Criminal Law

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly sentenced defendant on charge of attempted first degree murder of peace officer to 30 years in prison plus additional 20 years for using firearm during commission of attempted murder offense set forth in subsections 8-4(c)(1)(B)-(D). Appellate Court, in affirming instant sentence, found that firearm enhancements contained in subsections (B),(C), and (D) can be applied to instant sentence imposed for attempted murder under subsection 8-4(c)(1)(A), and rejected defendant’s claim that his sentence for attempted murder was already enhanced, such that it could not be doubly enhanced by instant subsections. Appellate Court also rejected defendant’s claim that trial court wrongfully denied his request for appointment of paid second expert with respect to defendant’s insanity claim, where first expert found defendant to be sane. Fact that first expert sent note to defendant’s counsel after generation of expert’s report, indicating that defendant’s case was “borderline” did not require appointment of second paid expert. (Dissent filed.)

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of natural life imprisonment, under circumstances where defendant was found guilty of shooting pregnant girlfriend in head during confrontation with police. While defendant argued that trial court erred in finding that he was subject to mandatory life sentencing because unborn child was “victim,” and thus he was not convicted of murdering more than one victim so as qualify for natural life sentence, Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, found that mandatory life sentence was proper, where: (1) defendant was convicted of both murder of girlfriend and intentional homicide of unborn child; and (2) relevant statute required that intentional homicide of unborn child be sentenced same as first degree murder. Appellate Court also found that under instant circumstances, there were two “victims” so as to support imposition of natural life sentence.

This case presents question as to whether trial court erred in summarily dismissing defendant’s pro se petition for post-conviction relief that challenged his 40-year sentence on charges of attempted murder and aggravated battery with firearm, where defendant claimed that he was 18 years old at time of offense, and trial court was otherwise unable to consider his youth and its attendant characteristics prior to its imposition of 25-year mandatory firearm enhancement. Record showed that defendant based his claim on proportionate penalties clause of Illinois Constitution. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, observed that there was nothing in Miller that suggested that mandatory sentence enhancements imposed on juvenile offenders violated 8th Amendment, and that because defendant’s sentence was not tantamount to de facto life sentence, procedural requirements set forth in Miller did not apply to defendant.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly found defendant guilty of obstruction of justice under circumstances where, at hospital, defendant was presented with signed search warrant seeking his blood and urine samples in conjunction with his DUI arrest, where defendant was asked at least three times to produce said samples, but ultimately refused to offer or failed to submit to any blood or urine samples at that time, and where police ultimately left without said samples, since local police policy did not allow police to physically force defendant to provide said samples. Trial court found that defendant’s recalcitrance at hospital qualified as obstruction of justice by concealment of physical evidence, and Appellate Court affirmed, after finding that: (1) evidence at issue met requirement of “physical evidence;” contained in obstruction of justice statute; (2) defendant’s actions met definition of “conceal” in terms of preventing disclosure or failing to act; and (3) defendant’s actions were knowing. Fact that police may not have informed defendant that his refusal to submit to search warrant could lead to felony charge of obstructing justice did not require different result. (Partial dissent filed.)