Commercial Banking, Collections, and Bankruptcy

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-debt collector’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiffs’ actions, alleging that defendant failed to identify name of creditor to whom debt is currently owed in violation of section 1692g(a)(2) of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Record showed that: (1) defendant sent form letters stating name of original creditor as Comenity Capital Bank and its client as “Pay Pal Credit;” and (2) plaintiffs had Pay Pal accounts, and that Comenity Capital Bank was owner of plaintiffs’ debts. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant presented sufficient information about plaintiffs’ creditor and debts in manner that unsophisticated consumer could understand, where letter identified single creditor, as well as commercial name to which plaintiffs had been exposed. Fact that letter identified Comenity Capital Bank as “original” rather than “current” creditor did not require different result, since: (1) letter, by informing plaintiffs that they could request name of original creditor if different from current creditor, alerted plaintiffs to possibility that original and current creditor was the same entity; and (2) FDCPA does not require use of any specific terminology to identify creditor.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing for lack of standing plaintiff-debtor’s class action alleging that defendant-debt collector violated sections 1692g(a)(4) and (5) of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by neglecting to inform her that any notification that disputed debt and that any request for name and address of original creditor must be made in writing. Plaintiff lacked standing to pursue instant claim, where she failed to allege that she tried to dispute her debt or verify her original creditor without submitting written requests, and where instant bare allegation of procedural violation without any allegation of concrete harm failed to satisfy injury-in-fact requirement to establish federal jurisdiction. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s action that she had standing simply because defendant had failed to provide her with all information required under sections 1692g(a)(4), (5). (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-surety’s action seeking to invoke doctrine of quia timet to require defendant to deposit $2.5 million in cash as bond collateral and satisfy all bond obligations issued by plaintiff on behalf of defendant under circumstances where certain subcontractors had sued defendant for failure to pay for labor and materials used in construction project covered by said bonds. Record showed that plaintiff had previously settled with defendant with respect to its contractual claim regarding written indemnity agreement calling for defendant to repay plaintiff for claims made against said bonds. As such, plaintiff could not use doctrine of quia timet to force defendant to make good on instant indemnity agreement, since: (1) plaintiff had settled its claim against defendant based on indemnity agreement; and (2) surety cannot use general equitable principles to obtain rights beyond those for which it negotiated in written indemnity agreement.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support Bankruptcy Ct. order that denied discharge of debtor’s debts in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, where two creditors filed adversary proceeding that contended that debtor omitted information in her petition that was material to debtor’s financial condition. Bankruptcy Ct. could properly find that certain real estate owned by debtor, debtor’s guarantee to bank on loan given to debtor’s company, debtor’s joint bank accounts and debtor’s use of alternative name in prior financial dealings were all not disclosed in bankruptcy petition. Moreover, Bankruptcy Ct. could properly conclude that debtor acted “fraudulently” by omitting said information from her petition with intent to deceive court and creditors, where record showed that: (1) debtor took active role in her financial affairs and was aware of her assets and liabilities; (2) debtor supplied information to her attorney who reviewed with debtor each page of petition before petition was filed; (3) said omissions deprived court and creditors accurate account of debtor’s financial affairs; and (4) said omissions underscored over-arching pattern of false statements that reflected disregard for truth.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing plaintiff-bank’s claim alleging that defendant issued erroneous CARPELS rating that exposed plaintiff to extra oversight and caused it to pay increased deposit insurance. At some point, plaintiff merged into non-bank enterprise and sought under Administrative Procedure Act (APA) refund of increased insurance payments. Yet, plaintiff could not assert said claim under APA, where: (1) APA establishes right of review only where there is no other adequate remedy in court; and (2) plaintiff asserted that it had such remedy under 12 USC section 1817(e)(1). Moreover, plaintiff could only use section 1817(e)(1) as source of financial payout if Tucker Act applied and could only assert said action in Ct. of Federal Claims. Also, plaintiff forfeited any claim under either section 1817(e)(1) or 1819(a) because plaintiff failed to raise section 1819(a) claim in Dist. Ct. and failed to alert Dist. Ct. to potential relief under section 1817(e)(1) until after Dist. Ct. had dismissed case.