Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Wednesday, January 28, 2026
Leading appellate attorney reviews the two Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Wednesday, January 28.
People v. Heintz, 2026 IL 131340
By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court
Majority written by Justice Theis, joined by Justices Overstreet, Holder White, and Rochford
Special concurrence by Justice O’Brien, joined by Justices Neville and Cunningham
Summary
When a defendant in a domestic battery case attempts to introduce evidence of the victim’s violent character under Rule 405(b)(2), that evidence is limited to conduct occurring prior to the charged incident. Additionally, when the State introduces evidence of a prior incident of domestic violence, it is error to prevent the defendant from introducing evidence that he was acquitted in that incident without conducting a balancing test. The error in this case was deemed harmless, and the case was remanded to the appellate court to consider unresolved claims.
William Heintz was charged with attempted first degree murder, aggravated domestic battery, unlawful restraint, and domestic battery following an incident that occurred on August 6, 2020. Prior to trial, both the State and the defense sought to introduce evidence of other acts of violent conduct. The State moved (pursuant to section 115-7.4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) to introduce testimony detailing four separate incidents of domestic violence that occurred prior to the charged offenses. In the fourth incident, the defendant was charged with domestic battery and was later acquitted. The court granted the State’s motion.
The defendant sought to introduce home surveillance videos showing two incidents demonstrating the victim’s violent behavior. Both videos were taken after the charged offenses, one set of videos was taken on November 5, 2020, and the other set was taken on February 9, 2021. The court barred the defendant from admitting the videos because they postdated the charged offenses.
The victim testified that on August 6, 2020, the defendant was at her residence when she returned home from work. He demanded to see her cell phone and then attacked her when she refused to provide it. She fled to the bathroom, and the defendant followed, kicked the door down, and threw her into the bathtub. He then stepped on her neck and chest and ran water over her face. The victim testified she could not breathe and blacked out. When she awoke, the defendant beat her and punched her face, held her head under running water and demanded her password. He then pulled out a knife and threatened to kill her. He cut her thumb with the knife and held her in the bathroom for hours until eventually he let her out and she went to sleep. The next morning, she sent a message to a coworker to send the police, and when the police arrived the defendant fled out the garage door.
The defendant testified that the victim invited him to her home on August 5, and when he arrived, she was sleeping. He woke her and asked her to see her phone, then grabbed it out of her hands. She then threw a beer in his face and fled to the bathroom with his phone. He chased her, forcing the door open, and she began to punch him and tried to knee him in the groin. He attempted to restrain her, and she fell into the tub. He then pinned her in the tub with his boot. When he let her up, she began punching him again, and the two fell back into the tub. He then put his boot on her chest again to restrain her until she settled down. He denied slapping, kneeing, or kicking the victim, and he denied stepping on her neck.
Both the defendant and the victim testified about the four prior incidents of domestic violence. The incidents occurred between February 2019 and July 2020. The victim stated that on July 3, 2020, she and the defendant were arguing, and the defendant pushed her down a hallway and the two of them fell down the stairs into a gun cabinet. He then pushed her outside and slammed her face into the ground. In describing the incident, she referenced the fact that he had been charged and that there was a trial in Iroquois County. The defendant testified that on July 3, 2020, he tried to remove the victim from his home and while he was trying to remove her the two tripped and he fell on top of her. The defendant sought leave to introduce evidence of his acquittal of the charges that resulted from that incident, but the court denied the defendant’s request.
The defendant was acquitted of attempted first degree murder but convicted of aggravated domestic battery, unlawful restraint, and domestic battery. The defendant appealed those convictions, and the appellate court (Third District) determined that it was error for the court to bar the defendant from introducing evidence of the victim’s prior violent conduct, regardless of whether that conduct occurred prior to or after the charged incident. It held that the error was not harmless because the evidence was not overwhelming and the case hinged on a credibility determination. It also found that the court abused its discretion when it refused to admit evidence of the defendant’s acquittal. It remanded the case for a new trial and declined to address additional claims raised by the defendant.
The Supreme Court found that it was required to interpret Rule 405 to determine whether the timing of a victim’s alleged violent conduct affects its admissibility. Rule 405(b)(2) provides that when a defendant in a homicide or battery case raises self-defense and there is conflicting evidence about which party was the aggressor, “proof may also be made of specific instances of the alleged victim’s prior violent conduct.” The Court found that the word “prior” cannot mean “prior to trial” because all evidence is limited to evidence that exists prior to trial. Such a reading would render the word “prior” superfluous.
Additionally, it is possible that a victim’s conduct following a violent attack may be a result of the trauma of the attack itself and not a preexisting disposition toward violence. In so holding, the Court overruled a First District case, People v. Degrave, which the appellate court in this case cited and relied on.
The Court then turned to whether the trial court abused its discretion by barring the defendant from introducing evidence of his acquittal of the charges stemming from the altercation on July 3, 2020. It found a previous case, People v. Ward, particularly instructive. Ward detailed the balancing tests courts must use when deciding whether to permit the introduction of other-crimes evidence, and it found that a court’s failure to permit the introduction of acquittal evidence was error when the State admitted evidence that the defendant had committed other sexual offenses. Here, references were made during the trial to the fact that the prior incident proceeded to a trial in Iroquois County. Evidence of the defendant’s acquittal would have provided important context to that information, and its absence risked unfair prejudice to the defendant.
Nonetheless, the Court found that the evidentiary error was harmless because the evidence in the record overwhelmingly supported the conviction. The evidence of the July 3 altercation was cumulative of other evidence and played a minimal role in the overall evidence presented and considered by the jury. The Court therefore remanded the case to the appellate court to consider the defendant’s remaining claims.
Justice O’Brien, special concurrence, joined by Justices Neville and Cunningham
Justice O’Brien concurred in the finding that the circuit court erred when it barred evidence of the defendant’s acquittal. She disagreed, however, with the Court’s analysis of Rule 405(b)(2) regarding evidence of the victim’s violent character. She would have adopted the appellate court’s reading of the Rule and found that the phrase “prior violent conduct” means “prior to trial.” The right to present evidence of a victim’s violent conduct is rooted in the defendant’s right to present a defense. By limiting evidence to conduct that occurred prior to the charged offense, the majority reads additional language into the statute and departs from its plain meaning. It ignores the existing statutory framework and narrows the trial court’s discretion to admit relevant evidence. The dissent would, however, agree that any error in this case was harmless error.
People v. Brown, 2026 IL 130930
By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court
Majority written by Justice Neville, joined by Justices Theis, Holder White, Cunningham, and Rochford
Special concurrence by Justice Overstreet, joined by Justice O’Brien
Summary
The 2021 amendment to the Code of Corrections establishing that a life sentence is only mandatory if a defendant’s first Class X felony occurred when he was 21 years old or older does not apply retroactively. The defendant here was 17 years old at the time of his first offense. The 2021 amendment did not change the law as it existed at the time of his sentencing.
Corwyn Brown was sentenced to mandatory natural life imprisonment after he committed his third Class X felony in 1995. 720 ILCS 5/33B-1(a) provides that anyone convicted of a Class X felony after having been twice convicted of a Class X felony shall be deemed “an habitual criminal” and section 33B-1(e) provides that “anyone adjudged an habitual criminal shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.” In 2021, the legislature amended the Code of Corrections (section 5-4.5-95(a)) to state that a natural life sentence is only mandatory if the first Class X felony occurred when the defendant was over 21 years of age. The defendant was 17 years old at the time of his first offense, and he brought a petition seeking leave to file a successive postconviction petition based on the new statute.
The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion, and the defendant appealed. The appellate court (First District) reversed, holding that the 2021 amendment was a “clarification and restoration of the original law” as it existed in 1995. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court observed that the appellate court was split in its interpretation of the statute. The First District had found that the amendment was retroactive because it clarified the text of the original statute. The Fourth District and the Fifth District found that the amendment did not apply retroactively and did not clarify the original law. The Court agreed with the latter perspective.
The Court first noted that the defendant’s claim was cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. However, the Court found that the amendment was neither retroactive nor a clarification of the law as it existed in 1995. Analyzing whether the law applied retroactively, the Court found that the amendment contained a clear temporal reach because it contained a date on which it became effective (July 1, 2021). Additionally, the Statute on Statutes provides that defendants are not entitled to resentencing under an amendment that provides for a mitigated punishment.
The defendant, citing the Court’s 2022 decision in People v. Stewart, argued that the 2021 amendment was a clarification of the then-existing sentencing laws. In Stewart, the court dealt with an amendment to section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Code of Corrections. Section 5-4.5-95(b) provides that when a defendant, having been convicted of the same Class 1 or Class 2 felony twice previously, is again convicted of the same offense, the defendant is sentenced as a Class X offender. In 2016, the legislature amended section 5-130 of the Juvenile Court Act to grant juvenile courts exclusive jurisdiction over minors who are charged with armed robbery or vehicular hijacking. Thus, a situation arose in which some defendants were sentenced as Class X offenders based on crimes that were considered Class 1 or Class 2 felonies prior to 2016 but became subject to juvenile adjudication after 2016. Appellate courts split on the issue of whether to apply Class X sentencing to those defendants whose crimes were committed prior to 2016 but which, under the new law, would be referred to juvenile court.
In 2021, the legislature amended section 5-4.5-95(b) to resolve the conflict, clarifying that the first qualifying offense for Class X sentencing must have been committed when the person was 21 years of age or older. The Court held that the amendment clarified the meaning of the prior statute because (1) there was a split in the appellate court, and (2) the previous version of the statute was silent as to how to resolve the issue.
Here, by contrast, there was no division in the appellate court, and the statute itself was not silent on the issue. The amendment in this case did not “clarify” the statute. Instead, it altered its substantive meaning. The two versions are incompatible and require different actions on the part of the sentencing judge. Moreover, the 1995 version of the law ceased to exist when it was amended in 2016. Even had a clarification been intended, the 2021 amendment could only have clarified the 2016 version of the law, which had replaced the 1995 version.
Because the 2021 amendment was neither retroactive nor a clarification of the habitual criminal statute under which the defendant was originally sentenced, the circuit court was correct to deny his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
Justice Overstreet, special concurrence, joined by Justice O’Brien
Justice Overstreet concurred in the judgment and the reasoning put forth by the majority. However, he would have found that the defendant’s claim was not cognizable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. A successive petition under the act requires the defendant to establish that the issue brought before the court has not been waived. To determine whether waiver applies, the court applies a “cause and prejudice” test to determine whether fundamental fairness requires the court to overlook the defendant’s waiver of the issue. Because the 2021 amendment does not affect the defendant’s sentence, he cannot establish the prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice test. Therefore, Justice Overstreet would have held that the circuit court properly dismissed the motion for failure to excuse waiver. He would have exercised “judicial restraint” and declined to reach the constitutional question of whether a sentence that exceeds the legally permitted limit amounts to a due process violation.