Child Law

Court entered finding that Respondent father was an unfit parent and terminating his parental rights. Respondent was lawfully incarcerated in a federal prison in Wisconsin at the time of hearings, which rendered him unable to exercise his statutory right to be present. Court made efforts to afford Respondent opportunities to participate in hearing, and appointed counsel as soon as it became aware of his desire to participate. Respondent showed obstructive behavior in failing to grant consent to CHASI caseworkers to access his prison records, which supported finding of failure to make reasonable progress or efforts.Court did not deny Respondent's statutory right to be present or violate his due process rights. (BURKE and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Petitioner is the biological mother of minor, now age 15. Minor’s paternal uncle and aunt filed petition for guardianship of minor, which court granted, over mother’s objection. Court granted mother’s petition to discharge guardianship. Court found that mother failed to establish a material change in circumstances occurred since initial granting  of guardianship of minor to the Guardians. Court's decision to grant directed finding and to deny mother's petition was not against manifest weight of evidence. Court properly limited hearing on petition to discharge guardianship to evidence germane to that proceeding, and issue of subject matter jurisdiction and standing were not probative to that petition. (BURKE and ELLIS, concurring.)

Minor and his older brother were made wards of the court and have lived with foster parent for 5 years. Facts and law justify court's order appointing foster mother as guardian of minor. Mother's attorney did not object during hearing when judge said she had a conversation with minor. Mother failed to show that she was prejudiced by the conversation, and it was merely cumulative, as many witnesses testified that minor said that he wanted to continue living with foster mother.(NEVILLE and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Court entered orders finding respondent father to be an unfit parent and terminating father's parental rights as to the minor who, at 6 weeks old, suffered fractures to femur and tibia by means other than accidental while in the care of her father. Agreed facts supporting father's guilty plea to aggravated domestic battery were in direct contradiction to father's sworn testimony during hearing on petition to terminate his parental rights.(McDADE and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

Court granted State's petition for termination of parental rights alleging that father was a depraved person per section 1(D)(i) of Adoption Act. Court erred in finding, on basis of wrong standard, that presumption of depravity had not been rebutted. Absent the presumption, father could have argued how classes he had taken and would take showed resetting of his moral compass and concrete steps for a different life. Respondent need not rebut presumption by clear and convincing evidence, but only had to provide evidence opposing presumption. (CARTER and WRIGHT, concurring)

In context of a juvenile neglect proceeding, Respondent father filed a supplemental petition to reinstate wardship over his minor child, so that Respondent could establish that he was no longer dispositionally unfit as a parent. State and DCFS opposed petition, but GAL supported petition. After hearing, court denied petition. All 3 conditions listed in section 2-33(1) of Juvenile Court Act must be satisfied before a supplemental petition for reinstatement of wardship may be granted. Court properly denied petition, as factual situation failed to satisfy the first listed condition: that wardship and guardianship under the Act were vacated in conjunction with appointment of a private guardian under Probate Act. (O'BRIEN and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

Court adjudicated minor neglected, determining that minor's mother contributed to injurious environment but Respondent father did not. At dispositional hearing, court found that minor's mother was unfit and that Respondent father was fit. Court adjudicated minor a ward of the court and appointed DCFS as guardian with the right to place. Court did not grant legal custody to either party, and thus DCFS had the rights and responsibilities of legal custody of minor. Court must show, before Respondent father loses his superior right to custody, that father was unfit, unable, or unwilling to care for minor under Section 2-27(1) of Juvenile Court Act. Court abused its discretion in appointing DCFS as guardian with right to place.(CARTER and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Possession of a stolen vehicle is not a violation of a traffic law, such that a minor accused of committing offense may be tried as an adult pursuant to Section 5-125 of Juvenile Court Act. Character of offense does not change because Defendants committed offense while operating vehicles in traffic. Court properly found that Defendants, age 15 and 17 at time of offense, could not be prosecuted as adults. (ZENOFF and BURKE, concurring.)