Child Law

Respondent appealed from a trial court order granting the State’s petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. On appeal, respondent argued that the trial court’s findings of unfitness were void because the court lacked personal jurisdiction at the adjudicatory and dispositional phases of the proceedings, that the court’s finding of fitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the court erred in denying respondent’s requests to continue the fitness and best-interest hearings. The appellate court vacated and remanded, finding that the State failed to meet its burden by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was an unfit parent. (STEIGMANN and CAVANAGH, concurring)

Respondent appealed from a trial court order terminating her parental rights to her minor children. On appeal, respondent argued that the court’s unfitness finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court’s best-interest finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence, her due process rights were violated when the court denied her motion to represent herself, the State failed to provide reasonable accommodations for respondent to complete required services during incarceration, and respondent was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The appellate court affirmed finding, among other things, that respondent did not request to represent herself in the proceedings that were subject of the appeal, and that respondent’s remaining arguments lacked merit. The appellate court also ordered sanctions against respondent’s appellate attorney for violating the rules of professional conduct, including “abuse of the adversary system” by “[f]lagrant and unprincipled use of AI without ensuring the accuracy of the generated response.” (LANNERD and KNECHT, concurring)

Respondent appealed from a trial court order denying her petition to discharge the private guardian of her minor children, arguing that the trial court erred when it considered the petition under the Juvenile Court Act instead of the Probate Act. Respondent also argued that the trial court finding that it was in the children’s best interest to maintain the private guardianship was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court correctly applied the Juvenile Court Act to the petition when it considered it as a petition to reinstate wardship and re-open a previously closed case and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was in the best interests of the children to maintain the wardship. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring)

In an amended petition for adjudication of wardship, the State alleged that respondent committed two acts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and one act of battery. The juvenile court found respondent guilty of all three charges and sentenced respondent to two years of probation and imposed the requirement that respondent have no unsupervised contact with any minor not related to him. On appeal, respondent argued that the juvenile court, under plain error review, committed a clear or obvious error by imposing a “no contact” condition of his probation. Respondent also argued that the battery adjudication should be vacated under the one-act, one-crime rule. The appellate court held that respondent did not establish that the juvenile court committed a clear or obvious error by not vacating the battery adjudication; however, the appellate court further found that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not challenging the “no contact” condition of probation. The appellate court vacated this condition of probation and remanded for entry of a revised order. (STEIGMANN and KNECHT, concurring)