(Ford, D-Chicago; Belt, D-East St. Louis) amends the Illinois Vehicle Code to provide that no motor vehicle may be stopped or searched by a law enforcement officer solely because of a suspected violation of driving a motor vehicle with any objects placed or suspended between the driver and the front windshield that materially obstructs the driver’s view. Passed both chambers.
(Peters, D-Chicago; Cassidy, D-Chicago) amends Section 2-1401 in the Code of Civil Procedure seeking relief from judgments. Provides that a movant may present a meritorious claim if the allegations establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there was substantial evidence of domestic violence or “gender-based violence” against the movant that was not presented at the movant’s sentencing hearing. Current law requires that no evidence of domestic violence against the movant was presented at the movant’s sentencing hearing. Deletes the requirement that the movant was unaware of the mitigating nature of the evidence of domestic violence and that the movant could not have learned of its significance sooner through diligence. Passed both chambers.
(Tarver, D-Chicago; Ventura, D-Joliet) amends the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 to expand the definition of “protected person” in provisions prohibiting certain deceptive tactics during custodial interrogation to include persons with severe or profound intellectual or developmental disabilities. Passed both chambers.
(Niemerg, R-Teutopolis; Rose, R-Champaign) amends the Code of Criminal procedure to make a rebuttable presumption that the testimony of a victim who is a child under 13 years of age may testify outside the courtroom to be shown in the courtroom by means of closed-circuit television. This presumption may be overcome if the defendant can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child victim will not suffer severe emotional distress. Before the court permits the testimony of victims under this Section by means of a closed-circuit television, the court must make a finding that the testimony does not prejudice the defendant. Passed both chambers.
This case present question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress warrantless police seizure of his clothes located in plain view in trauma room in emergency department of hospital. Record showed that: (1) defendant came to hospital with gunshot wound to his thigh, and that after defendant was taken to trauma room, which contained four walls and door, nurse gathered defendant’s bloody pants and underwear and placed said clothing in clear bag in trauma room; and (2) nurse’s notes indicated that after police arrived in defendant’s trauma room, defendant agreed to police request to look at said clothing and agreed with officer’s statement that officer would be taking said clothing with him. Basis of defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim was that he had reasonable expectation of privacy in his trauma room, such that police were required to obtain warrant to search said room. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, held that defendant did not have legitimate expectation of privacy in instant trauma room, where defendant had no ownership interest in said room and had no ability to exclude others from said room. Appellate Court also noted that trauma room was only temporary placement for defendant, where medical staff could assess his injuries and provide initial medical care.
This case presents question as to whether Class X sentencing treatment on charge of predatory criminal sexual assault of child violates Proportionate Penalties Clause of Illinois Constitution, where defendant submits that offenses of predatory criminal sexual assault of child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse have identical elements, but yield disparate penalties. Appellate Court, in affirming defendant’s 16-year sentence for predatory criminal sexual assault of child, held that there was no Proportionate Penalties Clause violation, since predatory criminal sexual assault of child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse offenses did not have identical elements. Fact that conduct at issue in instant case, i.e. touching of defendant’s penis by child under 13 for purposes of defendant’s sexual gratification or arousal, constituted both predatory criminal sexual assault of child and lesser included offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse did not require different holding.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s motion seeking leave to file successive post-conviction petition, where defendant alleged in said petition that: (1) newly discovered evidence corroborated his claim that his confession was coerced by certain Chicago police detective; and (2) his 45-year sentence on charges of first-degree murder and attempted first degree murder was unconstitutional because he was only 19 years old when his offenses were committed. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that res judicata barred defendant’s claim that his confession was coerced, where: (1) defendant unsuccessfully raised similar issue in his original post-conviction petition and did not establish requisite “prejudice” in the instant petition; (2) conduct by detective at issue in defendant’s case was not sufficiently similar to conduct contained in affidavits from others alleging misconduct by said detective; and (3) certain proffered affidavits did not support defendant’s claims of similar pattern and practice of alleged misconduct by detective. Appellate Court also found that defendant did not satisfy any “cause and prejudice” test for raising instant proportionate penalties claim with respect to his sentence in his successive post-conviction petition, where he could have raised said claim in his original post-conviction petition.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly denied defendant’s request for additional 166 days of sentencing credit for time spent while he was on pre-trial GPS monitoring program prior to entering into negotiated guilty plea that did not include such credit in agreed upon sentence, and where record did not affirmatively indicate that defendant had agreed to forego said credit. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, held that defendant had waived his right to receive all presentence credit that he was entitled to when he entered into fully negotiated guilty plea agreement, and that defendant could not reap benefit of his bargain via plea agreement and then turn to trial court to obtain essentially lesser sentence.
Defendant, who was convicted of first-degree murder when he was 16 years old and sentenced to 71 years in prison, appealed from the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court should have advanced his petition to the second stage because the trial court failed to rule on the petition within 90 days after it was filed. Defendant also argued that his petition sufficiently set forth a Brady violation claim, ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and an actual innocence claim. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the record did not support a finding that the trial court failed to rule on the petition within 90 days of filing and that defendant failed to set forth actionable claims in his petition. (BURKE, concurring and D.B. WALKER, dissenting
(Jimenez, D-Chicago; Simmons, D-Chicago) amends the Juvenile Court Act to give judges more discretion in sentencing if the minor was a survivor of sexual assault, sex trafficking or domestic violence. Passed both chambers.