Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Issued Thursday, December 4, 2025
Leading appellate attorney reviews the Illinois Supreme Court opinion handed down Thursday, December 4.
People v. Seymore, 2025 IL 131564
By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court
Opinion written by Justice Theis, joined by Justices Neville, Overstreet, Rochford, Holder White, Cunningham, and O’Brien
Summary
This case resolves the question of whether good time credit applies to sanctions imposed by the court for violating conditions of pretrial release. Interpreting the Behavior Allowance Act, the Supreme Court held that it does not.
The defendant, Geoffrey Seymore, was charged with four felonies related to the production and possession of methamphetamine. He was released two days later, subject to various conditions including electronic monitoring. One day after that, he violated the conditions of his release, and the State petitioned the court for sanctions. The court held a hearing and found that the State had proved the violation by clear and convincing evidence. The court imposed a sanction of 30 days’ imprisonment in the county jail, and below the preprinted order it wrote, “NO GOOD TIME TO APPLY.”
The defendant appealed, and the appellate court (First District) reversed the court’s finding that good-conduct credit did not apply to the sanction. The appellate court found that it had jurisdiction under Rule 604(h), which permits appeals of orders granting, denying, or revoking pretrial release. It further found that, although the issue was moot (the defendant having already served the 30-day term of imprisonment), the issue was one of public interest, which is an exception to the mootness doctrine. Ultimately, the appellate court concluded that sanctions for violations of the conditions of pretrial release are similar to criminal contempt proceedings, for which good-behavior credit applies.
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. First, it found that Rule 604(h) did not grant the court jurisdiction because the defendant’s pretrial release was neither denied nor revoked, nor did the court impose additional conditions of pretrial release. Instead it sanctioned the defendant for violating existing conditions. Nonetheless, the Court found it had jurisdiction because an order imposing sanctions, like a contempt order, disposes of a distinct collateral matter, which is independent of the case in which it arises. Thus, the sanctions order was final and appealable.
Second, the Court agreed with the appellate court in finding that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied. Although the public interest exception is narrow, the Court noted that the sanctions imposed are capped at 30 days’ imprisonment. Thus, the question would always be moot by the time an appellate court had an opportunity to address it, and, absent a ruling on the issue, trial judges would lack guidance on the question and might apply the law inconsistently.
Third, although the appellate court held that the State forfeited the argument that the defendant was not entitled to good time credit in the appellate court, that forfeiture did not prevent review before the Supreme Court.
Turning to the merits, the Court analyzed the language of the Behavior Allowance Act, which entitles persons serving “a sentence of confinement in a county jail” to a “good behavior allowance” amounting to one day of credit for each day served on the sentence. The Court found that a sanction of imprisonment is not a “sentence” under the Behavior Allowance Act. A “sentence” is defined by the Unified Code of Corrections as “the disposition imposed by the court on a convicted defendant.” The defendant was not convicted of any offense when the sanction was imposed, nor was he sentenced. The Court did note, however, that in the event the defendant was later convicted and sentenced, the good-conduct credit earned during his 30-day sanction would apply against his ultimate sentence.