Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Thursday, September 18, 2025
Leading appellate attorneys review the Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Thursday, September 18.
Bitner v. City of Pekin, 2025 IL 131039
By Amelia Buragas, Illinois State University
In Bitner v. City of Pekin, 2025 IL 131039, the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the Public Employee Disability Act prohibits a public employer from withholding employment taxes from payments made to an injured employee under section 1(b) of the Act. The Court followed the rules of statutory construction and concluded that the plain language of the statute establishes that the Act does not prohibit an employer from withholding taxes.
Plaintiffs, Christopher Bitner and John Brooks, were injured in the line of duty in separate incidents while working as police officers for the City of Pekin. Both plaintiffs received payments from the defendant under section 1(b) of the Disability Act, which states that an employee injured in the line of duty shall continue to be paid “on the same basis as he was paid before the injury.” The statute prohibits deductions from sick leave credits, compensatory time for overtime accumulations or vacation, or service credits in a public employee pension fund. The City of Pekin continued to pay the plaintiffs and, as the city did prior to the plaintiffs’ injuries, withheld state and federal income taxes, Social Security taxes, and Medicare taxes.
The plaintiffs objected to the withholding of these payroll taxes and filed a complaint against the City of Pekin. The complaint originally alleged violations of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act but was subsequently amended and in the second amended complaint the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that defendant violated section 1(b) of the Disability Act when it withheld employment taxes from the plaintiffs’ disability payments. Plaintiffs also alleged that the city improperly deducted from their accrued sick, vacation, or compensatory time. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that while section 1(b) prohibits public employers from deducting sick, vacation, and compensatory time, it says nothing about taxes and does not prohibit the withholding of payroll taxes. The appellate court also found that there was a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the city deducted any sick, vacation, or compensatory time because the parties offered conflicting affidavits on that question.
The Illinois Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs’ petition for leave to appeal. In the Supreme Court, the parties disputed only the question of whether the appellate court erred in its interpretation of section 1(b). This left the Court with a straightforward analysis of the language of the statute. The Court explained that the requirement of section 1(b) that an injured employee continue to be paid “on the same basis” “clearly means that an injured employee is to be paid from the regular payroll in the same manner as if the employee was on duty and in active service,” and that if an employer withheld employment taxes prior to the injury “it may continue to do so after the injury.” The Court also noted that the express prohibition against deductions for sick leave, overtime, vacation, and service credits created an implied exclusion of all other deductions under the maxim of expressio unius est exclusion alterius (“the expression of one thing is the exclusion of any other”).
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the statute cannot be read as allowing the withholding of employment taxes because doing so would “yield absurd or unjust consequences.” Plaintiffs supported this contention by arguing that the section 1(b) payments are not subject to federal income tax and that the Illinois legislature would not “allow a public employer to withhold a portion of the benefits from an injured employee without reason.” The Supreme Court found, however, that the plaintiffs did not cite to any specific IRS ruling or any federal law or regulation that prohibits withholding of payroll taxes. The Court also noted that even if the plaintiffs are correct that their payments are exempt from federal taxes, the proper remedy for that situation is to seek a refund from the IRS or to adjust their tax withholding by submitting a new W-4 withholding form to the employer. Thus, the Court concluded that section 1(b) “unambiguously” does not prohibit a public employer from withholding employment taxes and does not violate section 1(b) when the employer continues to withhold employment taxes from an employee’s disability payments on the same basis as before the employee was injured. The unanimous opinion was written by Justice Cunningham
Stewart v. Rosenblum, 2025 IL 131365
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
In January 2024, Aimee Stewart was charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle based on an allegation that she took a vehicle from her aunt without permission. She was arrested on a warrant about a month later. On February 7, 2024, Stewart was ordered released on conditions pending trial. What followed were multiple instances of Stewart’s failing to appear in court, being arrested, and being re-released on conditions.
That cycle culminated in Stewart’s November 5, 2024, arrest on a warrant for again failing to appear in court. Two days later, still in custody, she appeared in court, and the State filed a petition for sanctions. At that hearing, the judge expressed frustration with Stewart’s repeated failures to appear at scheduled court dates and with the limitation of 30 days in custody as an available sanction under the Pretrial Fairness Act (PFA). The judge then ordered Stewart detained.
Stewart’s counsel objected, informing the court that Stewart was not charged with a detainable offense and did not qualify for indefinite detention on a petition for sanctions. The court indicated that it was treating the situation as a revocation of pretrial release based upon Stewart’s repeated failures to appear. Stewart filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied. Ultimately, the judge found that sections 110-6 and 110-6.1 of the PFA were unconstitutional as applied because the sanctions provided were inadequate and there was no authority to sua sponte detain defendant for her repeated violations of conditions of release. Stewart appealed and also filed a habeas corpus complaint.
The primary question before the Supreme Court was whether sections 110-6 and 110-6.1 of the PFA curtailed the circuit judge’s “inherent authority to administer justice, control his docket, and manage the proceedings, and thus violated the separation of powers clause” of the Illinois constitution.
In the Supreme Court, the parties agreed that there was no statutory authority for Stewart’s indefinite pretrial detention at the time it was ordered. The judge argued, however, that he had the inherent judicial authority to deny release in order to manage his docket and achieve the disposition of Stewart’s case, rendering the PFA sections unconstitutional as applied here.
The Supreme Court first found that the necessary facts were not adequately developed because there had been no evidentiary hearing and thus no evidence as to the reasons for Stewart’s failure to appear and no evidence as to whether modified conditions of release and/or sanctions would have ensured her future appearance. It was not enough that the judge offered Stewart the opportunity to present such evidence through a motion to reconsider because the court is required to hold the hearing and consider the evidence before finding a statute unconstitutional as applied.
Additionally, the Court found that the judge had relied on an over-broad understanding of judicial authority in finding the statutes unconstitutional, relying on Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248. In Rowe, the Court had concluded that it is within the purview of the legislature to regulate the system of pretrial release and that the legislature may properly restrict the exercise of judicial discretion in doing so. The separation of powers doctrine is not violated simply because separate branches of government exercise overlapping authority on a subject. And the restrictions here do not unduly infringe on the court’s inherent authority to control its docket. The court had a range of sanctions available to it and could have modified the conditions of release, as well. Likewise, the court could have proceeded with trial in absentia if Stewart continued to voluntarily absent herself from the proceedings.
The Supreme Court reversed the court’s holding that sections 110-6 and 110-6.1 were unconstitutional as applied here. The Court also noted that it had previously granted Stewart’s habeas corpus petition and ordered her released from custody in May. The matter was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
People ex rel Smith v. Tobin, et al., 2025 IL 131213
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
Casey Ross was found guilty of driving while his license was revoked. Because Ross also had two prior convictions for driving while license revoked, the Illinois Vehicle Code (IVC) required a sentence of “a minimum term of imprisonment of 30 days or 300 hours of community service, as determined by the court.” 625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-1). The County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act (Behavior Act) provides that defendant’s imprisoned for offenses with a “mandatory minimum sentence” cannot be given good-behavior credit against their sentence that would reduce it below the mandatory minimum.
Here, Boone County Judge Robert Tobin found that because the IVC permitted community service as a sentence, it did not establish a mandatory minimum and thus authorized him to impose a lesser jail term of 14 days, with good-behavior credit to apply. State’s Attorney Tricia Smith responded by filing the instant mandamus action in the Illinois Supreme Court, asking the Court to direct the circuit court to enter a sentence that complies with the IVC and the Behavior Act.
In a unanimous opinion, the Court first held that the language of section 6-303(d-1) of the IVC is unambiguous. The circuit court has discretion to sentence a defendant to either a term of imprisonment or a term of community service. If the judge chooses incarceration, the sentence must be for at least 30 days, and if the judge chooses community service, it must be for at least 300 hours. Nothing in the statute permits the court to impose a term of imprisonment less than 30 days.
Similarly, section 3 of the Behavior Act is unambiguous in excepting from the general day-for-day credit provision any person “sentenced for an offense for which the law provides a mandatory minimum sentence” to the extent that the credit would reduce the sentence served below the mandatory minimum. Accordingly, Ross cannot earn good-behavior credit against his sentence if such credit would result in his being released before serving the mandatory minimum of 30 days of imprisonment.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court also disavowed language from People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (3d) 110477, in its opinion here. The issue before the court in Smith was whether that defendant was entitled to credit for time served against his jail sentence for resisting or obstructing a peace officer under 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a-5), which requires a minimum of either 48 consecutive hours of imprisonment or at least 100 hours of community service. The majority held that, in accordance with 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b), the defendant was entitled to credit for time spent in custody before sentencing. In response to the special concurrence’s discussion of the possibility of good-behavior credit, the majority went on to state that section 31-1(a-5) did not set a mandatory minimum because the court also had discretion to impose community service. This statement had no bearing on the dispositive holding in Smith and thus was obiter dicta. The Supreme Court clarified that both section 6-303(d-1) of the IVC and section 31-1(a-5) of the Criminal Code set mandatory minimum sentences if the court chooses to impose a term of imprisonment.
Because the circuit court sentenced Ross to a term that failed to comply with the statutorily required mandatory minimum, the Court vacated the sentencing order and issued a writ of mandamus directing the court to resentence Ross in compliance with the IVC and the Behavior Act.
People v. Keys, 2025 IL 130110
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
In October 2017, Ocheil Keys was charged with the murder of his girlfriend Barbara Rose, as well as three counts of concealment of a homicidal death and two counts of dismembering a human body. Following a jury trial, Keys was convicted of all charges. The issues before the Illinois Supreme Court were whether Keys’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of a portion of a video-recorded police interview of Keys, failing to seek redaction of inadmissible statements made by the police during video-recorded interviews of Keys, and failing to request a limiting instruction concerning the inadmissible statements. Additionally, Keys argued that convictions of multiple counts of concealment of a homicidal death and dismemberment of a human body were improper where there was but a single homicide and a single body.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the familiar standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (1984). To establish ineffective assistance, a defendant must show (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s shortcomings. Prejudice is shown where there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A failure to satisfy either prong is fatal to a claim of ineffectiveness.
Here, the Court concluded that Keys could not establish prejudice, and thus declined to address the questions of whether counsel’s performance was deficient. Specifically, the Court found that the evidence against defendant was overwhelming, such that there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial even if both of his video-recorded statements had been excluded. Specifically, Keys’s statements to Rose’s adult sons claiming that she went to Indiana to buy a car were inconsistent with evidence that Rose had made plans to babysit and to spend time with a friend on the date of her disappearance. Video surveillance at a gas station and retail store showed Keys purchasing a gas can, fuel, a lighter, two rolls of plastic and new bedding on the day of Rose’s disappearance. Keys borrowed his mother’s car a few days after Rose’s disappearance, and Rose’s burned and dismembered body later was found wrapped in a comforter in a black plastic bag in the backseat of that vehicle. Another jail inmate who knew Keys told the police that Keys had confessed to killing Rose. The inmate directed police to a location where burned pieces of bone were discovered and later determined to have belonged to Rose. Given all of this additional evidence against defendant, there was no likelihood of a different outcome at trial, and thus no ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Court then went on to resolve the questions of whether multiple convictions of concealment and dismemberment could stand where there was but a single victim and concluded that they could not. As to concealment, the Court noted that “conceal” is defined in the statute as performing “some act or acts” for the purpose of preventing or delaying the discovery of the homicide. 720 ILCS 5/9-3.4(b-5). Accordingly, a defendant cannot be convicted of multiple counts of concealment based on a series of acts committed as part of the same course of conduct where the statute specifically contemplates a single offense consisting of multiple “acts.” But the State argued that multiple convictions were proper here based on “successive commissions” of separate acts of concealment, specifically Keys’s acts of moving Rose’s body to the burn site and later moving her body parts to the back of his mother’s car. The appellate court disagreed, finding there was no substantial change in the nature of Keys’s criminal objective—that being to conceal Rose’s homicide. Thus, only a single concealment conviction was proper.
Dismembering a human body is defined as knowingly dismembering, severing, separating, dissecting, or mutilating any body part of a deceased individual. 720 ILCS 5/12-20.5(a). Looking at the plain language of that statute, the Court found it ambiguous as to whether multiple offenses involving a single victim were intended. Accordingly, applying the rule of lenity, only one dismemberment conviction could be upheld here. While Keys separately set fire to the victim’s body and severed her body parts, those acts were part of one single course of conduct designed to get rid of evidence of Rose’s murder. Accordingly, the Court also vacated one of defendant’s dismemberment convictions.
Lavery v. Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, 2025 IL 130033
By Amanda J. Hamilton, Akerman LLP
In Lavery v. Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, the Court addressed the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act, sovereign immunity, the prospective injunctive relief exception to sovereign immunity, and how those statutes and doctrines impact one another.
Plaintiffs Terrence Lavery and the Illinois Professional Health Program, LLC provide counseling and clinical services, including substance abuse programs, to their clients. One such client was a doctor who was suspended from practicing medicine. When the doctor sought reinstatement of his medical license, an administrative hearing was scheduled to determine whether the reinstatement of his license was in the public’s interest. As part of that hearing, the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (IDFPR) demanded that plaintiffs provide it with a copy of Lavery’s personal notes relating to the rehabilitation services Lavery provided to the doctor. Plaintiffs filed an action in Cook County seeking a protective order pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/3(b)). The circuit court inspected the notes in camera and granted the protective order, barring IDFPR from obtaining the documents. The circuit court also awarded plaintiffs their attorney fees and costs (totaling $10,639.21) pursuant to section 15 of the Confidentiality Act.
IDFPR appealed, arguing (for the first time) that the award of attorney’s fees and costs violated sovereign immunity. The appellate court addressed the sovereign immunity argument, finding that sovereign immunity implicates the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction and therefore may be raised at any time. In response, plaintiffs argued that the “prospective injunctive relief exception” applied to IDFPR’s sovereign immunity claim. The Court explained: “The prospective injunctive relief exception allows an action against a State agency or officer to proceed in the circuit court where a plaintiff is not attempting to enforce a present claim against the State but, instead, is seeking to enjoin a State officer from taking future actions that exceed his or her delegated authority when the future actions would result in a violation of the plaintiff’s protectable legal interests.” Id. ¶ 10. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the primary relief sought was to enjoin a State actor (IDFPR) from engaging in prohibited conduct (obtaining the confidential personal notes of a therapist) such that the circuit court’s judgment for attorney’s fees and costs was merely ancillary to the permissible injunctive relief. IDFPR responded by arguing that the award of fees and costs was a separate monetary judgment and was not “part and parcel” of the prospective injunctive relief, such that the exception did not apply. The appellate court affirmed, holding that because plaintiffs were required to initiate circuit court action to enjoin IDFPR from unlawful discovery in the administrative proceeding, the costs and fees were “part and parcel” to the injunctive relief that is not barred by sovereign immunity.
The Supreme Court granted IDFPR’s petition for leave to appeal to review the monetary judgment for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 15 of the Confidentiality Act. Justice Overstreet delivered the judgment and opinion of the Court. In its Opinion, the Court provides a history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and how it has evolved in conjunction with the Illinois Constitution. The Court noted that the determination of whether the circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a monetary judgment against IDFPR for attorney fees and costs involves a questions of statutory interpretation vis-à-vis the Lawsuit Immunity Act and section 15 of the Confidentiality Act.
The Court also provides a discussion of the prospective injunctive relief exception to sovereign immunity and an explanation of the rationale and purpose of the exception. Id. ¶¶ 23-31. The Court noted that the “looking forward relief” was a critical part of the exception. Id. ¶¶ 32-35.
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision as to the categorization of attorney’s fees and costs being “part and parcel” to the injunctive relief, stating: “A monetary judgment against a State agency is an entirely different category of relief from mere prospective injunctive relief to prevent future unlawful conduct.” Id. ¶ 37. It further stated: “[S]overeign immunity bars monetary judgments against the State for fees or costs unless the legislature has explicitly waived sovereign immunity in statutory language” and held that because no express language was found in section 15 of the Confidentiality Act, “the Appellate Court usurped the legislature’s exclusive authority over sovereign immunity by expanding the prospective injunctive relief exception to include subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a monetary judgment against the State for attorney fees and costs.” Id. at 13-21. It noted that it was not persuaded by the federal Eleventh Amendment cases cited by and relied on by the appellate court, stating they “offer no guidance in evaluating statutory sovereign immunity in Illinois under the State Lawsuit Immunity Act.” Id. ¶ 69.
In concluding, the Court held: “Absent an express statutory waiver of sovereign immunity in the statute authorizing awards for attorney fees and/or costs, the circuit court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a judgment against the State for attorney fees and/or costs. The legislature has not waived sovereign immunity with explicit language in the Confidentiality Act, and therefore, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a monetary judgment against the Department for plaintiffs’ attorney fees and costs.” Id. ¶ 79.