Criminal Law

Defendant appealed from an order of the circuit court denying his pro se petition for relief from judgment filed under section 2-1401(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, explaining that although defendant deposited his notice of appeal in the prison mail system several days in advance of the due date, he failed to certify the mailing date in compliance with supreme court rules. (MITCHELL and TAILOR, concurring)

The Illinois Supreme Court considered the question of whether a trial court must decide a defendant’s mid-trial motion for a directed verdict before proceeding to the defense’s evidence. The appellate court held that the defendant forfeited the issue on appeal and affirmed the defendant’s conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court held that a trial court must decide the motion before advancing to the defense’s evidence; however, it nevertheless affirmed under a plain error review by finding the error to be harmless. (NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, concurring and CUNNINGHAM, THEIS, and ROCHFORD, specially concurring)

In a criminal case, the defendant filed a petition for rule to show cause against two doctors who were officials of the Department of Human Services for failing to transfer defendant to a department facility for fitness restoration treatment in violated of the trial court’s order. The circuit court issued the rule to show cause, found the doctors in indirect civil contempt of court, and imposed a monetary sanction for every day that passed without defendant being transferred to a facility. After the transfer was completed and the monetary sanction established, the department and the doctors appealed. The appellate court vacated the trial court’s contempt order and the sanction imposed, finding that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the doctors willfully or contumaciously violated the court’s order. (HOLDRIDGE and ANDERSON, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of armed violence and was sentenced to 18 years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the armed violence statute violated his second amendment right to carry a handgun for self-defense, both facially and as-applied. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant’s conduct in which he possessed a controlled substance while simultaneously possessing an operational firearm was not protected under the second amendment. (VAUGHAN and SHOLAR, concurring)

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon pursuant to a statute that was subsequently found to be unconstitutional. As part of his plea agreement, the prosecution nol-prossed three additional counts. After his conviction was vacated, he petitioner for a certificate of innocence, which was denied by the circuit court on the grounds that petitioner was required to prove innocence on all four AUUW counts. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the circuit and appellate courts that denial of the petition was proper because defendant failed to prove that he was innocent of all four charges in the information. (THEIS, HOLDER WHITE, and CUNNINGHAM, concurring and ROCHFORD, NEVILLE, and O’BRIEN, specially concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of multiple counts of child pornography and was sentenced to a total term of 120 years in prison. On appeal, defendant appealed from his convictions and sentences, raising speedy trial, evidentiary, sufficiency of the evidence, unit of prosecution, and sentencing issues. The appellate court vacated two of his convictions by finding that the unit of prosecution precluded them and remanded for resentencing, but otherwise rejected defendant’s arguments and affirmed. (MOORE and BARBERIS, concurring)

Defendant appealed after he was found guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse. On remand from the supreme court, the appellate court considered defendant’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel did not object to the admission of other acts evidence and that defendant was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of that evidence. (C.A. WALKER, concurring and MIKVA, dissenting)

Defendant appealed from the denial of his post-conviction petition in which he challenged his 80-year sentence for first-degree murder and for personally discharging a firearm to cause death. At the time of the offense, defendant was 18 years old. On appeal, defendant argued that his petition established cause and prejudice, allowing him to litigate his sentencing claim in a successive post-conviction petition, and that he made a substantial showing of constitutional violation requiring further litigation at an evidentiary hearing. Defendant also argued that counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing to adequately defend his claim against the State’s motion to dismiss. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant did not demonstrate factual cause that would entitle him to litigate a successive petition and that his criticism of post-conviction counsel was unfounded. (PUCINSKI and GRAMRATH, concurring)