Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Thursday, November 20, 2025
Leading appellate attorneys review the eight Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Thursday, November 20.
Haase v. Kankakee School District 111, 2025 IL 131420
By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan
Riley Haase, a seventh grader at Kankakee Junior High School, while playing indoor soccer during gym class, was “tackled into a wall” by another student who was only intermittently injecting himself into the game, was not on either team, and was not dressed for gym class. Riley alleges that he sustained a permanent injury to his arm and shoulder. The gym teacher was alleged to have been seated and looking at a phone or laptop, and not paying full attention to the class activities, including that soccer game.
The complaint alleged that the gym teacher knew that the offending student had a history of physically violent behavior towards other students. The teacher denied having that knowledge. Plaintiff alleged that the teacher failed to remove that student from the game when it was clear that he was engaged in dangerous physical aggression towards other students, and failed to engage in supervision of the class, but rather continued to use his electronic devices.
The defendants' motion for summary judgment, in the first instance, relied on two sections of the Tort Immunity Act. Section 2-109 of the Act immunizes a local public entity for an injury resulting from an act or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable. Section 2-201 immunizes a public employee from liability for an injury resulting from the employee’s act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of discretion. Defendants contended in the alternative that they were entitled to immunity from liability for negligent supervision because plaintiffs failed to allege willful and wanton conduct, in reliance on section 3-108 of the Act which provides immunity for negligent supervision of an activity on public property unless the conduct amounts to willful and wanton conduct.
The circuit court granted summary judgment based upon all three statutory sections. With respect to section 3-108, the court concluded that the facts established, at most, inattentiveness by the teacher, which does not constitute willful and wanton misconduct.
A divided appellate court reversed. The majority held that there were questions of fact as to whether 2-201 applied, and also whether willful and wanton conduct existed. Justice Hettel contended in his dissent that allegations against school staff for inadequate supervision are insufficient as a matter of law to establish willful and wanton conduct, which would afford immunity under section 3-108.
The unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion for the Court by Justice Cunningham, reversed the appellate court. In the Supreme Court, plaintiff contended, in keeping with a finding in the appellate court, that if the offending student were aggressive and a danger to other students, and that information were known to the District, the failure to disseminate that information to the teachers may be willful and wanton conduct. However, the Supreme Court said that “the problem” with that position is that it had never been pled. Rather, the entirety of the complaint was based on respondeat superior principles for the conduct of the teacher. “There were no allegations that the District was independently liable for its own willful and wanton conduct.”
After a detailed examination, the Court found that the facts support a claim of negligent failure to supervise an activity on public property, but that they did not rise to the level of willful and wanton conduct, as defined in the Act.
The Court noted that there was no evidence that playing indoor soccer was an inherently dangerous activity, in contrast to the use of a mini-trampoline without proper safety guidelines as in Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213 (2007).
The Court concluded that “because we have found that section 3-108 applies, we need not address whether sections 2-109 and 2-201 of the Act also apply...” The circuit court’s summary judgment was affirmed.
Rainey v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 2025 IL 131305
By Amelia Buragas, Illinois State University
In one of two opinions released today involving the Retirement Board of the Policeman’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees and costs after the Board was ordered to restore her duty disability benefits. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice O’Brien, the court answered in the affirmative, finding that the Illinois Pension Code authorizes the award of attorney fees and costs to police officers, like the plaintiff, who successfully challenge the discontinuation of their duty or occupational disease disability benefits.
Plaintiff, a Chicago police officer, was injured in car collisions in 2013 and 2015 while she was on duty. She applied for and was awarded duty disability benefits after the second collision for injuries she sustained to her neck and shoulder. In 2022, the Board voted to discontinue plaintiff’s duty disability benefits and found that she was no longer disabled because of her duty-related injuries. But when plaintiff reported to the police department for work, the department found her physically unable to perform her duties. Plaintiff then pursued administrative review. The circuit court reversed the Board’s decision to discontinue plaintiff’s duty disability benefits and awarded attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 5-228(b) of the Pension Code. The Board appealed and the First District Court of Appeals affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the Board’s petition for leave to appeal, which focused solely on the award of attorney fees and costs.
In the Supreme Court, the Board argued that the attorney fees and costs provision of the Pension Code did not apply to a situation where the Board discontinued duty disability benefits. The Board contended that attorney fees and costs are applicable only in two circumstances: when an initial duty disability benefits application is denied under section 5-154 or under section 5-154.1. Plaintiff argued that the plain language of the attorney fees and costs provision established she was entitled to the statutory fee because she successfully challenged the Board’s denial of her continued duty disability benefits on administrative review. To resolve this issue, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the language of multiple sections of the Code, including sections 5-154, 5-156, 5-228, and 5-155. The Board argued that sections 5-154 and 5-156 established separate processes: one to apply for benefits and one to discontinue them and that section 5-228, which provides for attorney fees and costs, only applied to the application for benefits. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and concluded instead that sections 5-154 and 5-155 each address a disabled officer’s rights to disability benefits and section 5-156 explains how to obtain and continue those benefits. As a result, the Court concluded that “the plain language of the statute does not distinguish between an initial application for benefits and the continuation of them.” The Court noted that the Board’s interpretation of statute, which would limit the award of attorneys fees and costs only to those officers whose initial application was denied, would be “in contradiction to the legislative intent to assist disabled officers who successfully challenge the denial of their disability benefits, including their continuation.” The Court observed that the availability of attorneys fees and costs “helps to level the playing field” for officers who are required to defend their eligibility for continued benefits and who are “confronting the vast resources of the Board.”
Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, and found that section 5-228(b) of the Pension Code authorizes the award of attorney fees and costs to a police officer who prevails on administrative review when challenging either the denial of duty or occupational disease disability benefits or the discontinuation of them.
Moreland v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 2025 IL 131343
By Amelia Buragas, Illinois State University
In Moreland v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, the Illinois Supreme Court considered language in the Illinois Pension Code and clarified that when it comes to disability determinations, the Board is the ultimate arbitrator and is not bound to defer to the opinions of a Board-approved physician. Rather, the statute merely requires that the Board obtain and consider the opinion of a Board-approved physician when determining whether an officer is entitled to disability benefits.
Plaintiff, a Chicago police officer, sustained injuries to his lower back and hip in a car collision that occurred while he was on duty. He applied to the Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago for duty disability benefits. At the hearing on the plaintiff’s application, the Board heard conflicting testimony. A board-approved physician who conducted an independent medical examination concluded that plaintiff could return to work in a full duty, unrestricted capacity. Plaintiff’s treating physician, however, found that he was permanently disabled and was unable to safely carry and discharge a weapon. And the commanding officer of the police department’s medical services section found that he was not qualified to return to duty without restriction. The Board voted to deny disability benefits to plaintiff, noting that it placed greater weight on the opinions and conclusions of the independent physician despite recognizing that a treating physician “might have unique insight into a patient’s condition.” On administrative review, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding that it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The First District Court of Appeals, however, reversed and remanded. The appellate court focused on whether plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits must fail because he had not submitted proof of disability from a Board-appointed doctor under section 5-156 of the Pension Code. The appellate court examined apparently conflicting outcomes in two cases – Nowak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 315 Ill. App. 3d 403 (2000) and Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 234 Ill. 2d 446 (2009). In Nowak, the appellate court found that proof of disability from a Board-appointed doctor was a statutorily required condition precedent to the receipt of disability benefits. However, the First District noted that to apply that rule to this case would require it to “ignore” the Supreme Court’s decision in Kouzoukas, where the Court found a denial of disability benefits to be against the manifest weight of the evidence where the Kouzoukas plaintiff was denied benefits but not offered a position with the police department. The First District concluded that the plaintiff was in the same “catch 22” as the officer in the Kouzoukas case: he was unable to work because the police department would not assign him a position in the police service, yet he was unable to obtain disability benefits. Thus, the appellate court held that the Board’s decision was against manifest weight of the evidence despite the testimony of the Board-approved physician that plaintiff was not disabled.
The Illinois Supreme Court granted the Board’s petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court focused its analysis on the language of section 5-156 of the Pension Code, which states that proof of disability “shall be furnished to the board by at least one licensed and practicing physician appointed by the board.” In interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court followed the well-established tenants of statutory construction, noting that when the language of a statute is ambiguous, the Court “may consider the consequences of construing a statute in one way or another.” The Supreme Court noted that it had considered a similar question when it construed section 3-115 of the Pension Code in Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 226 Ill. 2d 485 (2007). In Wade, the Court concluded that the language of the statute was capable of two reasonable interpretations: requiring either certificates that the officer was disabled or certificates addressing the issue of disability. The Court also looked to language in section 4-112 of the Code, which provides that disability shall be established “by the board.” Wade reasoned that the legislature could not have intended to make a single physician, rather than the fund’s board, the decisionmaker.
The Supreme Court followed the reasoning of Wade and concluded that section 5-156 should be given the same construction as section 3-115 and found that the Board would have been within its authority to award plaintiff a duty disability pension despite the Board-approved physician’s opinion that the plaintiff was not disabled. The Court observed that despite the physician’s opinion, the Board held a full evidentiary hearing and allowed plaintiff to introduce other evidence of disability a process that “would have been a pointless waste of time,” if the only factor that mattered was the opinion of a sole physician. Thus, the Court held that section 5-156 merely requires that the Board must receive an opinion on an officer’s disability status from at least one Board-appointed doctor before awarding a disability pension but that “[t]he Board remains the ultimate arbiter of disability, and it has the discretion to credit the testimony of doctors not appointed by the Board.” The court then overruled Nowak.
However, this conclusion did not result in a different outcome for the plaintiff in this case. The Supreme Court next addressed whether the Board’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and found that plaintiff had failed to carry his very high burden under this standard of review. In doing so, the court distinguished this case from Kouzoukas due to differences in procedural posture. The Court acknowledged that this outcome may put police officers in the “frustrating position” where they are denied reinstatement because of a disability but also denied a disability pension. However, the Court noted that this outcome is not because of its decisions but is the “unfortunate result” of a statutory scheme under which the board and employer are “entitled to rely on the opinions of different doctors in determining whether the officer is disabled.” The Court’s opinion noted that any change to the existing statutory mechanism to resolve this “catch-22” must come from the legislature. The unanimous decision was written by Justice Rochford.
Fausett v. Walgreen Company, 2025 IL 131444
By Amanda J. Hamilton, Akerman LLP
In Fausett v. Walgreen Company the Court addressed whether an individual had standing to bring a class action on behalf of herself and other similarly situated against Walgreens for an alleged violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (“FACTA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1).
Walgreens sold prepaid debit cards and permitted customers to load additional funds on the cards. The plaintiff, Calley Fausett, paid Walgreens to let her add money to her prepaid debit card. The Walgreens cashier provided plaintiff with two electronically printed receipts, which disclosed the first 6 and the last 4 digits of her 16-digit debit card number.
Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Lake County, alleging that Walgreens willfully violated § 1681c(g) of FACTA by issuing a receipt with more than the last five digits of the plaintiff’s debit card number and that as a result, she suffered a heightened risk of identity theft and was forced to take further action to prevent further disclosure of the private information disclosed on the receipt. Walgreens filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that FACTA does not apply to cash transactions (and plaintiff’s value-load transaction was made in cash), that a prepaid card is neither a credit card nor a debit card, that there was no “willful” violation of FACTA, and that plaintiff lacked standing to allege an actual injury. The circuit court denied the Motion to Dismiss, being unpersuaded by Walgreens’ citations to federal case law and finding that standing was more liberally granted in Illinois. Plaintiff then sought class certification, which Walgreens opposed because Plaintiff failed to show a “distinct and palpable” injury. The circuit court granted the motion for class certification, and Walgreens sought appellate review pursuant to Rule 306(a)(8).
The appellate court denied Walgreens’ petition for leave to appeal, causing Walgreens to file a Rule 315 petition to the Supreme Court, which was granted. After all of the briefs were filed, the Supreme Court entered its own order, finding that the petition for leave to appeal was improvidently granted and noting that the parties argued the merits of the circuit court’s decision and not the appellate court’s denial of the Rule 306 petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court then vacated its prior order permitting the appeal but exercised its supervisory authority and directed the appellate court to allow the petition, permitting the parties to stand on the briefs they had submitted.
The appellate court rejected Walgreens’ arguments as to the plaintiff’s standing, finding that the FRCA provided a private cause of action for statutory damages and actual damages did not need to be pleaded or proved, and affirmed the circuit court. Walgreens filed a Rule 315 petition for leave to appeal.
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate and circuit courts, finding that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a FACTA violation claim and that her first amended complaint should be dismissed. The Court emphasized and reiterated, however, that Illinois standing law still applies, even in the context of a federal statute. The Court also discussed the distinction between common-law standing and statutory standing, noting: “With common-law standing, this court has often stated that the claimed injury, whether actual or threatened, must be: (1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief. With statutory standing, the legislature created the right of action and determined who shall sue, and the conditions under which the suit may be brought.” Id. ¶ 39 (quotations and citations omitted).
The Court further noted: “Unlike section 20 of the Privacy Act and section 8-1 of the Probate Act, the plain and unambiguous language of sections 1681n(a) and 1681p does not state the consumer or an aggrieved person may file the cause of action. Both sections are silent as to who may bring the cause of action for damages. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, Congress did not expressly empower her to sue to enforce her FACTA rights. As such, plaintiff’s FACTA claim does not implicate statutory standing principles, and thus common-law standing applies to plaintiff’s suit.” Id. ¶ 44.
In applying the facts alleged to Illinois common-law standing principles and citing to Petta v. Christie Business Holdings Co., P.C., 2025 IL 130337, the Court held that plaintiff failed to show a concrete injury; rather, plaintiff had merely shown “an increased risk of identity theft.” The Court noted that plaintiff had not been a victim of identity theft and was not aware of any harm to her credit or identity. Further, plaintiff could not identify anyone other than herself and the cashier who may have seen her receipts, and Walgreens presented an expert who explained that the first 6 digits of the prepaid card was a bank identification number only and did not represent any personal identifiers relating to the plaintiff. The Court held that plaintiff’s injury was therefore a “speculative future injury” insufficient to convey standing.
Justice Holder White authored the opinion. Justice Theis took no part in the consideration or decision.
People v. Grayson, 2025 IL 131279
By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court
Per curiam opinion
Sean Grayson, a Sangamon County sheriff’s deputy, was indicted on three counts of first degree murder, one count of aggravated battery with a firearm, and one count of official misconduct for causing the death of Sonya Massey. Grayson was initially detained prior to trial. He appealed his detention, and the Fourth District reversed the circuit court’s judgment. The State appealed the Fourth District’s determination. While the appeal was pending, Grayson’s case proceeded to trial, and he was convicted of second degree murder. Therefore, the question of whether Grayson should be detained prior to trial is now moot, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal based on the mootness doctrine.
People v. Butler, 2025 IL 130988
By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court
Opinion written by Justice Overstreet, joined by Justices Neville, Theis, Holder White, Cunningham, and O’Brien
Justice Rochford took no part in the decision.
This case presented the question of whether limited testimony by a minor in a sexual abuse case was sufficient to satisfy the confrontation clause and permit the State to introduce a video recorded interview of the minor. The minor testified at trial, and although she denied remembering her prior statements, she was subjected to unrestricted cross-examination and the jury was given the opportunity to observe her demeanor. The court found that the confrontation clause’s requirements were satisfied and affirmed the defendant’s convictions.
The defendant, Sidney Butler, was tried and convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated criminal sexual abuse for abusing his younger sister, K.P., when she was between the ages of 4 and 8. Prior to the defendant’s trial, the State moved to admit a video recorded interview of K.P. when she was 9 years old pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/115-10(b)(1). Section 115-10 permits the State to introduce out-of-court statements in prosecutions for certain offenses if (1) the court finds sufficient safeguards of reliability and (2) the victim either testifies at trial or is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the statement’s veracity. In the recording, K.P. recounted several incidents of sexual abuse, providing specific and unique details of several incidents involving multiple abusers, including the defendant. The court found K.P.’s statement to be sufficiently reliable and ruled that it would be admissible at trial if K.P. testified.
At trial, K.P. was called as a witness by the State. However, when K.P. was called to the stand, she stopped responding to questions after providing her name, her age, her grade in school, and her mother’s name. She was recalled to the stand later that day, and she testified that she did not remember an incident when the defendant did something to her. She identified herself in a still image from the video recorded interview and testified that she remembered bringing up the defendant’s name during the interview. However, when asked whether she remembered specific statements from the interview, she responded that she did not remember. During cross examination, defense counsel focused on the fact that K.P. was brutally beaten by her mother’s boyfriend just prior to the interview. She still bore the resulting injuries during the interview. Defense counsel did not ask K.P. any questions about the allegations contained in the video recorded interview.
After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the defendant appealed, arguing the circuit court should not have admitted the video recorded interview because K.P.’s testimony did not satisfy the requirements of section 115-10. The defendant contended that K.P. did not make any accusations during her trial testimony, and the defendant was therefore deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine her about her accusations, which violated his right to confrontation under the U.S. Constitution and the Illinois Constitution. The appellate court (First District) affirmed the defendant’s convictions.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision and reasoning, distinguishing or overruling several related cases. The defendant cited In re Brandon P., 2014 IL 116653 and In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13 (2008). In Brandon P., a minor was called to testify and “completely froze” on the stand, causing the State and the court to agree that the minor was unavailable to testify. In Rolandis G., the victim answered a few preliminary questions about himself but “resolutely refused to respond” to questions about the events at issue. By contrast, K.P. was initially reluctant to testify, but she ultimately answered questions during both direct and cross examination.
The defendant also cited People v. Learn, 396 Ill. App. 3d 891 (2009). In Learn, the minor victim of aggravated criminal sexual abuse became too emotionally distraught to continue after testifying to preliminary matters. The appellate court held that she did not testify within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court found that Learn was factually distinguishable, since Learn was factually similar to Brandon P. and Rolandis G., and K.P. answered questions posed to her. However, it also overruled Learn to the extent it misconstrued the confrontation clause requirements contained in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Crawford states that the confrontation clause “does not bar the admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.” Id. at 59 n.9. Based on its interpretation of Crawford, the court in Learn stated that for a witness to comply with the statutory requirements of section 115-10 the witness must “testify and accuse” the defendant at trial. Learn has since received negative treatment in Illinois courts, and the Supreme Court specifically overruled its requirement for witnesses to accuse the defendant while testifying.
Additionally, the defendant cited People v. Kitch, 239 Ill. 2d 452 (2011). In Kitch, the Supreme Court affirmed a defendant’s conviction where the victim testified to each element of the crime, which the Court found provided enough detail to allow for cross-examination within the meaning of the confrontation clause. Here, the Court clarified that the reverse conclusion does not follow: a defendant’s right to confrontation is not denied when a witness’s testimony is not detailed enough, not sufficiently accusatory, or evasive. A witness’s inability to recall details or past statements affects the witness’s credibility, not the admissibility of the witness’s prior statements.
The Court found that its decision in this case was further supported by previous U.S. Supreme Court precedent, including Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (holding that the confrontation clause does not guarantee that witnesses called by the prosecution will provide testimony that is unmarred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion) and United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (affirming Fensterer’s conclusion that the confrontation clause guarantees only the opportunity for cross examination and is satisfied when a witness is placed on the stand, under oath, and willingly responds to questions). Moreover, the Court found its result consistent with its own decision in People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66 (1989) (the circuit court properly admitted a witness’s prior inconsistent grand jury testimony, even when the witness could not recall it, where the witness took the stand, was placed under oath, and responded willingly to questions about the prior testimony) and other appellate court cases reviewing the issue.
K.P. appeared at trial, took the stand, testified under oath, and responded to the questions posed to her on direct and cross-examination. She identified the defendant and recalled making statements during the recorded video interview. She was subject to unrestricted cross-examination, and although she testified she did not remember her prior statements or the sex offenses at issue, the defendant’s right to cross-examination or confrontation was not violated by her forgetfulness, confusion or evasion. Therefore, the court properly admitted the video recorded interview pursuant to section 115-10.
People v. Williams, 2025 IL 130779
By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court
Opinion written by Justice Cunningham, joined by Justices Neville, Theis, Overstreet, Holder White, Rochford, and O’Brien.
The defendant appealed his conviction for threatening a public official. At trial, the jury was provided two jury instructions defining the offense, one which stated that a law enforcement officer must receive a “unique threat” and one which did not. The defendant contended the two instructions were in conflict and were misleading to the jury. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed his conviction, and the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court.
The defendant, Isaiah Williams, was charged with threatening a public official after making repeated threats to a Kendall County sheriff’s deputy during his arrest and transportation to the Kendall County jail. At the close of trial, the court tendered to the jury Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal (IPI Criminal) Nos. 11.49 and 11.50.
IPI Criminal No. 11.49 states that “A person commits the offense of threatening a public official when he knowingly delivers or conveys, directly or indirectly, to a public official by any means a communication containing a threat that would place the public official in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm; and the threat was conveyed because of the performance or nonperformance of some public duty.”
IPI Criminal No. 11.50 contains the propositions the State must prove to sustain a charge of threatening a public official. The fifth proposition indicates that the State must prove “the threat to a sworn law enforcement officer contained specific facts indicative of a unique threat to the sworn law enforcement officer and not a generalized threat of harm.”
The defendant did not object to either instruction or propose any alternative or supplemental instructions. The defendant was convicted of threatening a public official, and he appealed. On appeal, the defendant argued that IPI Criminal No. 11.49 does not mention the “unique threat” requirement the State must prove to sustain a conviction. He acknowledged he had failed to object to the instructions, but he requested review under the plain error doctrine. Alternatively, the defendant asked the court to find that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions. The appellate court (Second District) rejected the defendant’s arguments and affirmed the defendant’s conviction. The appellate court declined to follow People v. Warrington, 2014 IL App (3d) 110772, wherein a defendant had successfully advanced a similar argument. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that IPI Criminal Nos. 11.49 and 11.50 were inconsistent and, alternatively, his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions.
The Supreme Court observed that jury instructions are not read in isolation. Jurors are explicitly instructed not to single out or disregard any instructions. Thus, there was no danger the jury would read IPI Criminal No. 11.49 and ignore the language contained in IPI Criminal No. 11.50. Together, they accurately convey the requirements for proving the offense of threatening a public official. The Court distinguished two prior Supreme Court cases (People v. Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d 61 (1977) and People v. Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729) wherein the jury was given instructions that expressly contradicted one another on the basis that IPI Criminal Nos. 11.49 and 11.50 do not contradict each other. Instead, IPI Criminal No. 11.49 provides a general definition of the offense, and IPI Criminal No. 11.50 provides the specific propositions the State must establish to prove the offense.
As the appellate court did below, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s reliance on Warrington, expressly overruling Warrington’s finding that IPI Criminal Nos. 11.49 and 11.50 are inconsistent. The Court therefore affirmed the appellate court’s ruling, finding the trial court did not err when it tendered jury instructions, and the defendant’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the instructions.
People v. Hietschold, 2025 IL 130716
By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court
Opinion written by Justice Rochford, joined by Justices Neville, Theis, Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham, and O’Brien.
When a defendant is tried in his absence, it is sufficient for the trial court to substantially comply with the statutory admonishment requirement. Here, the court admonished the defendant that his failure to return for trial might result in a waiver of his right to be present, and that he may be tried, found guilty, and sentenced but failed to advise the defendant that he would waive the right to confront witnesses called against him. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the trial court substantially complied with the statutory admonishment requirements.
David Hietschold, the defendant, was charged with aggravated battery in a public place of accommodation. Prior to trial, the court admonished the defendant as follows: “If you fail to come to court, that would constitute a waiver of your right to be present, and the trial could continue without you. You could be found guilty, you could be sentenced if you don’t come back to court.” The defendant acknowledged these admonishments but nonetheless failed to appear on his trial date, and his attorney attempted to secure a continuance, arguing the defendant was never arraigned. However, the State noted that under section 115-4.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the trial could proceed without an arraignment. Shortly thereafter, the defendant was tried, convicted and sentenced in absentia. The defendant appealed, and the appellate court (Second District) found that the circuit court failed to comply with the statutory admonishment requirements prior to proceeding with a trial in absentia because the court failed to advise the defendant he was waiving his right to confront witnesses called against him. The State appealed.
Defendants have a constitutional right to be present at all stages of the trial process. However, a defendant’s voluntary absence may waive that right. Section 113-4(e) of the Code provides defendants with a statutory right to be informed of the possible consequences of their failure to appear in court when required. Section 113-4(e) states that “[i]f a defendant pleads not guilty, the court shall advise him at that time or at any later court date on which he is present that if he *** fails to appear in court when required by the court that his failure to appear would constitute a waiver of his right to confront the witnesses against him and trial could proceed in his absence.” The statute’s purpose is to prevent “bail jumping” and to promote the speedy execution of justice.
The Supreme Court analyzed section 113-4(e), concluding that the word “shall” mandates that the trial court must admonish a defendant under the statute. However, the right to admonishment is not a constitutional right, and the trial court need only substantially comply with the statute’s requirements to be sufficient. Substantial compliance means that the court must communicate the statute’s “essence” rather than its precise language.
The lack of an arraignment in this case had no bearing on the outcome because there was no evidence it adversely affected the defendant’s rights. The lack of a formal plea was apparently an oversight by the parties, and everyone proceeded as if the defendant had pled not guilty.
The Court ultimately concluded that the trial court substantially complied with section 113-4(e) despite not advising the defendant that his failure to appear would waive his right to confront witnesses. The Court cited numerous appellate court cases finding substantial compliance with section 113-4(e) under similar circumstances. The essence of the admonishment is that a defendant has a right to be present at trial, and the trial may proceed in his absence.
The Court found guidance in cases discussing substantial compliance under Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(4), which governs the admonishments the court must give prior to accepting a guilty plea. In previous cases, the Court has found substantial compliance with Rule 402’s admonishment requirements despite the trial court’s failure to advise the defendant of each of the rights the defendant waives when pleading guilty. Instead, it is enough for the trial court to substantially comply with the Rule by conveying its essence. Rule 402 is, in the Court’s view, equally or more important than the section 113-4(e) admonishment because the admonishments contained in Rule 402 are designed to satisfy constitutional due process requirements.
The Court rejected the defendant’s position that the statute contained two “components” or “elements.” Instead, the essence of the statute is that the defendant’s failure to appear at trial will not prevent the trial from proceeding in his absence. The loss of the right to confront witnesses is a corollary to that fact. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s reversal and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.