Quick Take on Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Issued Thursday, October 2, 2025

Leading appellate attorney reviews the Illinois Supreme Court opinion handed down Thursday, October 2. 

People v. Smith, 2025 IL 130067

By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court

Matthew Smith was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Kevin Guice at a bar. Prior to trial, Smith moved to suppress two eyewitness lineup identifications as unduly suggestive. In the second lineup, Smith elected to wear a red and white shirt and in both lineups his hair was in a mohawk. Smith also moved to exclude a photograph taken of him in the bar where the shooting took place, claiming the photograph was unduly prejudicial because it depicted him flashing gang signs. Smith’s counsel described the photograph as having been “taken at the club, which was the site of the shooting,” and said that they would admit that Smith was “wearing that shirt in the club.” The court denied both motions. Smith also sought to allow his mother to attend trial. However, the judge excluded Smith’s mother because the State had listed her as a potential witness.

At trial, several witnesses identified Smith as the shooter, and Smith was arrested fleeing the scene. A gun was found in the vehicle from which he fled, and a red and white shirt was also found in the vehicle. The State called a gunshot residue expert. Before trial, the State tendered the expert’s report, which indicated that she did not detect a sufficient number of gunshot particles to conclude that Smith had fired a gun. However, at trial she testified that ISP’s standards only permit a positive result where three “tri-component” particles are detected. The expert located a single tri-component particle on Smith’s right hand, and some laboratories permit analysts to report a positive result based on a single tri-component particle. The photograph of Smith taken in the bar was admitted as well. Although there was no evidence elicited about where or when the photograph was taken, it was recovered from Smith’s person at the time of his arrest, and it was admitted without objection. Smith elected not to testify, and his mother was permitted into the courtroom at that point.

During closing arguments, the State made the following two statements:

“In addition to this being a whodunit, it assumes two things. One that we completely disregard what these four people testified to; and two, let’s not mince words, in order for you to find him not guilty, you have to find that what they’re saying is that all four people lied, lied to your face. That is what you have to find.”

Then, later,

“[t]he only way this is whodunit is if you ignore the testimony that you have, if you find the four people who were in front of you liars.”

During jury deliberations, the jury sent a note that said: “Photo taken inside bar?” After argument, the court elected to send back the photograph recovered from Smith depicting him at the bar.

On appeal, Smith contended (1) his right to a public trial was violated when his mother was excluded from the courtroom, (2) the lineup identifications should have been suppressed as unduly suggestive, (3) the State elicited improper testimony on gunshot residue testing, (4) a photograph given to the jury during deliberations deprived him of a fair trial, and (5) several comments made by the State during closing arguments were prejudicial. The First District reversed Smith’s conviction on the first issue, finding that his right to a public trial had been violated. Then, reviewing Smith’s other claims, the appellate court found that the lineup identification was unduly suggestive, the State violated discovery rules when it elicited improper testimony, the photograph improperly filled in evidentiary blanks, and the State’s comments during closing arguments were improper.

The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision, first finding that the right to a public trial is not violated or even implicated when the court elects to exclude a potential witness from the courtroom. Exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom is a time-honored practice designed to preclude witnesses from altering their testimony.

Second, the Court held that the lineup was not unduly suggestive. The Court reviewed the lineups and found that the “fillers” used to identify Smith were not grossly dissimilar in age, size, weight, or appearance. Additionally, in the second lineup Smith elected to wear the red and white shirt he wore on the night of the shooting.

Third, the Court found that the State violated its discovery obligations when it elicited testimony from a gunshot residue expert that contradicted the expert’s disclosed report. However, the failure to comply with discovery rules requires reversal only when the defendant establishes prejudice from the violation. The Court found that Smith was not prejudiced because (1) the evidence against him was overwhelming, and (2) the failure was mitigated by the expert’s later testimony that the analysis indicated he “may not have discharged a firearm.” Accordingly, a new trial was not warranted.

Fourth, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the jury to view the photograph, which was admitted into evidence at trial. Although the State did not elicit testimony about where or when the photograph was taken, Smith admitted in his motion in limine prior to trial that it was taken at the bar on the night of the shooting. The Court found that Smith was prohibited by the doctrine of invited error from reversing his position and later arguing it was unknown when or where the photograph was taken.

Finally, although the State admitted its first contested statement during closing arguments improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant, any resulting prejudice was cured by the State’s other comments and the trial court’s instructions to the jury. The Court found that the second comment was not an example of improper burden shifting. The Court found it unlikely that Smith would have been acquitted had the State not made the improper comment. The State’s comments were therefore not reversible error.

In making its ruling, the First District elected to review only two of several comments made by the State during closing arguments that Smith alleged were improper. Therefore, the Court remanded the case back to the First District to consider the additional comments not addressed in its decision.