Quick Take on Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Issued Thursday, August 28, 2025
A leading appellate attorney reviews the Illinois Supreme Court opinion handed down Thursday, August 28.
People v. Class, 2025 IL 129695
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
Angel Class was convicted of first degree murder at a bench trial and sentenced to 45 years of imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Class subsequently filed a series of post-conviction petitions, culminating in the successive petition which was the subject of the instant appeal. In that petition, Class raised a claim of actual innocence, supported by the affidavits of several witnesses. The circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, and Class appealed. The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded the matter for a third-stage evidentiary hearing. In remanding, the court stated:
Finally, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) permits a reviewing court, in its discretion to order that a case be assigned to a different judge on remand. See [People v.] Serrano, 2016 IL App (1st) 133493, ¶ 45; People v. Tally, 2014 IL App (5th) 120349, ¶ 43. Pursuant to the discretion conferred upon us by this rule, we find that the interests of justice would be furthered by assigning this case to a different judge on remand.
The State filed a petition for leave to appeal, asking the Supreme Court to determine whether the appellate court had authority to remand with directions to assign to a different judge under Rule 366(a)(5), noting that Rule 366 governs civil appeals while Rule 615 governs the authority of the appellate court in criminal appeals. In response, the Court entered an order remanding to the appellate court for the limited purpose of explaining its reasoning for the decision to order reassignment.
On remand, the appellate court issued a modified opinion, finding reassignment proper under both Rule 366(a)(5) and Rule 615(b)(2). The appellate court also rejected the State’s assertion that reassignment was only proper if bias or actual prejudice was found. Here, the court explained, reassignment was necessary because the trial judge had committed multiple errors below, undermining confidence she would be able to put those findings “out of her mind” on remand. The Supreme Court then granted leave to appeal and ultimately reversed the reassignment portion of the appellate court’s decision.
First, the Court held that Rule 366 does not apply here. The authority for reassignment comes from Rule 615(b)(2), which provides that the reviewing court may “modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to...the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.” But, the authority to reassign a case on remand is not without limits.
The Supreme Court went on to clarify that the appellate court may sua sponte order judicial reassignment in subsequent post-conviction proceedings, but only in rare circumstances, specifically where the record clearly reveals bias, the probability of bias, or actual prejudice on the part of the trial judge. Prior adverse judicial rulings, alone, will almost never provide a basis for reassignment. Similarly, a court’s critical, and even hostile, remarks will not require reassignment unless they reveal that the court’s opinion was derived from an extrajudicial source or show a degree of antagonism making fair judgment impossible.
The facts here did not warrant reassignment. The trial judge did rule against defendant in dismissing his successive post-conviction petition, but that fact alone did not disqualify her from presiding over proceedings on remand. The judge’s adverse ruling was not based on extrajudicial information and did not show a high degree of antagonism to defendant’s claim. Rather, the judge merely committed legal error, and a court’s prior legal error does not rise to the level of judicial bias. If it did, a new judge would be required in every remand. Here, there was nothing to suggest the judge would not follow the law on remand, and thus the reassignment portion of the court’s order was vacated.
The dissent would have found bias and would have affirmed the direction that the matter proceed before a different judge on remand. Specifically, the dissent concluded that the record showed that the court had prematurely judged the credibility of defendant’s evidence of actual innocence, resulting in a lack of confidence as to her ability to be objective at an evidentiary hearing on the same claim.