Quick Take on Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Issued Thursday, October 23, 2025
Leading appellate attorney reviews the Illinois Supreme Court opinion handed down Thursday, October 23.
People v. Reed, 2025 IL 130595
By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court
Majority written by Justice Overstreet, joined by Justices Theis, Holder White, and Cunningham.
Special concurrence by Justice Rochford, joined by Justices Neville and O’Brien.
Summary of Holding
The petitioner pled guilty to AUUW pursuant to a negotiated plea. The State dismissed 3 additional counts. The AUUW conviction was based on the statute subsequently found unconstitutional under People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶ 22. The petitioner petitioned for a certificate of innocence (COI) pursuant to section 2-702 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-702. The circuit court denied the petition because the petitioner was required to prove that he was innocent of all the offenses charged in the information, and he could not establish his innocence of all four counts. The appellate court agreed. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling.
Case Summary
The petitioner was arrested on October 6, 2003. He was charged with four counts of Aggravated Unlawful Use of a Weapon (AUUW), two counts for carrying an uncased, loaded, and immediately accessible firearm in public or on a public street and two for carrying a firearm in public or on a public street without a valid Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card. He pled to Count I of AUUW and the State dismissed the remaining three counts. As part of his plea, he stipulated that he was involved in a shooting, and at the time of his arrest he had in his possession a loaded, semiautomatic handgun.
Following the court’s decision in Aguilar, the petitioner successfully petitioned to vacate his conviction in 2022. He then filed a petition seeking a certificate of innocence (COI), arguing that he met the requirements to obtain a COI because he had been convicted of a felony, served a prison term, his conviction had been vacated, and he did not bring about his own conviction. The state objected and responded that under section 2-702(g)(3) the petitioner was required to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he was “innocent of all the offenses charged in the indictment or information.” 735 ILCS 5/2-702(g)(3). The circuit court agreed with the State and denied the petition for a COI. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s decision.
The Supreme Court, applying principles of statutory construction, analyzed the statute governing certificates of innocence. The petitioner argued that the subsections of the statute granting relief clearly state that a COI pronounces the petitioner innocent of all offenses for which he or she was incarcerated. However, the Supreme Court observed that the language describing the relief available once a COI is obtained and the requirements for proving innocence are different.
The Court distinguished its previous holding in People v. Palmer, 2021 IL 125621, which found that the State, in challenging a COI, could not posit a new, uncharged, theory of guilt because the statute required petitioners to establish their innocence of the offenses actually charged in the indictment or information. It rejected the petitioner’s suggestion that Palmer required only a showing of innocence of the offenses for which the petitioner was incarcerated, finding that Palmer presented a different question from the one posed in this case. The Court also overturned People v. Green, 2024 IL App (2d) 220328, which interpreted Palmer to suggest that a petitioner is only required to prove his innocence of the charges for which he was incarcerated. Additionally, the Court overruled People v. McClinton, 2018 IL App (3d) 160648, which misconstrued the language contained in subsection (b) of the COI statute (pertaining to the relief available under the statute) as applying to subsections (d) and (g), which describe the requirements of proof.
The Court further rejected the petitioner’s suggestions that other sections of the statute, including subsections (b), (f), and (g)(1) altered the plain language of subsection (g)(3) in such a way as to limit the scope of the COI statute to offenses for which the petitioner was incarcerated. It found that subsections (b) and (h) serve separate purposes and rejected the petitioner’s contention that requiring him to prove his innocence on all charged offenses rendered those sections superfluous. It also rejected the petitioner’s argument that the “all charges” rule leads to absurd results. Given the plain language contained in the statute, the Court found that the legislature clearly intended for petitioners to allege and prove their innocence of the offenses charged in the charging instrument. Neither the title of the statute (“Petition for a [COI] that the petitioner was innocent of all offenses for which he or she was incarcerated”) nor the policy considerations put forth by the petitioner nor the language contained in similar statutes from other jurisdictions swayed the Court from its conclusion because the language of the COI statute was plain and unambiguous. The Court concluded the legislature acted intentionally when it included express language in certain sections of the statute but omitted it in others.
Relying on language in People v. Green, 2024 IL App (2d) 220328, the petitioner argued that the “all charges” rule was inconsistent with tort principles because he was unable to seek relief for the charges for which he was not incarcerated. The Court held that the petitioner was conflating the basis for damages in a subsequent proceeding with the threshold evidentiary requirements for obtaining a COI and overruled Green on that additional basis. The Court next clarified that when the State elects to dismiss charges pursuant to a plea agreement, it does not constitute a concession of innocence of the dismissed charges, nor does it mean that the offenses were never charged. In Green, the appellate court suggested that when the State elected to dismiss the charges by nolle prosequi it reverted the matter to the condition that existed before the commencement of the prosecution. The Court overruled Green on that basis as well, finding that the COI statute does not state that “offenses charged” are limited to “offenses prosecuted” or that dismissed charges are excluded from “offenses charged.”
Additionally, the Court held that the State was not judicially estopped from claiming the petitioner must prove his innocence because the State never represented or intended for the trier of fact to believe the petitioner was innocent of the dismissed charges. Finally, the Court explained that requiring a petitioner to prove his innocence of all charged offenses does not violate the presumption of innocence applicable in criminal proceedings because COI petitions are civil in nature, and the COI statute expressly requires petitioners to prove their innocence.
Justice Rochford, special concurrence, joined by Justices Neville and O’Brien
Justice Rochford’s special concurrence suggests that there is no “one size fits all” solution, and that “[a]lways requiring a petitioner to prove his or her innocence of all charged offenses would lead to absurd results, and never requiring a petitioner to do so would also lead to absurd results.” Under many circumstances, including those present in this case, the petitioner was clearly not innocent of the other valid (dismissed) charges.
The invalidation of the AUUW statute under Aguilar gave rise to many of the appeals discussed by the majority. Outside of that context, however, the COI statute has generally not been held to require proof of innocence of every charged offense. Further, several of the hypotheticals raised by the appellate court highlight the injustices that might result from strict application of the “all cases” rule. For example, as described in People v. Warner, 2022 IL App (1st) 210260, if a defendant was charged with murder and drug possession, and then wrongfully convicted of the murder, languished in prison for years before eventually proving his innocence, he could not obtain relief without also proving himself innocent of the drug possession. And as discussed in People v. Brown, 2022 IL App (4th) 220171, numerous procedural complications are foreseeable. For example, what if the prosecution dismisses a charge due to lack of evidence months or years before entering into a plea agreement? What if a plea agreement resolves two separate indictments? What if a defendant is found guilty on one offense at trial and not guilty on another—must he prove his innocence on both charges, including the acquittal, since a finding of not guilty is not the same as a finding of innocence?
These scenarios are especially concerning given the legislature’s stated policy aim, announced in the statute’s description in section 2-702(a), of removing technical and substantive obstacles to petitioners seeking a COI. The special concurrence would require a “reasonable nexus” between the offense for which the petitioner seeks a COI and the other charged offenses for which a petitioner must establish his or her innocence. The special concurrence calls on the legislature to clarify (1) of which charges it intended petitioners to prove themselves innocent, and (2) how these principles apply in the context of a plea agreement.