Criminal Law

Defendant was found guilty of four counts of domestic battery and one count of unlawful restraint and was sentenced to five years in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the victim disavowed her prior identification of defendant as the offender and that the trial court improperly allowed a witness to testify to the results of Internet database searches. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court’s determination that the victim’s prior statements were the correct version of what occurred was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the records of the witness’ database searches were not hearsay and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring)

Defendant, who was charged with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion seeking review of his pretrial detention by finding that continued detention was necessary to avoid the real and present threat that he posed. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court’s decision should be reversed because he established a change in circumstances showing that there were less restrictive means of protecting the community from any threat that he posed. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that continued detention was necessary because the defendant failed to present any new information or demonstrate a change in circumstances to justify changing the court’s decision to order defendant’s pretrial detention. (KNECHT and DeARMOND, concurring)

Defendant appealed from the circuit court’s order granting the State’s petition to deny pretrial release, arguing that the petition was untimely because it was filed months after his first appearance and that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions could mitigate any threat he posed. The appellate court affirmed, explaining that the first appearance occurred under the Juvenile Justice Act and that it was not until the matter was transferred to criminal court that the provisions of the Pretrial Fairness Act were triggered. The appellate court further found that the trial court did not err in finding that no conditions would prevent defendant from continuing to be a threat based on his gang affiliation and prior adjudications. (PETERSON and ANDERSON, concurring)

Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder and that he personally discharged a firearm that was a proximate cause of the victim’s death. Defendant was also found guilty of several counts of concealment of a homicidal death and dismembering a human body. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because trial counsel failed to seek suppression of a video-recorded interview, did not seek to redact inadmissible statements made by police and suggestions of other crimes, and in requesting a limiting instruction concerning the inadmissible statements. Defendant also sought to vacate several of his convictions for dismemberment and concealment. The Illinois Supreme Court found that trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel because defendant could not establish prejudice. The court further concluded that defendant was improperly convicted of multiple counts of dismemberment and concealment. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

The Illinois Supreme Court considered the sentencing provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code and County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act to consider whether the Vehicle Code, where it authorizes a minimum term of imprisonment of 30 days or 300 hours of community service, permits the circuit court to sentence the defendant to a 14-day term of imprisonment and whether the Behavior Act permits the circuit court to make the 14-day sentence subject to day-for-day credit for good behavior. The court held that the Vehicle Code did not permit the circuit court to sentence defendant to 14 days in jail and that the Behavior Act did not permit good behavior for the sentence because the credit reduced the sentence to a term less than the mandatory minimum sentence. (THEIS, OVERSTREET, HOLDER WHITE, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

The Illinois Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an as-applied challenge to the Pretrial Release Act. The petitioner, who was the defendant in the underlying criminal case, was charged with possession of a stolen motor vehicle and was initially released; however, after she failed to appear the State filed a petition for sanctions. Respondent, an associate judge of the circuit court, did not act on the petition and instead declared the Act unconstitutional as applied to petitioner’s case because it did not allow him to indefinitely detain petitioner before trial and he argued that he had an inherent authority to detain defendants prior to trial. The supreme court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, finding that the Act does not violate the separation of powers clause as applied to this case and that the respondent had no authority under the Act or the Illinois Constitution to indefinitely detain the petitioner. (THEIS, NEVILLE, OVERSTREET, CUNNINGHAM, ROCHFORD, and O’BRIEN, concurring)

Petitioner was found guilty of two first-degree murders and an attempted third murder and was sentenced to natural life, plus 30 years in prison. He subsequently filed a post-conviction petition alleging that because he was 19 years old at the time of the murders his sentence violated the proportionate-penalties clause because of his status as an “emerging adult” who suffered from mental illness at the time of his crimes. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant forfeited his claim by failing to raise it during sentencing and that, even if he had not, a life sentence for a legal adult who was the principal shooter in a premeditated double murder was not arguably unconstitutional. (McBRIDE and HOWSE, concurring)