Public Act 100-987
(Andersson, R-Geneva; Mulroe, D-Chicago) creates the Criminal and Traffic Assessment Act. The Act would standardize court-filing fees and fines into 13 schedules of potential assessments for criminal and traffic offenses and four schedules for civil court cases. The Act also caps the maximum amount of money that can be assessed under each schedule and for various services or filings within the court process. The money collected under these assessment schedules would then be distributed at the state, county, and local levels for officials to decide how to best allocate their portion for maintaining the courts. It would also provide a sliding-scale waiver for some civil litigants and criminal defendants depending on their income relative to the federal poverty level. It has an immediate effective date for part of it and a delayed effective date for most of it.
Public Act 100-966
(Bush, D-Grayslake; Cassidy, D-Chicago) allows a court to waive the notice and publication requirement to change a person's name if the person files a written declaration that they believe that publishing their name change would put them at risk of physical harm or discrimination. The movant must provide evidence to support this claim. Effective January 1, 2019
Public Act 100-923
In re A.P.-M
Court terminated parental rights of Respondent mother as to 3 of her children, and nearly 2 years later terminated her parental rights as to her 1 other child. As the first order was not a final order, court had jurisdiction when it issued second order terminating parental rights. DCFS did not violate Respondents due process rights, and it was not fundamentally unfair, when DCFS terminated Respondents reunification services, when child was not scheduled to be reunified with Respondent. No ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to object to termination of reunification services, as it is highly unlikely that court would have changed permanency goal to Respondent.(KNECHT and TURNER, concurring.)
Public Act 100-714
(Morrison, D-Deerfield; Olsen, R-Amends the Illinois Human Rights Act to provide that an "order of protection status" includes status as a person protected under the Protective Orders Article of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the Stalking No Contact Order Act and the Civil No Contact Order Act. Effective January 1, 2019.
Public Act 100-639
(Feigenholtz, D-Chicago; Hunter, D-Chicago) amends the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 and the Protective Orders Article of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. It adds to the list of protected persons any of the following persons abused by a family or household member of a child: (1) a foster parent of that child if the child has been placed in the foster parent's home by the Department of Children and Family Services or by another state's public child welfare agency; (2) a legally appointed guardian or legally appointed custodian of that child; (3) an adoptive parent of that child; or (4) a prospective adoptive parent of that child if the child has been placed in the prospective adoptive parent's home pursuant to the Adoption Act or pursuant to another state's law. Authorizes these persons to file a petition for an order of protection. Effective January 1, 2019.
Public Act 100-607
In re M.C.
Courts order terminating parental rights of Respondent father was not against manifest weight of evidence. Minor is in a good home, her needs are being met, and she is thriving in her current placement, and her foster parents are willing to adopt her. Respondent has not been a parent to minor and will remain unable to be a parent for the foreseeable future due to his lengthy prison sentence for armed violence. (HARRIS and TURNER, concurring.)
In re Maurice J.
(Court opinion corrected 7/26/18.) Minor respondent was adjudicated delinquent for committing offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) by carrying a firearm on his person while under age 21. Officer claimed that he stopped car in which Respondent was a passenger due to a minor traffic violation. Officers mistaken belief that driver committed a traffic violation was unreasonable where driver never left the street to avoid a sped bump. Seizure of Respondent as an occupant in the car, which occurred when police activated lights and siren, was also unreasonable. Seizure led officers to observe Respondent with the firearm and to recover it. Thus, Respondent was entitled to suppression of such evidence.(FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, concurring.)