Construction Law

Five-alarm fire destroyed 100-year-old, 6-story building which had fallen into disrepair. Fire was caused by unlicensed contractor who Estate had hired to complete work in basement, and he never obtained permit for work. Sparks from torches being used then started fire. Public policy did not support imposition of strict liability upon wrecking company and construction company for damages resulting from demolition of building.  Section 1-4-7 of Municipal Code does not impose strict liability on a municipality; negligence is required for statute to apply. Court properly denied Estate's motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict or, in the alternative, its motion for a new trial. Jury heard conflicting evidence that Estate was negligent in hiring unqualified person to make repairs to building, and evidence that wrecking company was negligent in demolishing building which caused damage to adjacent building and led to its demolition.  General verdict creates presumption that jury found in favor of Defendant on each defense, where no special interrogatories were requested by the moving party. Evidence was sufficient for jury to conclude that Estate was more than 50% negligent, thus barring recovery by Estate. (REYES, concurring; GORDON, specially concurring.)

Mechanics Lien Act does not restrict the availability of liens for architects, engineers, land surveyors, or property managers to services performed only for the raising, lowering, or removal of a house, and can include services done for the purpose of improving property. Resolution of issue as to whether owner of property at time contract for services was entered into knowingly permitted developers to enter into contracts regarding the property involves genuine issues of material fact, and thus summary judgment is precluded. (FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

Plaintiff was injured while working on construction project on Washington Street bridge in Chicago; his employer had contracted with City to do certain work on project, including sandblasting and painting bridge. Plaintiff sued City, and two subcontractors. Court properly granted summary judgment for all Defendants. Neither subcontractor entrusted work to employer and retained control over employer’s work such that they would owe a duty to Plaintiff under Section 414 of Restatement (Second) of Torts. Contracts between subcontractors and employer did not state that subcontractors would supervise employer in manner in which its workers did their work. Contract with City provided that City’s supervision of employer was discretionary, so that City is immune pursuant to Section 2-201 of Tort Immunity Act. (REYES and McBRIDE, concurring.)

Dispute over mechanics liens arising from construction project to develop real property owned by Plaintiff. Court correctly construed language of Section 30 of Mechanics Lien Act that "the court shall find the amount due from the owner to the contractor" to refer to the amount due from owner to lien claimants' immediate contractor. Court correctly found that outstanding amount owed on contract between general contractor and subcontractor limited funds recoverable from Plaintiff and general contractor to satisfy liens of that subcontractor and its subcontractors. When parties to relevant contract have agreed as to amount owed on contract, there is no longer a triable issue of material fact as to that amount, even if a non-party contends otherwise. It is consistent with liberal construction of Mechanics Lien Act to permit court, in its equitable discretion, to require deposit of funds and thus extinguish liens of subcontractors. (CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)