally, a surveillance video from the school showed Olvera stumbling as he walked, running into lockers and almost hitting a table. Coupled with the instructor’s description of Olvera’s driving, this evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Olvera was incapable of driving safely.