Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of domestic battery. Defendant was in a verbal altercation with police officers at the scene of a traffic accident involving his 18-year-old son. When Defendant's wife stepped between Defendant and the officer, Defendant pushed his wife to the side and continued to argue. Police officer signed complaint for domestic battery against Defendant, but Defendant's wife refused to cooperate and insisted that Defendant did nothing wrong. Court erred in allowing officer to testify in a way which implied that Defendant had committed prior offenses, and that the arrest was "for the safety and protection of the victim", which led to inference that Defendant had a history of domestic violence against his wife. Given the harmless nature of the contact, where all competent evidence showed that Defendant's wife was not insulted or provoked in any way, State's argument was based on pure speculation. State's argument that it was not required to prove that Defendant's wife was insulted or provoked, which was accepted by court and argued to the jury, was a clear and obvious error, as what Defendant's wife felt and thought did matter. Evidence overwhelmingly favored Defendant such that the jury could not have concluded otherwise. Court erred in denying Defendant's motion for directed verdict. Appellate court does not have the authority to overrule Illinois Supreme Court's order assigning a judge of the 15th Circuit to preside over this case. (McLAREN, concurring; ZENOFF, concurring in part and dissenting in part.) 

Defendant and his codefendant and brother were convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated battery. Jury also found that Defendant was armed with a firearm during the kidnapping and sexual assault. Both Defendants proceeded pro se and were tried jointly, before a single jury. Court, after making informing jurors of the 4 Zehr principles, stated, "I take it that all of you accept and understand these four propositions of law. If that's not the case, raise your hand." That was the functional equivalent of a question that sought to confirm the jurors' acceptance and understanding, tracking verbatim the language that Rule 431(b) requires, and was sufficient to confirm the jurors' understanding of the 4 Zehr principles. Victim testified that while she was standing at a corner waiting for a bus, Defendant approached her while carrying a gun at his side and said that she had "2 options, get in the car or get shot."  Based entirely on this testimony, jury found that Defendant was armed with a firearm during the kidnapping and the sexual assault. A rational trier of fact could take it as a threat to "shoot" the victim in the usual sense of the term, with a real gun, i.e. a firearm, even though in this case the firearm was not discharged and never found. The evidence that Defendant was armed with a fireearm was sufficient. (HOWSE and McBRIDE, concurring.)  

In 2002 Defendant, then age 19, shot and killed his former friend after Defendant accused him of stealing a stereo system from Defendant's car. Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st degree murder and court imposed the minimum sentence of 45 years. This sentence was, under the Illinois Supreme Court's later decision in Buffer, a de facto life sentence. Sentencing judge clearly did not believe that Defendant should spend the rest of his natural life in prison. It is not clear that trial judge knew Defendant's correct age at time of offense, as twice during arguments in mitigation, defense counsel stated that he was 20 when actually he was 19 at the time. The sentence, which was imposed absent consideration of the Miller v. Alabama factors, violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Summary dismissal of postconviction petition is reversed, and remanded for 2nd-stage proceedings. (ODEN JOHNSON, concurring; HARRIS, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted in 1995, after jury trial, of criminal sexual assault of his minor stepdaughter and sentenced, as a habitual offender, to natural life in prison. Defendant had been convicted in 1987 of aggravated criminal sexual assault of the same victim, then age 7. The presentence investigative report (PSI) indicated that Defendant had a juvenile adjudication, at age 17, for criminal sexual assault, and convictions in 1982 for deviate sexual assault and indecent liberties with a child, and a 1988 conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault. As there was substantial precedent, at the time of Defendant's 1995 sentencing, that deviate sexual assault was a predicate offense for habitual offender status, trial counsel's performance was not objectively unreasonable assistance in failing to object that it was not a predicate offense for habitual offender status. (LAMPKIN and MARTIN, concurring.)

Circuit court found that a bona fide doubt existed as to Defendant's fitness to stand trial, and found Defendant unfit and remanded him to custody of Department of Human Services. Later reports from DHS indicated that Defendant would be unable to attain fitness within 1 year. Discharge hearing occurred, and court did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably in allowing state to introduce evidence deposition as substantive evidence in lieu of live testimony of a witness, age 86 and wheelchair bound, whose identity Defendant allegedly stole. Bringing witness to the courthouse from her nursing home presented a clear risk to her already fragile health. (HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial in absentia of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and he was sentenced in absentia to 30 years. Defense counsel failed to file the record or a brief after filing a notice of appeal which caused the appeal to be dismissed for want of prosecution. Because counsel filed the appeal and identified himself as "counsel of record", there is a presumption that he was acting on Defendant's behalf. Defendant's postconviction petition sets out the gist of a constitutional claim as his counsel's performance deprived him of an appeal that he would otherwise have taken, and thus counsel's conduct reflects an inattention to the Defendant's wishes and prejudice is presumed. (FITZGERALD SMITH and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 3 counts of the 1st degree murder of Pontiac Correctional Center superintendent, 2 counts of conspiracy to commit murder, and 1 count of solicitation to commit murder. Later, appellate court vacated all convictions other than 1 count for 1st degree murder. Defendant made a claim of actual innocence. Appellate court defers to the factfinder's determinations in all 3rd-stage proceedings, as witness demeanor and paralanguage (vocal signs perceptible to the ear that are not actual words) are key to trial court's evaluation of credibility. At 3rd-stage hearing, court is not required to make explicit findings or discuss what evidence it found credible or not credible. Considering totality of evidence, court's determination is not against manifest weight of evidence. (CAVANAGH and HOLDER WHITE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of being an armed habitual criminal, and 2 counts of unlawful use of possession of a weapon by a felon. State rested without presenting any additional evidence or requesting that court take judicial notice of anything that might establish that Defendant was the person named in a particular criminal case, and thus State failed to establish that Defendant was the person named in that case. Thus, Defendant's conviction for being an armed habitual criminal is vacated. Defendant's custodial statements and a certified statement of conviction in another criminal case was sufficient to establish that Defendant committed unlawful use or possession of a firearm by a felon beyond a reasonable doubt. Trial judge conducted a proper inquiry, which met the requirements of Krankel, on Defendant's posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (REYES and MARTIN, concurring.)

Defendant, pro se, was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated DUI of alcohol with a suspended or revoked license. Case was not complex, with no scientific evidence and few witnesses. Thus, appointment of standby counsel was not required. Court did not err in failing to conduct a fitness hearing and in permitting Defendant to represent himself at trial. Court did not err in failing to issue jury instruction defining "actual physical control." Court erred in failing to instruct jury as to elements of aggravated DUI while having a revoked license, and conviction on that count is vacated. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)