Commercial Banking, Collections, and Bankruptcy

Mervyn v. Atlas Van Lines

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Contracts
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 17-2036
Decision Date: 
February 14, 2018
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendant-trucking company’s motion for summary judgment in plaintiff-truck driver’s action alleging that defendant breached terms of lease to haul shipments, as well as violated federal Truth-in-Leasing regulations that covered terms of said lease. While plaintiff claimed that defendant had failed to pay him correct amount for said shipments as set forth in lease, plaintiff could not bring instant breach of contract action, where: (1) clause in lease indicated that financial entries made by defendant on payment documents were presumed correct and final if not disputed by plaintiff within 30 days after payment distribution; and (2) plaintiff waited 4 years to file instant lawsuit that essentially challenged said entries. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that said clause created only rebuttable presumption that could be challenged via instant lawsuit.

HR 828

Topic: 
Malpractice insurance

(Demmer, R-Dixon) urges the ARDC to look into further amending Supreme Court Rule 756 to require Illinois attorneys to disclose to prospective and current clients if and when the attorney's malpractice insurance has lapsed. This is a legislative resolution. It has just been introduced. 

Senate Bill 2432

Topic: 
Service of summons and foreclosure

(Mulroe, D-Chicago) provides that a summons that otherwise complies with Supreme Court Rules and is properly served is not invalidated and the court's jurisdiction is not affected by an error in format. Provides that a summons is not defective if the named defendant is listed on a document attached to the summons. Provides that the changes to the Code of Civil Procedure are declarative of existing law set forth by the Illinois Supreme Court in Fleshner v. Copeland, 13 Ill.2d 72 (1958).

Amends the Mortgage Rescue Fraud Act to provide that it is a violation for a distressed property consultant to, among other things, enter into, enforce, or act upon any agreement with a foreclosure defendant, whether the foreclosure is completed or otherwise, if the agreement provides for a division of proceeds between the foreclosure defendant and the distressed property consultant derived from litigation related to the foreclosure. Just introduced. 

Toll Processing Services, LLC v. Kastalon, Inc.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Conversion
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 15-3187
Decision Date: 
January 23, 2018
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed and reversed in part and remanded

Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in action alleging that defendant wrongfully converted plaintiff’s pickle line rolls that had been stored at defendants’ facility awaiting plaintiff’s purchase order to defendants to recondition said rolls. While Dist. Ct. based its ruling on finding that plaintiff had abandoned said rolls where plaintiff did not communicate with defendants regarding said rolls for approximately 32 months under circumstances where parties had assumed that plaintiff would place purchase order within few months, Ct. of Appeals found that there was insufficient evidence for Dist. Ct. to decide on summary judgment that plaintiff had intended to abandon said rolls. This is so, since reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff’s prolonged silence, standing alone, did not constitute decisive and unambiguous intent to abandon said rolls, especially where there was no evidence that anyone at plaintiff told defendants that it did not want said rolls or did not intend to use or sell them. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, in granting defendants’ summary judgment motion with respect to plaintiff’s similar breach of contract claim, since there was no meeting of minds with respect to how long defendants had agreed to store rolls, and since plaintiff did not know at time of alleged contract formation when, if ever, it would issue purchase order.

The Bank of New York Mellon v. Laskowski

Illinois Supreme Court
Civil Court
Service
Citation
Case Number: 
2018 IL 121995
Decision Date: 
Friday, January 19, 2018
District: 
3d Dist.
Division/County: 
Will Co.
Holding: 
Appellate court reversed; remanded.
Justice: 
THOMAS

Plaintiff bank, as trustee for certificate holders of an alternative loan trust, filed residential mortgage foreclosure complaint against various defendants, including Pacific Realty Group. Court granted Bank's motion to vacate DWP (entered sua sponte upon Plaintiff's attorney's failure to appear), and reinstated case. Pacific filed motion to quash service 48 days after reinstatement of case, and 90 days after it filed its appearance, alleging that it is a foreign LLC and that it does not have a registered agent in Illinois.The 60-day time limit for filing motion to quash, in Section 15-1505.6(1) of Mortgage Foreclosure Law, is tolled while underlying case is DWP. THus, Pacific's motion to quash service was timely filed.(KARMEIER, FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

A.L. Dougherty Real Estate Management Co., LLC v. Tsai

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Fraudulent Transfer Act
Citation
Case Number: 
2017 IL App (1st) 161949
Decision Date: 
Friday, December 29, 2017
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 1st Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
PIERCE

(Court opinion corrected 1/18/18.) Plaintiffs obtained default judgment against a company owned by Defendant Tsai, for breaching a commercial lease. Plaintiffs later learned that while underlying action was pending, company agreed to sell certain assets to Defendant Cube Global, a company formed by Defendant Tsai's 16-year-old daughter. After bench trial, court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Court properly declined to evaluate Plaintiffs' veil piercing claim under principle applicable to breach of contract claims as this dispute involves enforcement of a judgment not a breach of contract. Court properly admitted escrow and closing documents into evidence as a reasonable trier of fact could conclude from Defendant Tsai's testimony that they were authentic and were what Plaintiffs claimed they were.(SIMON and MIKVA, concurring.)

Boucher v. Finance System of Green Bay, Inc.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 17-2308
Decision Date: 
January 17, 2018
Federal District: 
E.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Reversed

Dist. Ct. erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ claim under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, alleging that defendant-debt collector’s dunning letter that threatened to impose “late charges and other charges” was impermissibly deceptive because said charges could not lawfully be imposed under Wisconsin law. While Dist. Ct. based instant dismissal on fact that said phrase matched safe harbor language set forth in Miller, 214 F.2d 872, defendant could not immunize itself by using said language, where said language was not accurate under circumstances of instant case.

The Oilgear Company v. Hitt

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Contract
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 17-2534
Decision Date: 
January 12, 2018
Federal District: 
E.D. Wisc.
Holding: 
Affirmed

Dist. Ct. did not err in granting plaintiff’s motion for entry of declaratory judgment that it was entitled to defer payment of $430,000 that was owed to defendant pursuant to contract to purchase defendant’s stock in plaintiff’s company, where parties had entered into agreement with plaintiff’s creditor (Bank) in which parties had acknowledged that plaintiff’s debt to defendant was subordinate to plaintiff’s debt to Bank, and that defendant would not be paid while plaintiff was in default of its obligation to Bank. Record showed that plaintiff was in default to Bank at all relevant times, and that Bank did not give plaintiff permission to pay defendant as was required by parties' agreement with Bank. As such, since plaintiff’s debt to defendant was junior to plaintiff’s debt to Bank, defendant must wait for payment from plaintiff until either Bank consents to plaintiff’s payment to defendant or until plaintiff cures its default of its debt to Bank.

Bank of America, N.A. v. Veluchamy

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Bankruptcy
Citation
Case Number: 
Nos. 15-2902 et al.
Decision Date: 
January 12, 2018
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed

In bankruptcy adversary action by creditor alleging that debtors had either hid or transferred bankruptcy estate assets to family and friends, Bankruptcy Ct. did not err in directing debtors to return $5.5 million to estate, where said funds had been transferred to Indian company one year prior to filing bankruptcy petition. While debtors argued that said transfer was legitimate because it reduced lines of credit for company that was controlled by debtors, Bankruptcy Ct. could find that said transfer was sham, where debtors failed to produce documentation to support their claim, and where there was no evidence that said company treated funds as reduction in lines of credit. Fact that Indian company was not party to instant adversary proceeding did not preclude Bankruptcy Ct. from making said finding where there was no evidence that Indian company took control over said funds. Also, Bankruptcy Ct. did not abuse its discretion in directing debtors’ children to turnover $18,577,954 based upon debtors’ instruction to company to issue stock to debtors’ children in effort to dilute debtors’ interest in said company and to divert assets to their children. While children argued that amount of turnover was erroneous, since it failed to focus on what estate lost in said transfer as opposed to what they had received, Bankruptcy Ct. had discretion to base turnover order on value of stock, and valuation method used was reasonable. Moreover, children did not otherwise challenge valuation of company prior to stock dilution.