Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Thursday, September 24, 2026

Leading appellate attorneys review the eight Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Thursday, September 24. 

Geller v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 2026 IL 132066

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan

This opinion deals with the arbitrability of claims asserted against Uber Technologies, Inc. arising out of the death of Mark Geller, a passenger in an automobile being operated by an Uber driver which was involved in a single vehicle accident on an expressway. While the procedural aspects of the case, and the Supreme Court’s resolution of the issues, can be efficiently summarized in short here, the lengthy opinion written for the unanimous court by Justice Overstreet will often be consulted for its detailed analyses of threshold issues in arbitration matters.

Mark’s wife Gloria Sheridan Geller is the independent administrator of the estate of her deceased husband. She filed this action asserting claims for wrongful death and under the Survival Act.  Uber filed a motion to dismiss or compel arbitration, grounded upon terms-of-use agreements containing arbitration provisions which had been separately executed by both Mark and Gloria. The circuit court granted that motion, compelling arbitration of Mark’s estate’s survival claims based on Mark’s agreement, but denied the motion to the extent that it sought to compel arbitration of the wrongful death claims in reliance on Gloria’s agreement. The estate moved to voluntarily dismiss the survival action, which was granted.

Uber appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration of the wrongful death claims. The appellate court reversed the circuit court, stating that although the wrongful death claims belong to Gloria individually, the arbitrator, and not a court, must decide whether the wrongful death claims fall within the scope of Gloria’s own arbitration agreement. The estate’s petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was allowed.

Gloria’s agreement was worded to involve claims arising from her own “access to or use of” Uber’s services in her individual capacity. The court noted that the wrongful death claims arise from injuries Mark sustained from his access to and use of Uber’s services. The court listed the several capacities in which Gloria was in the litigation: as an individual who had accepted terms governing her own transportation activities; as a beneficiary under the Wrongful Death Act; and as personal representative of the estate asserting wrongful death claims brought for the benefit of Mark’s next of kin. “A wrongful death action filed by a surviving spouse... is not an asset of the deceased’s estate that can be limited via the deceased’s arbitration agreement...”

The court decided that Gloria had not “clearly and unmistakably” agreed to delegate arbitrability of the estate’s wrongful death claims to an arbitrator and that the wrongful death claims did not fall within the scope of Gloria’s own agreement to arbitrate.

Much of the court’s analysis is taken up with the question of whether the parties had agreed to delegate the determination of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The court stated that the wrongful death claims arose from Mark’s death, which in turn resulted from his own use of Uber’s services, not Gloria’s. 

Because delegation of the determination of arbitrability is an exception to the general rule that arbitrability is a question for the courts, the party seeking delegation of that determination must demonstrate that intention of the parties by clear and unmistakable evidence.

This summary cannot do substantial justice to the many layers of inquiry involved in this opinion. In addition to the general law of contracts and arbitration, the court takes up in detail the Federal Arbitration Act, pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and state and federal intermediate reviewing court activity following SCOTUS guidance.

The wrongful death counts were remanded to the circuit court, to be resumed there, and the survival counts remain dismissed by the estate’s voluntary action.

Chicago Title Land Trust Company v. Watkin, 2026 IL 132383

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan

This compact opinion by Justice Tailor for the unanimous court, dealing with an unpaid note and a mortgage,  touches upon the survival of an obligation itself beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations; a response to a motion for summary judgment which asserted, inter alia, that a party had the right to appeal to the debtor to honor the debt out of a sense of moral obligation; and the equitable maxim that “he who seeks equity must do equity.”

Marline and Melvin Stein were the beneficial owners of what is described as a property in Wilmette, with Chicago Title as the trustee. The Steins executed a note in favor of Sara Watkin, promising to pay her “up to the sum of $150,000,” with a provision for interest and a one year term. The note was secured by a mortgage on the property. The Steins never made any payment on the note.

One day before the 10 year limitations periods on both the note and the mortgage were to lapse, Watkin filed a foreclosure action. Chicago title moved to dismiss for failure to send an acceleration notice. That complaint was dismissed without prejudice, and an amended complaint was never filed.

A year later, Chicago Title (as land trustee) filed a complaint to quiet title, seeking an order that the mortgage lien had no force because the statute of limitations had elapsed and an order enjoining Watkin from asserting any interest in the property.  Watkin moved for summary judgment, asserting that the expiration of the limitations periods did not affect the validity of her mortgage lien and had not extinguished the underlying debt. She further argued that she “retained the right to appeal to the debtor to honor the debt out of a sense of moral obligation even if the legal obligation could no longer be enforced.” The circuit court granted summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed, saying in part that Chicago Title improperly “conflated the ability to enforce the mortgage or note with the very existence of the underlying obligation.”

The parties agreed that Watkin may no longer bring an action to enforce the note or to foreclose on the mortgage lien. The issue concerned whether the mortgage lien itself continues. Section 13-115 of the Code of Civil Procedure imposes a 10 year limitation on foreclosure actions. Section 13-116 states, in part, that “the lien of every mortgage... shall cease by limitation after the expiration of 20 years from the time the last payment on such mortgage ...became or becomes due...” “Read together, the plain language of (those sections) indicates that a mortgage lien is not extinguished upon the lapse of the limitations period...; rather, ... the lien will ‘cease’ 20 years after the last payment on the mortgage became due.” The Court held that the lien, albeit unenforceable now because a foreclosure action is time-barred, will survive for at least 20 years after the last payment became due.

Speaking more generally to the nature of limitations, the Court stated “It is well settled that a limitations statute affects remedies; it does not extinguish substantive rights.” Here, while the statute bars Watkin from bringing a foreclosure action, it does not extinguish the debt Marline owes Watkin or the mortgage lien that secures it. The debt remains the same as before, excepting that the remedy for enforcement is gone.

Additionally, the Court invoked the maxim that “he who seeks equity must do equity” as “inform[ing] our conclusion.” Noting that quiet title actions are equitable proceedings, and that the trust beneficiary had never paid the debt to Watkin, the grant of quieting title was not supported. 

The Court concluded its opinion by stating that Marline could secure the lien’s release “by satisfying her debt to Watkin.” It ends with “Otherwise, she will have to wait.”

Greenswag v. Lieberman Management Services, Inc., 2026 IL 132101  

By Amelia Buragas, Illinois State University

In Greenswag v. Lieberman Management Services, Inc., the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff stated a legally sufficient claim under the Consumer Fraud Act. After analyzing the language of both the Consumer Fraud Act and the Condominium Property Act, the Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to state a legally sufficient claim and affirmed the judgment of the lower courts. To reach this conclusion, the Court relied on its own recent precedent clarifying the public policy purpose of the Condominium Property Act as well as the factors to be considered when looking at claims brought under the Consumer Fraud Act.

At issue in the case was the defendant condominium management company’s compliance with a provision of the Condominium Property Act. The Act requires condominium sellers to provide a set of documents to prospective buyers. The Act also required that the owner’s association furnish the disclosure documents and allowed the association to charge the seller a “reasonable fee covering the direct out-of-pocket cost of providing such information.” Plaintiff sought to sell her condominium, and the defendant charged her $470 to prepare and deliver the required disclosure documents. Plaintiff then filed a lawsuit alleging that the defendant engaged in an unfair business practice under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Act by charging an allegedly excessive and unreasonable fee. The circuit court dismissed the lawsuit pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the appellate court affirmed.

In the Illinois Supreme Court, plaintiff argued that the defendant violated the Consumer Fraud Act in three ways: 1) the fee was not a reasonable fee to cover defendant’s out-of-pocket costs for providing the disclosure documents; 2) the fee was not reasonable because defendant had already prepared the documents in its regular course of business; and 3) the condominium owners had already paid for the preparation and maintenance of the documents through their regular association fees. The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis with the language of the Condominium Property Act. The Court noted it had recently considered the public policy set forth in section 22.1 of the Condominium Property Act in Channon v. Westward Management, Inc., 2022 IL 128040. The Court found in Channon that section 22.1 was designed primarily to benefit potential buyers, not sellers, and that the reasonable fee provision was “merely incidental to the underlying purpose of section 22.1” and that “the legislature did not intend section 22.1 to imply a private right to relief for unit sellers.”

The Court then turned to the language of the Consumer Fraud Act. The Court noted that plaintiff did not allege that the defendant engaged in deception or fraudulent conduct but instead that the fee charged to provide the disclosure documents was unfair. The Court then explained that in determining whether a business practice is “unfair,” it will consider 1) whether the practice offends public policy, 2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous, and/or 3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers. The Court also noted that charging a high price, even an unconscionably high price, “is generally insufficient to establish a claim” and that additional evidence of unfairness is required to sustain a claim. Here, the Court concluded that plaintiff could not establish a violation of public policy because the public policy behind section 22.1 of the Condominium Property Act is to protect buyers and not sellers and that purpose was fulfilled when the condominium buyer was supplied with the disclosure documents in a timely manner. The Court also concluded that while the condominium sellers were a “captive audience” in that they were required to obtain the documents from the owner’s association, the lack of choice resulted from the statutory scheme and not from a management company’s business practices. As such, the Court explained that the plaintiff failed to allege how the defendant’s business practices were oppressive or unfair. Finally, the Court noted that plaintiff failed to allege that she was substantially injured by the defendant’s business practice because the claim that the documents were too costly was not the type of injury the Act was designed to remedy.

The Supreme Court also noted that since the filing of plaintiff’s lawsuit, the Condominium Property Act was amended by the General Assembly to place a cap of $475 as the maximum fee a condominium association can charge unit sellers to obtain the statutorily required disclosure documents. The Court noted that this amendment did not change its analysis and, to the contrary, undercut plaintiff’s argument that condominium owners had already paid for the service through their regular association fees because both versions of the statute rejected the notion that the services provided by the defendant had already been paid for. Thus, the Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court’s order dismissing the complaint. The unanimous opinion was authored by Justice Neville. Justice Tailor took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Reynolds v. Reynolds, 2026 IL 132627

By Amanda J. Hamilton, Akerman LLP

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Holder White, the Illinois Supreme Court held that section 610.5(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which  governs motions to modify parenting time, requires only a “showing of changed circumstances,” and not the “substantial change in circumstances” required under section 610.5(c) for modifications of parenting plans or allocation judgments. The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Nancy Reynolds and Christopher I. Reynolds Sr. are the unmarried parents of two daughters, D.R. and E.R. In July 2016, the McHenry County Circuit Court entered an allocation judgment based on the parties' agreement, granting petitioner primary parenting time and significant decision-making responsibilities. Respondent received weekly parenting time with limited overnight visitation.

In November 2021, respondent filed a motion to modify the allocation of parental responsibilities and parenting plan pursuant to sections 600 and 610.5 of the Act. He later amended the motion to seek only an increase in parenting time, citing changes since 2016, including his switch to remote work, his move to a larger home closer to the children's schools, D.R.'s autism diagnosis and her bond with a similarly diagnosed half-sibling, and the children's growing relationships with their half-siblings. Respondent's proposed increase in parenting time was consistent with the recommendation of a court-appointed custody evaluator, Dr. Mark L. Goldstein, who opined that the existing parenting plan was not in the children's best interests.

After respondent rested his case, petitioner moved for a directed finding. The circuit court found that respondent had established a prima facie case of changed circumstances, but under the second step of its analysis, concluded that respondent failed to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances as required by section 610.5(c) of the Act. The court granted the motion for a directed finding.

The Second District Appellate Court vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court applied the wrong legal standard. The appellate court held that section 610.5(a), not section 610.5(c), provides the applicable standard for a motion seeking to modify parenting time only, requiring a showing of changed circumstances rather than a substantial change in circumstances. The appellate court rejected the contrary reasoning of the Third District in In re Marriage of Trapkus, 2022 IL App (3d) 190631.

On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the plain language of section 610.5(a) treats motions to modify parenting time differently from motions to modify allocation judgments or parenting plans. Subsection (a) permits modification of parenting time "at any time, without a showing of serious endangerment, upon a showing of changed circumstances that necessitates modification to serve the best interests of the child." By contrast, subsection (c) applies to modifications of parenting plans or allocation judgments and requires a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. The Court further held that applying subsection (c)'s heightened standard to parenting-time modifications would render the provisions of subsection (a) meaningless and superfluous. The Court expressly overruled Trapkus to the extent it was inconsistent with this holding.

Applying the correct legal standard, the Court found that the circuit court's order granting the directed finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court noted that even the circuit court itself had acknowledged that respondent proved there had been changes since 2016 but erroneously required those changes to be substantial and unanticipated. The Court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the matter for the circuit court to determine whether respondent demonstrated that those changes necessitate a modification in parenting time to serve the best interests of the children under section 610.5(a).

People v. Benson, 2026 IL 131191

By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court 

Majority written by Justice Overstreet, joined by Justices Neville, Holder White, Cunningham, Rochford, O’Brien and Tailor

Summary

Vacates the appellate court’s decision to review a defendant’s as-applied constitutional challenge to his conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. The challenge was raised for the first time on appeal, and the Supreme Court found that the record was not adequately developed because the defendant failed to raise the issue before the circuit court.

The defendant, James Benson, was convicted of reckless discharge of a firearm, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF), and domestic battery. On direct appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of the UPWF statute, both facially and as applied to him. He argued that the UPWF statute was unconstitutional as applied to him because his prior conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon was not an inherently dangerous felony justifying a permanent ban on firearms possession. The appellate court found the claim forfeited but agreed with the defendant that the record was sufficient to reach the merits. It  rejected the defendant’s contention that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him because his conduct was not “inherently dangerous.”

The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal the appellate court’s ruling with respect to the defendant’s as-applied challenge.

The Court noted that as-applied constitutional challenges require the court to consider the particular facts and circumstances relevant to the application of the statute to an individual defendant. Whereas a facial challenge may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal, an as-applied challenge must be raised in the circuit court so the factual record is sufficiently developed for appellate review. A narrow exception to this rule was observed in People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, where all the facts and circumstances necessary to decide the defendant’s challenge were already in the record. That exception did not apply here.

First, the Court observed that the UPWF statute excepts persons granted relief under the Firearm Owners Identification Act. The FOID Act permits “non-dangerous” felons to apply for a FOID Card, and resolving an as-applied challange would require the court to consider whether the defendant qualified for the exception.

Next, the Court favorably cited cases that declined to consider an as-applied challenge in the absence of a factual record, including People v. Boss, 2025 IL App (1st) 221855 and People v. Burns, 2024 IL App (4th) 230428. Those courts found that the record did not disclose the circumstances of the defendant’s prior felony conviction, nor how the facts of those convictions related to the current as-applied challenge. Those circumstances are potentially crucial to determining what danger a defendant may pose, and without such information a reviewing court is in no position to rule on an as-applied second amendment challenge.

Without a factual record, a reviewing court also cannot determine whether the statute (as the defendant contended) permanently disarms him where it explicitly provides for relief under the FOID Act. When such a challenge is raised for the first time on appeal, the record is silent as to whether the defendant applied relief under the FOID Act, which the Court found was “integral to the consideration of whether the application of that statute to convict the defendant of UPWF is constitutional.”

The Court therefore vacated the portion of the appellate court’s judgment that considered the merits of the defendant’s as-applied constitutional claim and affirmed the remaining portions of the judgment.

People v. Wade, 2026 IL 131745

By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court 

Majority written by Justice O’Brien, joined by Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham, and Tailor

Justice Rochford took no part in the decision.

Summary

Vacates one of the defendant’s two convictions for aggravated kidnapping under “unit of prosecution” analysis. The defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated kidnapping for committing two distinct criminal sexual assaults during a kidnapping. However, he only committed the criminal act of kidnapping once.

Patrick Wade, the defendant, committed a kidnapping, during which he committed two separate acts of criminal sexual assault upon the victim. He was charged with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and two counts of aggravated kidnapping because he committed two felonies (criminal sexual assault) upon the victim during a kidnapping. He was found guilty on all four counts, and the court imposed consecutive 15-year sentences for the two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and two concurrent 10-year sentences for aggravated kidnapping.

The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that it violated the one-act, one-crime rule because he committed only a single act of kidnapping. The appellate court (First District) rejected the defendant’s argument and affirmed his convictions and sentence.

Before the Supreme Court, the defendant renewed his argument and further contended that multiple convictions are impermissible where the “unit of prosecution” for the offense of aggravated kidnapping is the kidnapping itself, so only one conviction may be entered per kidnapping. Unit of prosecution analysis is used to determine what the statute seeks to prohibit and what unit of time, action, or instance of a crime constitutes a single commission of that offense. The State conceded error and agreed that one of the defendant’s kidnapping convictions had to be vacated.

The Supreme Court agreed, finding that although the kidnapping statute did not expressly define the unit of prosecution, the statute’s plain language prohibits the act of kidnapping and imposes enhanced punishments for various aggravating circumstances. The presence of multiple aggravating circumstances does not create additional offenses of aggravated kidnapping. Here, the defendant kidnapped one victim, and two aggravating circumstances were present. The Court agreed with the parties that the case should be remanded to the trial court to “vacate the less serious of the two aggravated kidnapping convictions” and impose a sentence on the more serious offense.

Because the Court found that the “unit of prosecution” for aggravated kidnapping is the kidnapping, it found that it did not need to determine whether the defendant’s convictions violated the one-act, one-crime rule.

People v. Nibbelin, 2026 IL 131825

By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court 

Majority written by Justice Rochford, joined by Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham, O’Brien, and Tailor

Summary

Resolves the split within the Fourth District over whether a defendant may raise a complaint about errors in the imposition of assessments for the first time on appeal by claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Applying the plain language of Rule 472, this case holds that a defendant must raise issues pertaining to the imposition of assessments in the trial court first and may not raise them for the first time on appeal. Affirms the appellate court’s remand of the case to the circuit court so the defendant may raise a Rule 472 challenge to the imposed assessment.

The defendant, Carthall Nibbelin, was charged with 10 counts of possessing child pornography, and he pled guilty to four counts. He was sentenced to 36 months’ probation, ordered to register as a sex offender, and ordered to refrain from consuming alcohol. The court imposed fines, fees, and costs in the amount of $14,947. The clerk applied the defendant’s $10,000 bond to the assessments, and after a probation fee was added, the total amount owed was $5,847.

The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation multiple times by consuming alcohol and accruing several new charges for failing to register as a sex offender. Eventually, following the State’s ninth petition to revoke the defendant’s probation, the defendant was sentenced to a term of four years’ imprisonment. The court imposed costs, fines, and assessments.

The defendant appealed his sentence, arguing, among other things, that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a waiver of the assessments. He cited Supreme Court Rule 404(e), which provides that a defendant who is represented by a public defender is entitled “to a waiver of assessments as defined in 725 ILCS 5/124A-20(a).” The Rule requires defense counsel to file an appropriate certification with the court. The defendant argued that (1) he was represented by a public defender, (2) his counsel failed to file the certification, and (3) he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure, since there was a reasonable probability his assessments would have been waived if the certification had been filed.

The State responded by pointing out that Rule 472, which deals with errors in the imposition of assessments, grants the circuit court continuing jurisdiction to address errors in the imposition of fines, fees, assessments, and costs. It further provides that no appeal may be taken on such issues unless the error is first raised in the circuit court. The appellate court (Fourth District) agreed with the State’s position and remanded the matter to allow the defendant to raise it in the circuit court.

Before the Supreme Court, the defendant emphasized that he alleged error on the part of his counsel and not on the part of the court. He argued that Rule 472 only covers errors of the court, and his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was therefore properly raised for the first time on appeal.

Construing Rule 472 (titled “Correction of Certain Errors in Sentencing”), the Supreme Court found that its purpose was to “quell the rising tide of appeals raising only fines and fees issues that went unaddressed in the lower courts.” It observed that different panels within the Fourth District had resolved cases raising the failure to file an assessment waiver differently. Some held that Rule 472 barred such claims unless they were first pursued in the circuit court, while others found that Rule 472 only barred claims of error against the court. However, the Rule itself contains no such limitation.

The Court noted that when Rule 472 was enacted, the Court also enacted Rule 452, which requires the State to prepare a sentencing order for review by the defendant (or defense counsel) that is to be submitted to the court. The sentencing order must include “all applicable fines, fees, assessments and costs” imposed against the defendant. Thus, the duty to avoid error falls on all relevant parties.

Further, Rule 404(e) offers no ambiguity. When a defendant is represented by a public defender, his counsel must file a certification requesting a waiver of assessments and the defendant “shall be entitled” to such a waiver. The imposition of assessments despite the defendant’s representation by a public defender is precisely the problem Rule 472 was designed to remedy, and it must be corrected by filing a motion under Rule 472. Such corrections are attainable “at any time following judgment.” Thus, the case was remanded for the defendant to file a motion under Rule 472.

People v. Aguilar, 2026 IL 131382

By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court

Majority written by Justice Overstreet, joined by Justices Neville, Holder White, Cunningham, Rochford, O’Brien, and Tailor

Summary

Holds that the State may not charge a defendant with aggravated DUI for committing a DUI while his driver’s license is suspended for reasons other than those listed in section 11-501(d)(1)(G) of the Vehicle Code. To elevate a simple DUI to an aggravated DUI based on a suspension not listed in section 11-501(d)(1)(G) would contravene the purpose of the statute and render section 11-501(d)(1)(G) superfluous.

The defendant, German Aguilar, was charged with two counts of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) at a time when he did not possess a driver’s license. At the time of the offense, the defendant’s license was suspended because he failed to comply with the financial responsibility insurance requirement of the Vehicle Code. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing the State’s information did not state an offense. The State responded that the defendant did not “possess” a license because his right to drive had been suspended. The circuit court dismissed the charges, and the State filed two new counts, adding the detail that the defendant’s license was suspended due to a financial responsibility insurance suspension. The defendant moved to dismiss the charges a second time, and the circuit court dismissed the two new counts with prejudice. The appellate court (Fifth District) affirmed the dismissal.

The Supreme Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Vehicle Code. Section 11-501(d)(1)(H) of the Vehicle Code elevates a DUI offense to an aggravated DUI offense where the person commits a DUI “while he or she did not possess a driver’s license or permit or a restricted driving permit or a judicial driving permit or a monitoring device driving permit.”  Subsection (G) of the same statute also elevates a DUI offense to an aggravated DUI offense, but only where the person committed a DUI “during a period in which the defendant’s driving privileges are revoked or suspended” for certain specified reasons. Those reasons include having a prior DUI offense, refusing chemical testing, leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident involving injury or death, or reckless homicide. They do not include the defendant’s failure to maintain financial responsibility insurance.

Interpreting the plain language of the statute, the Court found that the defendant’s suspension did not elevate his DUI offense to an aggravated offense. The State argued that because the defendant’s license was suspended, he possessed neither a physical license nor the right to operate a vehicle. However, the State’s interpretation would render section 11-501(d)(1)(G) superfluous, since every license suspension would also qualify as a failure to “possess” a license. The Court found that a more reasonable reading is that subsection (H) “addresses individuals who never acquired one of the licenses or permits identified in that subsection [citation] while subsection (G) separately addresses individuals whose licenses are suspended because of the specific offenses enumerated in that subsection [citation].”

The State also argued that the Vehicle Code generally treats driving with a suspended or revoked license more seriously than driving without ever having obtained a license, comparing the statutes governing driving on a suspended or revoked license (Class A misdemeanors) and the statute governing driving without ever having been issued a license (Class B misdemeanor). But the Court observed that the Vehicle Code makes numerous distinctions between different types of unlicensed driving and driving on different kinds of suspensions.  The legislature has not adopted any categorical rules about unlicensed driving and has instead assigned different penalties to different circumstances. The Court declined to delve into the legislative history of subsections (G) and (H) given the unambiguous language and structure of the two subsections.

In reaching its decision, the circuit court relied on an unpublished Fourth District case, electing not to rely on the dicta contained in a Second District opinion, which was the only precedential authority available at the time of the court’s decision. The Second District case was People v. Rosenbalm, 2011 IL App (2d) 100243, and it initially found that the appellant’s arguments had been forfeited. Nonetheless, it addressed the merits of the case and found that a person whose license was revoked, suspended, or expired did not “possess” a driver’s license. Rosenbalm went on to acknowledge that its interpretation rendered subsection (G) superfluous. The Supreme Court observed that judicial dicta are not binding precedent if it is found to be erroneous, and here the dicta was erroneous because it conflicted with the plain statutory language.

Finally, the Court reversed the circuit court’s decision to dismiss the charges against the defendant with prejudice. The relevant statutes (section 114-1(a)(8) and section 114-1(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure) state that dismissal based on a defect in the charging instrument does not prevent the State from filing a new charge. Because the charges were dismissed based on defects in the charging instrument, the State should have been permitted to re-file them, and the Court modified the circuit court’s judgment accordingly.