Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition that challenged his armed robbery conviction, even though defendant argued that police violated his 5th Amendment rights by extracting confession from him after he informed police that he wanted to cut off his interrogation. Record showed that after police gave defendant Miranda warnings and after defendant had agreed to speak to police without attorney, police initially asked defendant about his presence in stolen van. At some point in interrogation, officer asked defendant about defendant’s participation in robbery, and defendant stated that: “I don’t want to talk about this,” and that “I’m talking about this van.” Defendant argued in his direct appeal that all interrogation should have stopped at this juncture instead of police eventually extracting confession about robbery. Wisconsin Supreme Court, though, could properly find that defendant’s confession was admissible, where defendant’s statements, when taken in context of his interrogation, was ambiguous as to whether he had invoked his Miranda rights and wished to end all further questioning. (Dissent filed.)

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 84-month term of incarceration on unlawful possession of firearm charge, even though applicable Guidelines range was between 51 and 64 months’ incarceration. Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant knowingly joined his passenger’s plan to hold victim at gunpoint, and Ct, of Appeals rejected defendant’s claim that Dist. Ct. was required to consider whether instant upward variance in sentence would create sentencing disparity between defendant and other defendants, especially where Dist. Ct. gave adequate explanation as to why sentence within applicable Guidelines range would not reflect seriousness of defendant’s offense, would not adequately deter him from future and would not adequately protect public. Moreover, instant sentence was not substantively unreasonable, where Dist. Ct. considered legitimate factors in determining defendant’s sentence that included defendant’s almost uninterrupted pattern of criminal conduct since he was 17, lack of deterrent effect of prior punishments and severity of crimes that defendant had committed.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss their indictment on federal arson charge (18 USC section 844(i)), even though defendants argued that said statute was unconstitutional because Congress overstepped its Commerce Clause authority when it enacted said statute. Ct. of Appeals found that said statute was constitutional, where statute’s jurisdictional element limits statute’s reach to discrete set of arsons that have explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce. Record showed that defendants had burned building that housed business, and Ct. observed that section 844(i) covers only property currently used in commerce or in activity affecting commerce.

In prosecution on charge of possession of firearm by felon, Dist. Ct. erred during sentencing when calculating offense level, where Dist. Ct. imposed enhancements under section 2k2.1(b)(4) of USSG for both possession of stolen firearm and for possession of firearm with obliterated serial number, where text of said section indicates that Dist. Ct could impose enhancement for either possession of stolen firearm or possession of firearm with obliterated serial number, but not both. However, error was harmless, where statutory maximum for instant offense, i.e., 120 months, was lower than Dist. Ct.’s resulting guideline range of 135-168 months or guideline range of 121-to-150 months that would have resulted had Dist. Ct. properly imposed only one enhancement. As such, error could not have affected Dist. Ct.’s choice of 108-month sentence for defendant.

Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ request for reduction in their 320-month and 204-month sentences under First Step Act. Both defendants were eligible for such relief, even though their charged drug conspiracy pertained to both crack cocaine and heroin. However, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion on denying their requests for relief, where Dist. Ct gave thorough consideration of relevant 3553(a) sentencing factors that included defendants’ participation in rehabilitation, their prison disciplinary history, nature and seriousness of their offenses, prior criminal history and importance of deterrence. Ct. rejected defendants’ contention that denial of their requests for reduced sentence was improper because Dist. Ct. had duty to avoid unwarranted disparate sentences when compared to sentences given to their co-defendants, since sentencing disparity between co-conspirators is not valid basis to challenge instant Guideline sentences that were otherwise correctly calculated.