Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of various offenses related to burglary of a retail store. A DHS envelope containing Defendant's address, found at a basement apartment pursuant to a search warrant, was not hearsay and was thus properly admitted in evidence as the proof of residency was used to establish Defendant's constructive possession of items found in that apartment.  Evidence against Defendant was overwhelming. No ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to call Defendant's mother and sister, as it would have been cumulative and would not have altered the fact that the DHS letter and Defendant's actual possession of stolen property matching property recovered from basement apartment established his constructive possession of contraband recovered from basement. (GORDON and REYES, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of armed robbery with a dangerous weapon and armed robbery with a firearm. Defendant filed postconviction petition alleging that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by unduly influencing him to reject a plea offer through promise of acquittal and by stipulating to admissibility of a jail phone call involving Defendant. Trial court wrongly dismissed Defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for influencing him, with a promise of acquittal, to reject plea offers. Court properly dismissed claim as to stipulation, as the recording is difficult to understand, making it reasonable for counsel to strategize that jury would give it very little weight. Defendant did not provide support with his petition to show that he was not one of the parties on the recording. (HUDSON and BRENNAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of armed robbery and aggravated battery offenses. Court denied Defendant's motion for new trial, and prior to imposition of sentence, Defendant requested a "stay" in order to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Krankel counsel was appointed and filed a motion for new trial, which court denied. Court sentenced to 17 years for armed robbery and an additional 15 years for possessing a firearm. Krankel counsel preserved the claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to trial court's entry of judgment on 2 counts. Court properly exercised its discretion in denying Defendant's 2nd motion for new trial, as no practical reason justified trial counsel demanding entry of judgment on either of those 2 counts, and declining to do so was a reasonable strategic decision, and as court's judgments remained subject to alteration up until that time they became final. No clear error in court's sentence, as it was well within the permissible sentencing range and court thoroughly considered mitigating factors and properly exercised its discretion.  (GORDON and MARTIN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery with a firearm. Defendant filed pro se petition for relief under section  2-1401 of Code of Civil Procedure, and in that petition asked court to consider his petition as a postconviction petition under Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Defendant's petition met requirements of section 122-1(d) of the Act, and trial court erred in not considering the pro se section 2-1401 petition as a postconviction petition. Court used its determination that Defendant's arguments would not succeed as postconviction claims to buttress its refusal to consider the petition as a postconviction petition. Court's view that Defendant's arguments were waived was incorrect, as Defendant avoided waiver by arguing that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's errors.  Because Defendant named and cited the Act in his petition, the court was required to consider the petition as a postconviction petition. (ZENOFF and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 2 counts of aggravated battery based on the striking and burning of a child, whose mother was a codefendant and tried in a separate and simultaneous jury trial trial.  The trial court's viewing of recorded interviews of the child by police and by a forensic interviewer, in chambers, during a pretrial section 115-10 hearing, was not a critical stage of Defendant's trial and did not affect Defendant's ability to defend himself. Multiple witnesses testified at trial about Defendant's abuse and torture of the child. Defendant affirmatively waived his right to be present when court viewed the interviews, as defense counsel agreed to the viewing in chambers. Defendant is bound by his counsel's waiver as it did not involve a fundamental right. (HOWSE and ELLIS, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1st degree murder, for the beating death of a man in an alley. Defendant was present in the alley but denied that he participated in the attack and testified that he arrived at the scene after the attack had concluded. Defendant made a substantial showing that his conviction rested on false evidence procured by police misconduct, in violation of due process. Defendant made a substantial showing of actual innocence. Defendant's claim of actual innocence relies on newly discovered evidence: the report of Dr. Loftus that an identification of a suspect with whom the witness is acquainted is not necessarily accurate, especially in poor viewing conditions, and that cross-racial identification could negatively impact accuracy. Remanded for 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing. (FITZGERALD SMITH and COBBS, concurring.)