On remand from a prior appeal, defendant filed an amended motion to withdraw guilty plea, arguing the trial court failed to substantially comply with SCR 402 before accepting his guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion, finding that defendant had waived the argument by failing to include it in his initial motion to withdraw guilty plea. The appellate court found that that the defendant did not forfeit his Rule 402 claim and remanded for a new hearing on the amended motion. (DeARMOND and HOLDER WHITE, concurring)
Defendant appealed from the circuit court’s dismissal of his successive post-conviction petition at the second stage, arguing that his counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing to amend his pro se conviction to address potential procedural bars to his claim that his sentence violated Miller v. Alabama. The appellate court affirmed, finding that counsel was not unreasonable where the trial court discussed the procedural bars and correctly found prior precedent precluded defendant’s claim. (McLAREN and SCHOSTOK, concurring)
Defendant was found guilty of involuntary sexual servitude of a minor, traveling to meet a minor, and grooming. At trial, defendant asserted the defense of entrapment. On appeal, defendant argued defense counsel was ineffective in presenting his entrapment defense where he failed to object to the circuit court’s responses to two jury notes regarding the legal definition of “predisposed,” failed to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument mischaracterizing the entrapment defense and the parties’ burdens of proof, and failed to present defendant’s lack of criminal record to the jury. The appellate court agreed and reversed defendant’s conviction. The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the matter for a new trial. Dissenting justices argued defendant could not establish the prejudice prong of Strickland. (ANNE M. BURKE, GARMAN, and OVERSTREET, concurring and MICHAEL J. BURKE, THEIS, and CARTER, dissenting.)
Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and vehicular hijacking and sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 30 and 15 years, respectively. The appellate court dismissed his direct appeal for want of jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed his post-conviction petition and defendant appealed, arguing that his post-conviction counsel failed to provide reasonable assistance by not amending the petition to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to avoid forfeiture of defendant’s other post-conviction claims. The appellate court vacated the dismissal of defendant’s petition and remanded for further proceedings on his claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not filing a notice of appeal from defendant’s conviction. (MIKVA and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring)
Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm towards a police officer and found to be an armed habitual criminal. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 30 years’ imprisonment for each offense. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in several evidentiary rulings, he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court improperly denied a continuance, and the State made improper comments during closing. The appellate court vacated one of defendant’s convictions for aggravated discharge of a firearm toward a police officer pursuant to the supreme court’s recent decision in People v. Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729, and affirmed the remaining convictions. (HARRIS and MIKVA, concurring)
Defendant was found guilty of domestic battery and sentenced to 12 months of conditional discharge. He appealed arguing his counsel was ineffective for failing to tender a defense-of-property instruction. The appellate court affirmed, finding that defendant had not established that his property was in immediate danger of unlawful trespass, being carried away, or other tortious or criminal interference. (HUTCHINSON and BRENNAN, concurring)
In prosecution on mail and wire fraud charges stemming from scheme to defraud defendant’s employer out of more than $200,000 by defendant inflating his company’s profits so that defendant could obtain unearned bonuses and submitting false claims to company’s rewards program, Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error where, during voir dire, Dist. Ct. informed prospective jurors that grand jury had issued defendant’s indictment based on probable cause, which was defined as meaning “its probably true that defendant had some connection with criminal activity.” Record showed that Dist. Ct.’s comment that improperly implied that grand jury’s finding had some bearing on defendant’s guilt or innocence did not deprive defendant of fair trial, where said comment was subsequently clarified by Dist. Ct. that government bore full burden of proof at trial, notwithstanding issuance of indictment, and that indictment was not evidence. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in imposing $189,709 restitution order, where record did not establish said amount as actual loss to defendant’s company. Dist. Ct., also erred in ordering defendant to forfeit all $88,106.78 in performance-based bonuses, where forensic testimony only attributed $47,288.97 of said bonuses to defendant’s over-billing scheme.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 175-month term of incarceration on RICO conspiracy charge under circumstances where: (1) Dist. Ct. conducted sentencing hearing via video-conference under CARES Act without making finding that sentencing could not be further delayed without serious harm to interests of justice; and (2) Dist. Ct. made finding that defendant should be held accountable for conspiracy to commit murder. Instant RICO conspiracy charge arose out of defendant’s leadership role in violent gang. While CARES Act requires that Dist. Ct. make finding that sentencing could not be further delayed without serious harm to interests of justice, defendant failed, under instant plain error standard, to show that he was prejudiced because of Dist. Ct.’s failure to make instant required finding, where there was no evidence that Dist. Ct. viewed his sentencing arguments less favorably merely because he made them remotely. Also, record supported Dist. Ct.’s Guidelines calculation based, in part, on finding that he was responsible for conspiracy to commit murder, especially where defendant, in his gang leadership role, approved and ordered acts of violence that included shooting rival gang members.
In prosecution on drug and firearm charges that stemmed from certain controlled purchases of drugs and firearm between defendant and confidential informant (CI), Dist. Ct. could properly find that government met its burden of showing beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was not entrapped into making charged weapon and firearm transactions, even though defendant argued that he and CI had “important” friendship, and that CI made several requests for defendant to sell him drugs and firearm. Ct. of Appeals found that defendant and CI were mere acquaintances in same gang and were not close friends. Moreover, friendship alone is not enough to establish inducement for entrapment purposes, and that CI did not invoke his friendship status with defendant when asking defendant about availability of drugs or weapon. Also, defendant never refused CI’s multiple requests to purchase drugs and weapon, and defendant demonstrated familiarity with availability and pricing of street drugs and suggested that CI purchase methamphetamine. Dist. Ct., though, committed plain error when sentencing defendant to 210-month term of incarceration, where Dist. Ct. relied on presentence report that improperly increased offense level based on defendant’s prior convictions for crimes of violence that, due to their age, did not receive criminal history points.
Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to 42-month term of incarceration on wire-fraud charge that stemmed from defendant’s scheme to embezzle $150,000 from charity that defendant served as its executive director, where said sentence was based, in part, on section 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) of USSG, which applies two-level enhancement when offense involved misrepresentation that defendant was acting on behalf of charitable organization. While defendant argued that enhancement did not apply because there was no misrepresentation of his status as charity’s executive director, Dist. Ct. found that enhancement applied because of defendant’s intent about disposition of money coming into charity. Ct. of Appeals found that remand was required for new sentencing hearing because Dist. Ct. failed to consider Application Note 8(e)(i), which instructs Dist. Ct. not to impose instant enhancement under section 2B1.1(b)(9)(i) if conduct that formed basis for said enhancement is only conduct that formed basis for enhancement under section 3B1.3 of USSG, which Dist. Ct. also imposed on defendant. As such, Dist. Ct. must determine on remand if enhancements under sections 2B1.1(b)(9)(i) and 3B1.3 rested on different conduct.
