Practice News

A must-have for all civil litigators. From Dog Bite to Divorce! Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213(f) & (g) applies to all civil litigation in Illinois. It governs the procedure for identifying trial witnesses and disclosing their proposed testimony.  The ISBA is excited to offer this update of our popular Supreme Court Rule 213(f) & (g) - Quick Reference Guide, last published in 2002. The Guide is a useful tool for quickly learning the law under Rule 213(f) & (g). It reviews all of the Illinois Appellate and Supreme Court decisions to date concerning Supreme Court Rule 213(f) & (g). In addition to a summary, the Guide organizes the propositions for which the cases stand by topics that can be quickly referenced during argument on a motion in limine or motion to bar opinion witnesses. As every litigator knows, the heart and soul of every case is presented through the witnesses who testify. Accordingly, being able to raise and respond to Rule 213(f) & (g) objections is an essential trial skill. This Guide is designed to help the litigator do just that! Written by Paul O. Watkiss, the Guide is published in a uniquely useful format and makes clear the pitfalls of ignoring its nuances.

The Illinois Supreme Court has announced the appointment of Daniel Lawrence Peters as a Circuit Judge of Cook County, Fourth Subcircuit. This fills the position opened by the retirement of the Hon. Jennifer Duncan-Brice. It is effective Aug. 1 and terminates on Dec. 3, 2012.

In the latest Trusts and Estates newsletter, Mary Cascino flags an unintended and unwelcome byproduct of the new POA Act, which took effect July 1, and proposes some language to remedy the problem. The new Act "revises the statutory form in Section 3.3(c)...to state in paragraph 1 of the form: 'I...hereby revoke all prior powers of attorney...,'" Cascino writes. The problem? That language can be read to revoke not only prior statutory POAs but also routine limited agencies, including "special or limited powers of attorney such as those on file at a bank, investment house or corporation records." Not good. She recommends that lawyers avoid trouble by adding the word "statutory" to the new statutory form so it reads thusly: "I...hereby revoke all prior statutory powers of attorney...." Cascino notes that HB 1712, passed by the General Assembly but not yet signed by the governor, is designed to cure the problem by "identifying powers of attorney that would be excluded from such revocation...." But it won't take effect until January 1, 2012, assuming Governor Quinn signs it as expected. Her proposed fix would cover the gap between 7/1/11 and 1/1/12.

By Michael T. Reagan, The Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan In Wirtz v. Quinn, Justice Burke wrote for a unanimous court in reversing the appellate court’s Opinion which had declared the 2009 Capital Projects Acts unconstitutional. This Opinion will serve as a modern Baedeker for the law of legislative drafting. This action, brought by Rockwell Wirtz and Wirtz Beverage Illinois, LLC, on behalf of taxpayers generally, was initiated by a complaint seeking to enjoin the disbursement of public funds pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/11-303. The statute requires that the action be commenced by filing a petition for leave to file, and requires that the circuit court find reasonable ground for filing before the complaint may be filed. The circuit court concluded that reasonable ground did not exist, and denied the petition. The appellate court found that PA 96-34 "An Act Concerning Revenue" violated Article IV, § 8(d) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, the single subject clause. The remaining three acts, consisting of an Appropriation Bill, a Trailer Bill and a Budget Implementation Bill, each expressly provided that it was passed contingent upon PA 96-34 becoming law. Because the appellate court found that PA 96-34 was void in its entirety, the remaining three bills were found to fall as well because of that contingency. The appellate court did not then have occasion to take up any of the other constitutional challenges to the bills. The supreme court granted the Petition for Leave to Appeal filed by the numerous governmental defendants and handled the case in a compressed timeframe. The supreme court reversed the appellate court’s holding that PA 96-34 violated the single subject clause. Then, in the interest of judicial economy, and perhaps in recognition of the practical fiscal importance of this dispute, the court addressed all of the other constitutional challenges pled in the taxpayers’ complaint, rather than remanding the case to the appellate court.