Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Thursday, June 25, 2026

Leading appellate attorneys review the two Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Thursday, June 25.  

Anderson v. Smith, 2026 IL 131714

By Amelia Buragas, Illinois State University

In Anderson v. Smith, 2026 IL 131714, the Illinois Supreme Court resolved a split between the appellate courts regarding the proper legal standard to be applied by circuit courts when considering a motion to dispose of a lawsuit under the Citizen Participation Act. The Supreme Court also clarified the nature of those proceedings and the materials to be considered by the trial courts. However, as is explained in more detail below, the outcome of this case is limited to lawsuits filed before January 1, 2026.

The underlying case began in 2017 when the plaintiff and the defendant attended a press conference that preceded a public hearing on a measure to approve a large-scale hog farming operation. Plaintiff supported the measure and defendant opposed it. During an on-camera interview with another proponent of the measure, defendant stood behind the speaker holding a sign that said “farms, yes; factory farms, no.” The parties to the lawsuit then had an interaction, although the details of that interaction are disputed. Whatever occurred, defendant then asked a family member to call the police and told the responding officer that plaintiff pushed her. Plaintiff was arrested and charged with battery but was found not guilty after a bench trial. Shortly before the criminal trial, plaintiff filed a lawsuit against defendant for defamation in which he alleged that defendant falsely and publicly accused him of assault.

In the defamation case, defendant sought dismissal of the complaint under the Citizen Participation Act arguing that her acts were in furtherance of her right to participate in government and that plaintiff’s complaint was “clearly based on, related to, or in response to her opposition to the hog farming operation and her report of what she believed was a crime committed against her.” Defendant argued that plaintiff’s complaint was a meritless and retaliatory Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). Defendant filed both a 2-619 motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment under the Act, both of which were denied by the circuit court. However, the circuit court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(9). The appellate court then held that the trial court improperly applied the “meritless and retaliatory” standard as it was defined by Ryan v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 12005 and reversed and remanded. The appellate court also explained that if the plaintiff creates a genuine factual issue on the motion, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve the disputed factual issues. The supreme court then granted plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal.

The Illinois Supreme Court explained that the legislature enacted the Citizens Participation Act in 2007 to address a “disturbing increase” in the number of SLAPP lawsuits being used to deter individuals from exercising their political rights or to punish them for doing so. The Illinois Supreme Court previously discussed motions brought under the Act in Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443 and Glorioso v. Sun-Times Media Holdings, LLC, 2024 IL 130137, which developed a three-part test for motions brought under the Act. Under what has become known as the post-Sandholm test, the moving party has the burden of establishing that 1) the movant’s acts were in furtherance of their rights to petition, speak, associate, or otherwise participate in government to obtain a favorable government action; and 2) that plaintiff’s claims are solely based on, related to, or in response to the movant’s exercise of those rights. If the movant meets their burden under the first two prongs, then the burden shifts to plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence the third prong of the test: that the movant’s acts were not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action.

The parties both agreed that the first prong was satisfied in this case. For the second prong, however, the parties disagreed whether the second prong “required the defendants to show that the lawsuit was meritless, retaliatory, or both.” The Supreme Court noted that in Sandholm it had observed that “SLAPPs are, by definition, meritless.” The Court further observed that the First District had applied this principle to narrow the second-prong test to examine solely whether the suit was meritless and retaliatory. The Court went on to explain that the appellate courts had misinterpreted Sandholm as establishing a strict “meritless and retaliatory” test. The Court explained that when it used the terms “meritless” and “retaliatory” in Sandholm it used those terms “as adjectives to describe SLAPPs, rather than as elements that a movant must prove to establish that a lawsuit is a SLAPP.” The Court noted that this is consistent with the language of the Act, which does not contain any such requirements. The Supreme Court reiterated that the second prong of the post-Sandholm test simply requires that the defendant show the plaintiff’s claims are “solely based on, related to, or in response to the movant’s exercise of the rights to petition, speak, associate, or otherwise participate in government to obtain favorable government action.” The Court then explained that this requires a subjective inquiry into the plaintiff’s intent in bringing the lawsuit.

The Supreme Court also parted ways with the appellate court on whether the trial court should hold an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court observed that an evidentiary hearing would be contrary to the Act’s suspension of discovery and 90-day time frame for a trial court to rule on the motion. The Court explained that “if the legislature intended to allow an evidentiary hearing on the motion, it could have so specified,” noting that at least two other states have such language in their anti-SLAPP laws. The Supreme Court held instead that the trial court must determine plaintiff’s subjective intent in bringing the lawsuit from the pleadings and other supporting documents. The Court further explained that in determining the plaintiff’s subjective intent, the trial court can consider the timing of the complaint and whether the damages sought are disproportionate to the injury alleged. However, whether a complaint is meritless because it is frivolous or missing an essential element is not necessarily dispositive and that even a meritorious claim “may still be dismissed as a SLAPP,” if it is proven that it was brought solely to deter or punish the defendant.

The unanimous opinion was authored by Justice Rochford and is limited in its scope to cases filed prior to January 1, 2026. The Supreme Court noted that the legislature amended the Citizens Participation Act in 2025 and that those amendments were not applicable to this case because they had not yet gone into effect when the initial lawsuit was filed.

E.W. v. Board of Education of East St. Louis School District No. 189, 2026 IL 131757

By Amanda J. Hamilton, Akerman LLP

In a 4–3 decision filed June 25, 2026, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Fifth District Appellate Court and affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board of Education of East St. Louis School District No. 189. Justice O’Brien delivered the judgment of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Neville and Justices Holder White and Tailor. Justice Cunningham dissented, joined by Justices Overstreet and Rochford. The Court held that section 29-4 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/29-4) does not require a school district to modify its regular bus routes or create separate routes to transport nonpublic schoolchildren to and from their schools.

Plaintiffs E.W. and A.M. are elementary school students who reside in East St. Louis and attend Bowman Catholic Elementary School, a nonpublic school. Their parents sued the District for declaratory and injunctive relief after the District informed Bowman Catholic Elementary School in August 2022 that it would no longer provide bus service to its students, citing a shortage of bus drivers. The District had previously transported Bowman students on its regular routes. The children lived more than 1.5 miles from Bowman, along a highway that composed one of the District’s regular bus routes.

The circuit court partially granted a temporary restraining order, requiring transportation only to the extent it could be provided on existing regular routes, and later entered summary judgment for the District, holding that section 29-4 did not require modification of regular routes to transport nonpublic students to and from their school. The Fifth District reversed, concluding that the statute required the District to treat qualifying nonpublic schoolchildren the same as public schoolchildren and to modify routes as needed.

The Supreme Court disagreed and held “that transportation provided by a local school district to nonpublic schoolchildren living at least 1½ miles from their place of learning under section 29-4 is limited to transportation at points along the District’s regular bus routes.” Construing the statute’s text, the Court emphasized the repeated use of the phrase “regular route” and concluded that the legislature identified pickup and drop-off locations for qualifying nonpublic schoolchildren as points along the district’s regular route nearest or most easily accessible to the child’s home and school. The Court rejected the appellate court’s interpretation of the word “extend” as requiring the District to lengthen or expand its routes, reading “extend” in context to mean “make available.” The Court also rejected plaintiffs’ reliance on the statute’s “on the same basis” language, explaining that phrase applies to nonpublic schoolchildren residing within 1.5 miles of their school, not those living more than 1.5 miles away. While acknowledging that a district may modify routes or operate separate routes if safer, more economical, and more efficient, the Court held that section 29-4 does not require it to do so.\

In dissent, Justice Cunningham argued that the majority’s reading rendered section 29-4 ineffective because no parent would place an elementary schoolchild on a bus that did not transport the child to the school attended. The dissent relied on the statute’s “to and from the school attended” language, statutory history, and the Court’s prior decision in Bakalis to conclude that the statute requires transportation to or near the nonpublic school. The dissent also cautioned that the majority’s construction altered the balance recognized in Bakalis and could raise constitutional concerns by denying parochial school students transportation on the same basis as public school students.