Quick Take on Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Issued Friday, October 31, 2025
Leading appellate attorney reviews the Illinois Supreme Court opinion handed down Friday, October 31.
People v. Johnson, 2025 IL 130447
By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court
Majority written by Justice O’Brien, joined by Justices Neville, Overstreet, and Holder White. Special concurrence by Justice Cunningham, joined by Justices Theis and Rochford.
Holding Summary
It was error for the trial court to reserve ruling on a midtrial motion for a directed finding until after the defendant rested his case. In this case, however, the error did not amount to plain error requiring reversal, and the Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the appellate court.
Case Summary
The defendant, Devin Johnson, was tried for murder. After the State rested its case, Johnson moved for a directed verdict. The court informed the parties that it was taking the motion under advisement. Johnson did not object. Johnson then waived his right to testify and rested. The court advised that it would rule on the motion after the verdict was returned. Again, Johnson did not object. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the court stated that the motion was still under advisement because it “wanted to do some legal research.” The court then issued a written order denying Johnson’s motion for a directed verdict.
Johnson appealed, arguing, among other things, that he was denied a fair trial when the court failed to rule on his motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s evidence. The appellate court affirmed his conviction (People v. Johnson, 2023 IL App (4th) 221021-U), finding that Johnson had forfeited the issue by failing to object to the court’s decision to reserve its ruling.
The Supreme Court agreed that the issue was forfeited when Johnson failed to object to the court’s procedural decision but elected to review the matter under the plain error doctrine. Plain error permits a reviewing court to address defects affecting substantial rights, even though they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. The Court held that previous precedent, People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62 (2009) and People v. Averett, 237 Ill. 2d 1 (2010), holding that a defendant’s decision not to testify prevents the court from reviewing certain claims for plain error, did not bar review in the instant case.
Applying principles of statutory construction, the Court examined the statute that permits defendants to move for a directed finding, section 115-4(k) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/115-4(k)). Although the statute is silent as to when the court must decide a midtrial motion for a directed verdict, the Court found that its purpose was rooted in the protections of the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments. The Court held that the purpose of making such a motion “is to avoid forcing a defendant into going forward with his own evidence when the State’s case is insufficient.” This purpose is only achieved when the trial court decides the motion before proceeding to the defense’s case. Accordingly, the Court found that it was plain error for the trial court to reserve its ruling on the motion and proceed with the defendant’s case.
Plain error permits reversal only if (1) the evidence is so closely balanced that the error threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. After reviewing the record, the Court found that (1) the evidence was not closely balanced, and (2) Johnson himself had previously argued the error was not the type of serious structural error subject to second prong plain error review. The Court therefore held that although the trial court erred when it failed to rule on the midtrial motion, the error did not warrant reversal under the plain error doctrine. On that basis, the Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court and the circuit court.
Justice Cunningham, special concurrence, joined by Justices Theis and Rochford
Justice Cunningham concurred in the affirmance of the defendant’s conviction. However, she would not have held that section 115-4(k) requires the trial court to rule on a motion for a directed verdict midtrial. She observed that the statute itself says nothing at all about when the motion must be decided. Justice Cunningham also observed that the statute’s purpose—protecting defendants from being convicted on insufficient evidence—is served regardless of when the court rules on the motion. She would have held that a knowing and voluntary decision not to testify does not require a defendant to “have the benefit of the trial judge’s ruling on the motion for directed verdict.”