Child Law

DCFS made indicated finding of medical neglect of her grandson, for not seeking medical care promptly for a burn on his leg. As Respondent is a day care provider, she requested an expedited 14-day review period of her request for expungement of indicated finding. A request for a 14-daqy review does not void a request for an expedited appeal, but only extended  timeline in which final decision becomes due. As Respondent rejected earlier dates for hearing, the delay was attributable to Respondent, which converted her expedited appeal to a regular appeal. As her due process rights were not denied, and Director's decision was issued within 90-day deadline for a final administrative decision, Respondent was not entitled to expungement as a matter of law.  (FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring.)

Court terminated parental rights of Respondent father. Court did not deny Respondent's due process rights as a result of court allowing his counsel to withdraw without first complying with Rule 13, or by failing to admonish his of his right to appeal after entry of dispositional order. During applicable 9-month period, Respondent was incarcerated and made no attempt to contact caseworker; and he did not attempt to arrange any visits with minor through DCFS during entirety of proceedings.Court's finding that it was in minor's best interest to terminate Respondent's parental rights was not against manifest weight of evidence. (LYTTON and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Respondent minor, age 17 at time of offense, was adjudicated delinquent of armed robbery and sentenced to 3 years probation. Totality of circumstances and U.S. Supreme Court's 1972 Neil v. Biggers decision factors favor State and support court's finding that victim's identification was reliable. Victim had an unobstructed view of minor's face and his gun from a distance of 2 feet for 5-7 minutes, was certain he was the man who robbed her at gunpoint and had to problem at all picking him out of photo array. The basic legal principle that a single eyewitness identification of the accused under circumstances permitting a positive identification is sufficient to convict is still intact. Minor failed to overcome strong presumption that counsel, as a matter of sound trial strategy, decided not to present victim's 9-year-old daughter as a witness to deprive State of an opportunity to emphasize that she sat next to victim as she was being robbed, and thus no ineffective assistance of counsel. (PIERCE and WALKER, concurring.)

Court terminated parental rights of Respondent mother as to her children, now ages 9 and 6. Respondent cannot show prejudice as to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, as she was adequately served and made fully aware that she risked losing her parental rights by failing to comply with DCFS requirements. As service of process for personal jurisdiction was effective, orders were not void, and thus counsel would not have gained anything by raising claim as to service. (MASON and HYMAN, concurring.)

Prior to birth of minor, now age 5, DCFS had opened cases against Respondent mother as to her 6 other children. Minor was placed in a foster home and has resided there throughout pendency of abuse and neglect case. Court erred in focusing on parental fitness in relation to changing permanency goal or closing case to private guardianship. In setting permanency goal, court must give full consideration to the best interest factors outlines in Section 2-28 of Juvenile Court Act.Mother's slow progress toward reunification, her failure to achieve return home with any of her other children, raise serious concerns about her ability to parent the minor. Mother has consistently failed to complete random drug screenings. Further attempts at returning home are not in minor's best interest. Adoption and termination of mother's parental rights are not appropriate as mother and minor continue to have a relationship with one another. Private guardianship with foster parents is an appropriate permanency goal and would serve minor's best interests. (HOWSE and ELLIS, concurring.)

(Dissent from denial of rehearing.) Circuit court erred when it terminated Respondent fathers parental rights to his minor child. Unconstitutional aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) conviction is null and void, and thus cannot serve as a basis for finding father depraved under section 1(D)(i) of Adoption Act. With this conviction removed from consideration, DCFS cannot establish that father met the statutory definition of depravity. Thus, termination of parental rights of father under presumption of depravity was thus contrary to manifest weight of evidence. (BURKE, concurring; KILBRIDE and NEVILLE, specially concurring; THEIS, THOMAS, and GARMAN, dissenting.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/14/18.) Court involuntarily terminated parental rights of both parents as to their 4 minor children, after hearing substantial testimony from several witnesses, and entered order that the minor children be placed for adoption. Juvenile Court Act and Adoption Act do not deprive children or parents of due process, as they give the parties and the court a fair and meaningful opportunity to address what final measures are in the best interests of the child. Section 2-28 of Juvenile Court Act passes constitutional muster, as adoption is the least restrictive method that State can pursue to resolve competing interests and considerations as to best interests of dependent children.(MIKVA and WALKER, concurring.)