Are Civil Petitions for Rule to Show Cause Filed in Domestic Relations Matters Pleadings or Motions?

Introduction

Whether by design or coincidence, certain things in life are subject to prolonged dispute. For example, since its introduction in 1966, the child-oriented confectionery known as “Razzles” (which starts out hard and eventually turns chewy) has been the subject of dispute as to whether it is a “candy” or a “gum.” Indeed, in its marketing efforts, its original manufacturer used to have a contest for kids to argue for each option.

Similarly, for many years, family law practitioners in Cook County have been bedeviled by the question of whether petitions for rule to show cause seeking to hold a party in indirect civil contempt of court (“Petitions for Rule”) are pleadings or motions. It is an important question because it determines the permitted practice regarding these filings. If it is a pleading, it can be subject to a motion to strike or dismiss. 750 ILCS 5/105(d) (2026). If it is a motion, it cannot be stricken or dismissed. In re Marriage of Wolff, 355 Ill. App. 3d 403, 407 (2d Dist. 2005).

Moreover, if it is a pleading, it would be subject to fact pleading requirements. Illinois’s Code of Civil Procedure would require the responding party to admit or deny each allegation paragraph by paragraph, lest a court deem an undenied allegation admitted. If it is a motion, however, the response should be in narrative fashion. See James A. Shapiro & Mitchell B. Goldberg, From the Judge’s Side of the Bench: The Value of a Narrative Response, Decalogue Tablets (Spring 2024).

Before attempting to answer the question, it is first helpful to understand some potential causes of confusion by practitioners.

Potential causes for confusion

The single biggest potential cause for confusion as to whether Petitions for Rule are pleadings or motions in the family law context may come from the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (2026)) itself. The IMDMA acknowledges that family law, which is a civil practice area, falls under the Civil Practice Law. See, e.g., 750 ILCS 5/105(a) (2026) (“The provisions of the Civil Practice Law shall apply to all proceedings under this Act, except as otherwise provided in the Act”). However, almost immediately the IMDMA goes on to require that the initial pleading in a case brought under the act “shall be denominated a petition” (rather than a complaint) and that a “responsive pleading shall be denominated a response.” 750 ILCS 5/105(c) (2026). Those same words are also used to refer to the filings in motion practice in other civil cases. As the IMDMA requires practitioners to use the same nomenclature for pleadings and motions, resulting confusion is completely understandable.

Another potential cause of confusion is the fact that at least a few appellate decisions have considered and affirmed the granting of motions to dismiss Petitions for Rule. See, e.g., In re Marriage of O’Malley, 2016 IL App (1st) 151118, ¶ 55; In re Marriage of Nesbitt, 2014 IL App (1st) 131825-U, ¶ 56. Practitioners rely on the mere willingness of courts to rule on such cases as an implied recognition that Petitions for Rule are pleadings instead of motions. However, such practitioners do so at their peril, as none of the parties in those cases ever raised the issue of the inapplicability of motions to dismiss to Petitions for Rule, and, thus, those courts did not actually address that question.

To directly answer the question of whether Petitions for Rule are pleadings or motions and to overcome the above bases for potential confusion, it is important to understand (a) the distinction between pleadings and motions and (b) the nature and procedural requirements of Petitions for Rule. Each of these issues shall be addressed in turn.

Understanding the difference between a pleading and motion in family cases

Given the above, it is important for family law practitioners to understand the distinction between pleadings and motions. A pleading consists of a party's formal allegations of his claims or defenses. William J. Templeman Co. v. Liberty Mut Ins. Co., 316 Ill. App. 3d 379, 388 (1st Dist. 2000). A pleading is a document setting forth the pleader’s facts in a paragraph-by-paragraph format. See 735 ILCS 5/2-603 (2026). It should contain facts that petitioners consider relevant to build the framework of their cause of action. 

In the family law context, the IMDMA expressly states that pleadings include “any petition or motion filed in the dissolution of marriage case which, if independently filed, would constitute a separate cause of action.” 750 ILCS 5/105(d) (2026). When answering a pleading, admitting or denying each allegation is obligatory, and does the useful work of narrowing the issues for trial. According to Illinois’s Code of Civil Procedure, “every answer and subsequent pleading shall contain an explicit admission or denial of each allegation of the pleading to which it relates.” 735 ILCS 5/2-610. In the family law context, only pleadings are subject to motions filed pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 750 ILCS 5/105(d) (2026); see also In re Marriage of Sutherland, 251 Ill. App. 3d 411, 414 (1993) (2-615 motions); Wolff, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 407 (2-619 motions).

By contrast, in the family law context, “[a] motion is an application to the court for a ruling or order in a pending case.” Wolff, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 407 (denying a motion to dismiss a motion to reconsider because the request to reconsider was not a pleading). Examples of motions (which are not subject to motions to strike or dismiss) include motions for reconsideration (id.), motions for temporary relief (In re Marriage of Engst, 2014 IL App (4th) 131078, ¶¶ 18-21), and motions to enforce compliance with a marital settlement agreement (In re Marriage of Nguyen, 2023 IL App (1st) 221045-U, ¶ 23).

Though there is no bright-line test, there are clear, functional differences between pleadings and motions that carry implications in their separate roles. The Nguyen case illustrates this point. Id. In Nguyen, the ex-wife filed a motion to compel enforcement of her Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA). Id. ¶ 6. The ex-husband filed a motion to dismiss the ex-wife’s motion to compel. The court reasoned that a petition to start or modify a dissolution action is a pleading because it commences a new action. Id. ¶ 23. The wife’s motion was simply to enforce a previously entered MSA. As logic did not support the idea that a motion to compel enforcement started anything new, the court held it to be a motion. Therefore, the court found the respondent’s motion to dismiss was statutorily unsound as he could not move to dismiss a motion. See id.

In sum, pleadings are those filings that can stand as independent causes of action or responses thereto. Motions are merely applications for relief within existing cases. They are materially different and need to be treated as such.

Understanding Petitions for Rule and civil contempt

A Petition for Rule seeks a finding of civil contempt. Milton v. Therra, 2018 IL App (1st) 171392, ¶ 37. Indeed, the issuance of a rule to show cause is only appropriate in civil contempt. Id. This is because in criminal contempt proceedings, a respondent has a right against self-incrimination and cannot be required to “show cause” as to why the respondent should not be held in contempt. Id.

Whether contempt is civil or criminal turns on the purpose of the contempt charge. Id. ¶ 35. Civil contempt is used to compel compliance with a court order, usually for the benefit or advantage of another party to the existing proceeding. Id. Civil contempt proceedings are coercive in nature and are avoidable through obedience. Id.; see also City of Chicago v. Bryan, 2022 IL App (1st) 211074, ¶ 29 (civil contempt is designed to compel future compliance with existing court orders). Of critical importance, a person held in civil contempt must be able to "purge" the contempt by complying with the order the court sought to enforce. Id.; Milton, 2018 IL App (1st) 171392, ¶ 35.

In contrast, the purpose of criminal contempt is to punish past conduct, rather than to coerce future conduct. Bryan, 2022 IL App (1st) 211074, ¶ 30. It is used to punish past willful and contumacious behavior, including an act committed against the majesty of the law in disrespect of the court or its process. Milton, 2018 IL App (1st) 171392, ¶ 35.

Contempt, whether civil or criminal, may be direct or indirect. Id. ¶ 36. The distinction between direct and indirect contempt largely depends on where the contumacious conduct took place. Id. Direct contempt occurs in the judge's presence or in an integral or constituent part of the court. Id. All other contempt is indirect and must be established by the presentation of evidence. Id.

Importantly, a finding of civil contempt relies on the existence of a court order and willful disobedience of that court order. Id. Longstanding Illinois practice permits the commencement of civil contempt proceedings by the filing of a petition in the court having jurisdiction of the cause wherein the order was entered. Hake v. People, 230 Ill. 174, 192-93 (1907).

The party petitioning for a civil contempt finding bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie showing of a willful violation of a court order. In re Parentage of Melton, 321 Ill. App. 3d 823, 829 (1st Dist. 2001). Noncompliance with a court order is prima facie evidence of civil contempt. In re Marriage of Ray, 2014 IL App (4th) 130326, ¶ 15. Where a party asserting the violation of a court order establishes a prima facie showing of a willful violation of a court order, the court enters a rule to show cause. Melton, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 825. The trial court’s entry of a rule to show cause is the first step in enforcement of its orders. Id. at 831.

Procedurally, the Petition for Rule and the rule to show cause work in concert to notify the alleged contemnor of the allegations against the respondent and the time and place of the evidentiary hearing on the claim within a reasonable time in advance of the hearing. Milton, 2018 IL App (1st) 171392, ¶ 35; Melton, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 829. When a party establishes a prima facie case of civil contempt, the burden shifts to the contemnor to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. Ray, 2014 IL App (4th) 130326, ¶ 15. To meet this burden, the contemnor may present evidence that noncompliance was not willful and contumacious, and that a valid excuse exists for such noncompliance. Id.

Petitions for Rule are motions

As shown above, a party files a Petition for Rule in the court in which the order seeking enforcement was entered. It cannot be filed as a new, separate case. Indeed, Illinois courts have recognized that civil contempt proceedings are a continuation of the original cause of action. Bryan, 2022 IL App (1st) 211074, ¶ 30; Levaccare v. Levaccare, 376 Ill. App. 3d 503, 509 (1st Dist. 2007) (quoting People v. Budzynski, 333 Ill. App. 3d 433, 438 (4th Dist. 2002)).

In the context of family law, the Illinois Supreme Court has explicitly held that a pending civil contempt petition is not a separate claim independent of a dissolution action. In re Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d 145, 153-54 (2008) (recognizing that though Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(5) permits a contemnor to seek immediate review of a contempt finding and sanction imposed, a pending contempt petition “was not a separate claim independent from the dissolution action”). This contrasts with criminal contempt proceedings, which are separate and distinct and not part of the original case being tried. Id.

It is important to note that many practitioners often cite to the more than half-century-old language from the Illinois Supreme Court in Kazubowski v. Kazubowski, 45 Ill. 2d 405 (1970), to argue that Petitions for Rule constitute separate causes of action, qualifying them as pleadings under the IMDMA. There, the Supreme Court stated, “[A civil] contempt proceeding is final and appealable because it is an original special proceeding, collateral to, and independent of, the case in which the contempt arises.” Id. at 415. However, in Gutman, our Supreme Court clarified that the full context in Kazubowski “limit[s] the original and special status to an adjudication of contempt.” Gutman, 232 Ill. 2d at 152 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court further stressed that no other court has treated a pending contempt petition as a separate proceeding. Id. The Gutman court thus held the “justification for treating contempt petitions as separate proceedings for purposes of appeal is not present when there has been no ruling and sanction imposed.” Id. at 153. In light of the holding in Gutman, Petitions for Rule, which are the filings that begin civil contempt proceedings well before any ruling or sanction, do not constitute separate causes of action, and thus cannot be defined as pleadings under the IMDMA.

Since a Petition for Rule is an “application to the court for a ruling or order in a pending case,” it is a motion and not a pleading. Wolff, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 407; cf. 750 ILCS 5/105(d) (as it could not be independently filed and could not constitute a separate cause of action, it is not a pleading). Accordingly, since a Petition for Rule could not be independently filed and could not constitute a separate cause of action, it is not a pleading. Cf. 750 ILCS 5/105(d) (2026). Thus, it cannot be subject to motions filed pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 750 ILCS 5/105(d) (2026).

Conclusion

Unlike Razzles, which really do have properties of both candy and gum, Petitions for Rule do not have the properties of both pleadings and motions. Though the nomenclature used pursuant to the IMDMA and some prior appellate opinions have served as sources of confusion, a serious review of the differences between pleadings and motions and an understanding of the specific requirements of Petitions for Rule and the considerations involved in civil contempt, makes clear that Petitions for Rule are motions; they are not pleadings and, thus, not subject to dispositive motion practice.

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Judge James A. Shapiro is a judge with the Domestic Relations Division, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.

Judge Mitchell B. Goldberg is a judge with the Domestic Relations Division, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.

Alison Rimkus is a second-year law student at the University of Illinois College of Law.

The authors would like to thank David C. Adams, Esq. for his helpful editorial suggestions.