Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s section 2241 petition, alleging that sentencing court had mischaracterized him as career offender and imposed 35-year sentence on drug and firearms offenses, and that said error had resulted in his inability to pursue reduced sentence under 18 USC section 3582(c)(2). While defendant correctly asserted that he should not have been classified as career offender, where case law generated after his sentencing date established that one of his predicate convictions was not violent felony, said career offender finding did not result in Guideline range that was miscalculated at time of his sentence. Moreover, ineligibility for discretionary relief under section 3583(c)(2), by itself, is insufficient to establish miscarriage of justice for purposes of obtaining relief under section 2241 petition.
Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, concealment of a homicidal death, and obstruction of justice and sentenced to 36 years. Defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition focused on changes to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act that gave inmates the right to present a claim based on post-partum depression and post-partum psychosis. The trial court dismissed the petition at the second stage and defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, finding the trial court erroneously construed the statutory definition of post-partum depression as limiting its existence to one year past the last child’s birthday and that the statutory definitions did not indicate an intent by the legislature to place temporal limits on the condition. (O’BRIEN and DAUGHERITY, concurring)
In prosecution on drug distribution charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs and gun seized from defendant and his car following traffic stop on charge of following too closely to vehicle. Record showed that: (1) DEA agent who had been watching suspected drug house alerted officer that white Audi had left drug house and was headed officer’s way; (2) officer observed defendant driving white Audi at 40 to 45 m.p.h. and within less than car-length from another car; (3) officer stopped defendant’s car based upon perception that defendant was driving too closely to other vehicle; (4) defendant made quick and furtive movements as officer approached defendant’s car, and officer asked defendant to step out of his car; (5) defendant initially disregarded officer’s direction to put cell-phones on dashboard, and during search held his left arm close to his body; (6) during search of left side of defendant’s body, officer saw plastic bag that looked like heroin; and (7) officer subsequently learned that substance in bag was fentanyl and learned, following warrant search at scene of stop, that defendant had outstanding warrant on charge of operating vehicle after lifetime suspension of his driver’s license. While defendant insisted that stop was unlawful because he had not violated any statute, Dist. Ct. could properly credit officer’s version of events, which was corroborated by photograph indicating that officer was in position to make determination about speed of defendant’s car and its proximity to another vehicle. Also, officer could reasonably conduct frisk of defendant following instant stop given defendant’s movements at start of encounter, and inevitable discovery rule applied, where frisk of defendant and search of his car would have occurred once officer was aware of existence of outstanding warrant.
Defendant appealed from the trial court dismissal of his post-conviction petition at the first stage arguing that dismissal was improper where he set forth an arguable claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present a witness who would support his claim of self-defense and failing to present available evidence that rebutted the State’s argument that he fled after the shooting to avoid prosecution. The appellate court reversed and remanded for second-stage proceedings, finding that the defendant’s petition met the “low” threshold required to allege ineffective assistance of counsel. (MIKVA and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring)
Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction petition, arguing that he met the cause and prejudice test on his claim that his 35-year sentence violated the Illinois proportionate penalties clause. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant did not meet the threshold requirement of establishing that his sentence constituted a de facto life sentence. (REYES and MARTIN, concurring)
Defendant appealed from her conviction for driving while her license was suspended arguing that she was denied her sixth amendment right to confrontation when the State relied on a certified copy of her driving abstract to prove its case. The appellate court affirmed, finding that the certified driving abstract was not testimonial because it was not created for the purpose of establishing a fact at trial and that it was admissible under the public records exception to hearsay. (HOLDER WHITE and STEIGMANN, concurring)
Defendant was convicted of attempted murder of a police officer, aggravated discharge of a firearm, unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member, and possession of a defaced firearm and sentenced to 27 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court reversed defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial on all counts except unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member, finding that the erroneous admission of evidence cumulatively deprived defendant of a fair trial. (McLAREN AND SCHOSTOK, concurring)
State argued on appeal that the circuit court order in favor of an innocent owner of a vehicle was error because she was not entitled to have the vehicle returned to her as a joint owner. The appellate court affirmed the order of the circuit court, finding that section 36-2.5(m) of the Criminal Code does not apply to individuals who have met the requirements of an innocent owner as set forth in section 36-2.7 and, as a result, the trial court properly ordered the vehicle returned to her. (HAUPTMAN and McDADE, concurring)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder, attempted murder and home invasion convictions on grounds that police used improperly suggestive procedures over five photo arrays to finally obtain statement from victim that defendant was one of two shooters during incident. While Ct. of Appeals agreed with defendant that procedures used during photo arrays were unnecessarily suggestive, where victim failed to identify defendant as shooter until fifth photo array, under circumstances where victim had previously indicated that another individual “looked like“ shooter, and where the police removed said individual’s photo from subsequent photo arrays until victim identified defendant as shooter. Defendant, though, failed to establish any prejudice arising out of admission of said identification evidence, where: (1) jury had adequate evidence to convict defendant of charged offenses without putting any stock in victim’s identification; and (2) jury was fully aware of defendant’s contention that identification was flawed, and yet still found defendant guilty on charged offenses.
Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in dismissing on timeliness grounds defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his sexual assault of child convictions, where applicable one-year limitations period for filing habeas petition began in February of 2002, and defendant waited until August of 2010 to file instant habeas petition. While defendant argued that he was entitled to statutory tolling because prison law library never informed him of existence of instant one-year limitations period, which created impediment to filing timely habeas petition, Ct. of Appeals held that statutory tolling did not apply, since defendant failed to provide any information regarding his interactions with prison law library personnel to support claim that personnel created any impediment to defendant filing timely petition. Dist. Ct. could also properly deny defendant’s claim to equitable tolling, even though defendant argued that: (1) his appellate counsel retained his case file until June of 2005; (2) he gave case file to jailhouse lawyer, and file was retained by prison authorities until April of 2007, due to transfer of jailhouse lawyer; and (3) certain mental health problems precluded him from filing timely habeas petition. None of defendant’s proffered reasons constituted extraordinary circumstance that prevented him from filing timely habeas petition, since: (1) defendant did not proceed with diligence once he had received file from his counsel; (2) defendant must bear responsibility for time file was with jailhouse lawyer; and (3) none of defendant’s submitted medical records indicated that he was incapable of filing habeas petition.
