Criminal Law

Defendant was found guilty but mentally ill of six counts of home invasion, one count of armed violence, three counts of attempted aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated domestic battery, six counts of aggravated battery, and two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court’s findings of guilty but mentally ill were against the manifest weight of the evidence, that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel, that she could not be convicted of aggravated kidnapping of her own child, and that her conviction of aggravated domestic battery must be vacated under the one-act, one-crime doctrine. The appellate court affirmed the convictions of home invasion, armed violence, aggravated battery, and unlawful use of a weapon. The appellate court modified the convictions of attempted aggravated kidnapping to the lesser-included offenses of unlawful restraint and attempted unlawful restraint and remanded for resentencing. Finally, the appellate court reversed the convictions of aggravated domestic battery and aggravated battery and vacated the sentence imposed for aggravated domestic battery. (JORGENSEN and MULLEN, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and armed violence and was sentenced to 22 years in prison. On direct appeal, defendant argued that the armed violence statute violated the Second Amendment, both on its face and as-applied, that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor and witnesses for the State to refer to the decedent as the “victim,” and that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request for the duty to retreat instruction in self-defense. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the statute does not conflict with the provisions of the second amendment because the armed violence statute does not regulate the possession of a firearm by law-abiding citizens, that the defendant was not prejudiced by the description of the decedent as the “victim” because the references were insignificant and unobtrusive, and that the trial court judge did not err in its instruction of the jury. (VAN TINE and D.B. WALKER, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, arguing that the trial court did not properly consider her youth at the time of the offense. The trial court granted leave to file successive petition, which it then denied at the second stage. Defendant appealed, arguing that post-conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to properly support her sentencing claim in the successive petition. The appellate court affirmed, finding that it could not find counsel failed to adequately present defendant’s proportionate penalties clause claim when the law on sentencing was rapidly changing. (LAMPKIN and ROCHFORD, concurring)

Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery and was sentenced to two years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial when the circuit court misconstrued the “knowingly” standard. The appellate court agreed and reversed and remanded for a new trial, explaining that the trial court applied the incorrect section of the Criminal Code. (BRENNAN and HOLDRIDGE, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and was sentenced to 30 months of probation. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by admitting other acts evidence and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. In a prior appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court found that while the trial court erred in the admission of other acts evidence, it was harmless error and remanded for the appellate court to consider the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to object to other acts and hearsay evidence. (C.A. WALKER, concurring and MIKVA, dissenting)