Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Thursday, March 19, 2026
Leading appellate attorneys review the four Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Thursday, March 19.
Johnson v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, 2026 IL 132016
By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan
Two former employees of Amazon.com Services, LLC, who were hourly employees working in Amazon’s warehouse handling packages, filed this class-action complaint alleging that in March, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, all hourly, nonexempt employees were required to undergo medical screenings prior to clocking in for their shift. The screenings consisted of temperature checks and symptom screening questions. Plaintiffs allege that these uncompensated preshift procedures took 10 to 15 minutes on average, sometimes longer. The complaint was filed in Cook County but was removed to the Northern District of Illinois by Amazon pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act.
Plaintiffs alleged that Amazon violated federal and Illinois wage laws by failing to pay them and other warehouse employees for the time spent in those screenings. The district court granted Amazon’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit only with respect to the dismissal of their claim based on Illinois law. Upon that court’s certification of a question to the Illinois Supreme Court under Rule 20 “for instruction” (Rule 20(a)), the Supreme Court here answers that question in the negative: “Does the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/4a, incorporate the exclusion from compensation for employee activities that are preliminary or postliminary to their principal activities, as provided under the Federal Portal-to-Portal Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 254(a)(2))?”
In certifying the question, the Seventh Circuit noted that there was no Illinois authority on point, although several federal decisions took up the issue. 142 F.4th 932. The Supreme Court’s opinion sets out in full detail the relevant statutes as well as regulations promulgated by the Illinois Department of Labor. Those provisions will only be summarized here. That Court also noted that the Seventh Circuit laid out a “detailed analysis” of the history of the pertinent statutes.
The Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/4a(1), provides that employees may not be employed for more than 40 hours per week unless time and a half is paid for the excess hours. Although 10 exceptions are set out, none apply to preliminary or postliminary activities. The Wage Law mandated the Director of Labor to make administrative regulations, one of which defines “Hours worked” as “all the time an employee is required to be on duty, or on the employer’s premises, or at other prescribed places of work, and any additional time the employee is required or permitted to work for the employer.” The federal Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (PPA) (29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2)) excludes from the operation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) (29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)) any requirement for payment for activities that are preliminary or postliminary to the employee’s principal activities.
The Supreme Court grounded its decision on the plain language of the Wage Law which did not contain a similar exclusion as that found in the federal scheme. “Here, ... while section 4a of the Wage Law contains the same general overtime provision of the FLSA, it does not include the preliminary and postliminary activity exclusion that is set forth in the FLSA by the PPA.” The Court would not read in an exception.
An amicus brief in support of plaintiffs was filed by the Illinois Attorney General and the Illinois Department of Labor. A joint amicus brief in support of Amazon was filed by numerous business organizations, both state and national.
The opinion of the Seventh Circuit contains a useful compendium of the law pertaining to when certification under Rule 20 is warranted.
People v. Johnson, 2026 IL 131337
By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court
Majority written by Justice Rochford, joined by Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham, and O’Brien
Justice Tailor took no part in the decision
Summary
This case reverses the appellate court’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction for first degree murder. The appellate court’s majority substituted the test for determining the admissibility of identification evidence for the well-established standard used to review the sufficiency of the evidence. Upon reviewing the evidence, the Supreme Court concluded it was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case to consider the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The defendant, Antrell Johnson, was accused of first degree murder following the shooting death of Taurean Tyler. The sole issue at trial was the identity of the shooter.
Tyler and DeAngelo Mixon were walking toward their friend’s home to smoke marijuana. Their friend, Tristan Thomas, saw them approach, and he observed an African American person wearing a dark baseball cap, a dark jacket, and white pants run up behind Tyler and Mixon, draw a gun, and open fire. Tyler was killed, and Mixon was also shot once but survived. Janeese Washington and her husband, Robert Laster, also witnessed the shooting. They were in a car parked up the street waiting for a nearby church to open.
Washington identified the defendant as the shooter from a lineup she was shown. Laster initially did not identify anyone from a photo array, then a few days later identified someone other than the defendant as the shooter. Thomas and Mixon both identified the defendant as the shooter shortly after the shooting. They also told detectives they had known the defendant for several years, and they provided video taped statements.
At trial, the State relied on the testimony of the four eyewitnesses. While testifying, Thomas admitted he had initially identified the defendant but contradicted his earlier statements by claiming he did not have a clear view of the shooter and insisting he could only be certain the shooter was an African American with light skin wearing a black jacket. Mixon also claimed not to have seen who shot him. He testified that he “blinked out” after being shot, and he was unable to remember various details, including his identification of the defendant. Washington identified the defendant in court.
The defendant called two alibi witnesses. His ex-girlfriend testified that she and the defendant met at his grandmother’s house then went to her house later. She did not recall their whereabouts at the time of the shooting. His mother testified that the defendant was at his grandmother’s house earlier in the day, but he left with his daughter sometime around noon or 1 p.m. She did not know where he was at the time of the shooting.
The jury found the defendant guilty of Tyler’s murder and not guilty of attempted first degree murder for shooting Mixon. The defendant was sentenced to 55 years in the department of corrections, and he appealed his conviction.
On appeal, he claimed that (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict him and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective. A divided panel of the appellate court reversed the defendant’s conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence and did not reach the defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim. The majority found that the State had failed to satisfy its evidentiary burden under Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). It also cited social science literature on eyewitness identifications, which had not been discussed at trial nor raised by the parties in their briefs. It rejected Thomas and Mixon’s out-of-court identifications of the defendant as the shooter. It also rejected Washington’s identification of the defendant, holding that her description of the defendant was general and lacked sufficiently distinct or unique identifiers to prove his guilt.
The Supreme Court noted that Neil v. Biggers concerns the admissibility of identification evidence at trial and not the sufficiency of evidence. The appellate court conflated the two and made “other errors along the way.” The proper standard for reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Biggers described situations in which due process concerns might arise from the admission of identification evidence. According to Biggers, due process concerns arise when law enforcement officers use an identification procedure that is both suggestive and unnecessary. Biggers provided five factors to consider when evaluating the likelihood of misidentification based on a suggestive procedure. However, the defendant never argued that any of the identifications should have been suppressed. The Biggers factors are relevant when the court, having determined that an identification was elicited by suggestive and unnecessary police procedures, carries a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Once identification evidence has been properly admitted, its weight and the decision whether to credit the identification is the province of the trier of fact.
The Biggers factors are relevant to both admissibility and sufficiency, though they are weighed differently in each context. When a defendant challenges an identification based on suggestive and unnecessary police procedure, he may argue that the Biggers factors create a risk of misidentification. However, when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard is whether, viewing the already-admitted evidence in the light most favorable to the State, no rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Based on that standard, the Supreme Court found that the State provided sufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt. Mixon, Thomas, and Washington each identified the defendant as the shooter. Although Thomas and Mixon later tried to recant their identification of the defendant, the jury apparently rejected their recantations. There were ample reasons to reject their recantations, as Mixon felt afraid for his safety and both men knew the defendant. Reviewing courts generally defer to a jury’s credibility assessments, and there is no reason to suspect the jury here failed to properly weigh the evidence. Moreover, Washington identified the defendant repeatedly and consistently, including identifying the defendant at trial.
The Supreme Court additionally pointed out that the majority relied sua sponte on social science eyewitness identification research studies to support its decision. It cited the “weapon focus effect,” which it derived from an article that was neither presented at trial nor cited by the parties on appeal. It also cited another article for the proposition that a witness’s familiarity with the accused can contribute to wrongful convictions. When reviewing the sufficiency of the State’s evidence, reviewing courts must only review evidence actually admitted at trial and not new evidentiary material not considered by the trier of fact. The appellate court acted outside its role when it relied on materials outside the record to judge the credibility of witnesses. This error also deprived the State of the opportunity to address the research.
Finally, the majority improperly relied on the fact that the jury acquitted the defendant of the attempted murder of Mixon, finding that it signaled “potential doubts about the reliability of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.” Yet a jury’s acquittal on one count may not be considered when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence on another count. The sufficiency of the evidence is unrelated to how “rationally” the verdict was reached. Unless the verdicts are legally inconsistent (and the defendant did not claim that they were), reviewing courts must not rely on acquittal of a different crime as grounds for reversal.
People v. Shepherd, 2026 IL 131240
By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court
Majority written by Justice O’Brien, joined by Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham and Rochford
Justice Tailor took no part in the decision
Summary
A defendant may be convicted of solicitation of murder for hire even if the person the defendant solicits has no genuine intent to commit first degree murder. The crime is based on the defendant’s state of mind in commanding, encouraging, or requesting another person to commit murder with the specific means of paying or promising to pay that person.
The defendant, Christian Shepherd, was convicted of two counts of solicitation of murder for hire. The defendant was arrested in 2010 and placed in jail following allegations of sexual abuse. While there, he first approached Franklin Bryant and offered him money to murder his accuser, her mother, and two detectives involved in the case. Bryant feigned agreement and reported the offer to one of the two detectives, which led to the defendant being charged in a separate case.
The defendant then approached Daniel Robinson, whom the defendant offered money for the murder of his accuser, her mother, and the two detectives. The defendant also offered Robinson compensation to murder Bryant. Robinson testified at trial that he never intended to facilitate anyone’s murder and instead agreed to wear a recording device to record his conversations with the defendant. The defendant was recorded discussing the logistics of the murders, and he signed two documents authorizing payment to Robinson in the amount of approximately $18,000. He also signed over ownership of his vehicle to Robinson.
On appeal, the defendant argued that because Robinson only pretended to agree to the defendant’s plans, he did not “procure” Robinson as required by the statute since “procurement” requires a bilateral agreement. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed his conviction.
The defendant raised the same argument before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that the issue was one of statutory interpretation. To be convicted of solicitation of murder for hire, the statute requires that a defendant “procure” another person to commit the offense of first degree murder. The defendant argued that the word “procure” should be interpreted in the same way agreements are treated for the crime of conspiracy, which requires a bilateral agreement. However, the Court observed there were important distinctions between solicitation and conspiracy. Although solicitation often leads to a conspiracy, the two are not equivalent. Conspiracy offenses require an actual co-conspirator. Thus, agreements between defendants and government agents cannot support convictions for conspiracy. Solicitation, by contrast, is complete when the defendant attempts to secure a murder for hire.
Turning to the definition of “procure,” the Court found that the word “procure” encompasses unilateral agreements. Moreover, the text of the statute focuses on the actions of the defendant and does not rely on the actions of any other person.
The Court rejected the defendant’s contention that the legislature used the term “procure” to distinguish “solicitation of murder for hire” from “solicitation of murder,” a lesser offense. The defendant argued that if the legislature had intended solicitation of murder for hire to apply to unilateral agreements, it would have used the word “solicit” instead of “procure.” However, the Court noted that the word “procure” suggests “special effort, care, or means” (in this case, compensation). Compensation is not required for solicitation of murder, which can be done by commanding, encouraging, or requesting another to commit murder. By contrast, “procuring” another requires offering compensation. The distinction between the two offenses is therefore not the nature of the agreement (unilateral or bilateral) but the methods used to secure the other person’s agreement to commit murder.
People v. McCoy, 2026 IL 131565
By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court
Majority written by Justice Holder White, joined by Justices Neville, Overstreet, Cunningham and O’Brien
Justices Rochford and Tailor took no part in the decision
Summary
The circuit court dismissed the petitioner’s postconviction petition following a third-stage evidentiary hearing. The circuit court found that a co-defendant was not credible and the remaining evidence presented by the defendant was unlikely to change the result of the trial. The defendant appealed, arguing the circuit court failed to view the evidence collectively and objectively. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, although it found that the circuit court had not reviewed the evidence in the case collectively. The Supreme Court also affirmed the dismissal of the postconviction petition, but it found that the circuit court had reviewed the evidence collectively, and it found the circuit court’s factual determinations were not manifestly erroneous.
The defendant, Michael McCoy, was convicted of first degree murder and armed robbery in 1989. He appealed his conviction unsuccessfully, then filed numerous petitions seeking postconviction relief. The petition at issue in this case was advanced to the third stage of postconviction proceedings, which involves an evidentiary hearing.
The defendant was convicted following a jury trial. At trial, the evidence established that Hussein Awwad was working as a cashier at a liquor store. He was working at the store at approximately 11 or 11:30 p.m. with three other men, Nazih Youssef, Mohammed Ghrayyib, and Achmaad Hassan. Two people Awwad knew entered the store, the petitioner and Wane Millighan. Awwad knew that Millighan had recently been fired from the store for not working and watching where the cash was kept. Millighan and the petitioner bought some liquor, drank inside the store, and began bothering the customers, “especially the women.”
At around 1 a.m., Awwad was in the stock room when he heard a “great” noise. He went toward the front of the store where he saw Millighan holding a silver firearm and announcing a stick-up. Millighan ordered Grahyyib to open the cash register and began emptying it. Awwad then heard a gunshot from the liquor section of the store, and Millighan said “come on, let’s go, we are done,” and fled. Awwad observed the shooter, who he identified as the petitioner, exiting the liquor section holding a dark, long-barreled revolver and a bag. The petitioner walked right in front of him, about four or five feet away. Awwad then went to the back of the store and found Youssef lying on the floor covered in blood.
Awwad identified the petitioner a few days later at a lineup as the person who left the store that night with a black revolver, and he identified Millighan in a separate lineup approximately three months later. Awwad went on to identify the petitioner in court as the shooter. Ghrayyib corroborated Awwad’s testimony. He identified the petitioner in a photo array and later identified him in court. He also identified Millighan in a lineup.
A detective testified that he spoke to Awwad and Ghrayyib after the shooting, and they described the shooter as a “male Black, 25 to 30 years of age, five feet six to five feet eight, dark complected, 160 to 190 pounds, a mustache. He was wearing a black sports cap, a black leather jacket, waist-length, waist jacket, blue jeans. They described the man as having a gold earring, and possibly in his left ear or on his left ear. And they thought it was an ear piercing earring, or pierced earring.” The petitioner was arrested two days after the shooting. At the time, he was 24 years old, 5 feet, 9 inches in height, weighed 170 pounds, and had a gold earring in his left ear.
The petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and armed robbery and sentenced to concurrent terms of natural life and 30 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal. The petitioner filed several postconviction petitions prior to the current one, which was filed in January of 2019. In it, he alleged (1) actual innocence, (2) a violation of the rule requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory material, (3) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and (4) cumulative error. The defendant’s petition was supported by an affidavit from Millighan stating that a man named Howard Reed was the shooter in the robbery and the petitioner was not involved in the crime.
The circuit court dismissed the petitioner’s petition at the second stage, finding he had not made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. The petitioner appealed the dismissal, and the appellate court reversed, finding that at the second stage the court was required to accept Millighan’s affidavit as true. On remand, the petition advanced to a third-stage evidentiary hearing.
At that hearing, the petitioner’s counsel conceded he was present at the liquor store at 11 p.m. but argued that he had left by the time of the robbery. He presented testimony from Millighan who identified Howard Reed as the shooter, and he presented testimony from an expert on eyewitness identification and memory, who testified that one of the eyewitnesses was unreliable. He also presented evidence from an expert about the testing of blood, clarifying that a procedure used to test for blood on the petitioner’s shoes was merely “presumptive” and carried a high risk of false positive.
Millighan admitted to having participated in the robbery with three other men: “Buck,” “Geno,” and Howard Reed. He stated that all three men were dead, and that Reed was the one who had shot Youssef. He claimed the petitioner was not present on the night of the shooting or involved in the robbery. He acknowledged lying at his own trial when he professed his own innocence, and admitted he never claimed the petitioner was innocent until after he had a conversation with him in 2010.
Dr. Franklin, an expert on eyewitness identification and memory, testified that the eyewitnesses’ identification of the petitioner was likely the result of post-event influences and “at high risk of being inaccurate.” Her opinion was based on the fact that the eyewitnesses only observed the shooter for a short period of time during a high-stress event, the shooter was wearing a hat, and the shooter was of a different race. She criticized the lineup procedure. She also noted she made a few errors in her report but insisted the errors did not change her conclusions.
Deanna Lankford, a forensic scientist, testified as an expert. She stated that she had not performed any tests in the petitioner’s case, but she had reviewed reports from tests conducted by others. She stated that an officer tested the petitioner’s shoes in 1986, and the substance found thereon should not have been referred to as “blood” but rather “possibly blood.” She testified that a subsequent test in 2013 indicated “there was no blood present or there was not enough blood present to detect.”
The circuit court denied the petitioner’s successive postconviction petition. It found that Millighan’s testimony lacked credibility, Dr. Franklin’s testimony was not based on actual observations of any of the witnesses or interviews, and none of the witness’s testimony was of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the petition, holding that the petitioner’s actual innocence claim relied on Millighan’s credibility, and the court determined that Millighan was not credible.
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued the courts below erred in denying his postconviction petition because it failed to consider the old and new evidence collectively, made subjective credibility assessments, and required the petitioner to do more than refute the State’s case to establish actual innocence. He initially argued that the case should be reviewed de novo, since the court had made “legal errors.” However, at oral argument, he conceded that the standard of review was properly “manifest error.”
The Supreme Court noted that, in evaluating a postconviction petition, the circuit court must determine whether the evidence supporting the postconviction petition places the trial evidence in a different light and undermines the court’s confidence in the judgment of guilt. To establish a claim of actual innocence, a petitioner must present evidence that is (1) newly discovered, (2) material and not cumulative, and (3) of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result on retrial. Reviewing the record, the Court found that the circuit court had considered “all the claims, arguments, filings, trial transcripts, the facts contained within the record, as well as the testimony [and] exhibits presented at the third-stage evidentiary hearing” before reaching the conclusion that the evidence would probably not change the results upon retrial. It made relevant factfinding and credibility determinations, finding in particular that Millighan’s testimony was contrary to his sworn trial testimony. It also found that Awwad and Ghrayyib, and Hassan’s testimony was positive, consistent, clear, and credible. It found that the experts’ testimony was not of such a character that it would have changed the outcome of the case given the overwhelming evidence of the petitioner’s guilt.
The Supreme Court found that the circuit court’s credibility determinations were not manifestly erroneous. It agreed that Millighan’s testimony was not credible, and it found that the petitioner’s actual innocence claim relied on the credibility of Millighan’s testimony. It further agreed with the circuit court that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the experts’ testimony was likely to change the result on retrial.