Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of armed robbery and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Defendant had requested counsel, directly to a police officer, within hours after having been informed that he was a suspect in an armed robbery, the same offense which was later the subject of his interrogation. Immediately after a defendant asserts his right to counsel, all questioning must cease, and officers are not entitled to any further interrogation whatsover. Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements Defendant made to investigators during interrogation while in custody.(O'BRIEN, concurring; SCHMIDT, dissenting.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of domestic battery. Neither State's evidence nor testimony offered by defense established that Defendant reasonably believed her conduct was necessary to prevent or terminate her ex-boyfriend's entry into her house. Defendant's testimony shows that she did not have an actual belief that a use of physical force was necessary to prevent ex-boyfriend's entry, and he showed no conduct that suggested that force would have been necessary. Because Defendant testified and because her trial testimony undermined any theory of defense centered on the defense of dwelling, Defendant cannot successfully establish either that trial counsel's performance was deficient or that she was prejudiced by counsel's performance. (O'BRIEN, concurring; WRIGHT, specially concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion under section 404(b) of First Step Act to reduce his 235-month sentence for his conviction on charge of conspiracy to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base. While defendant’s 2009 conviction had potential for reduced sentence under First Step Act, Dist. Ct. could properly find that further reduction was not warranted, where: (1) defendant had previously received reduction on different ground from original sentence of 262-month term of incarceration; and (2) further reduction would deprecate seriousness of offense, as well as ignore need for deterrence and need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, especially where instant 235-sentence was below amended guideline range of 324-405 months of incarceration. Ct rejected defendant’s claim that Dist. Ct. was required to apply 2020 court’s decision in Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, that would have reduced defendant’s guideline range even further, since, section 404(b) allows, but does not mandate Dist. Ct. to apply intervening judicial decisions when considering request for reduced sentence. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in failing to apply Ruth and in denying defendant’s request to reduce his 235-month sentence.
Court dismissed Defendant's section 2-1401 petition to vacate 2006 conviction for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). Because it was the status of Defendant's prior conviction at the time he possessed the firearm that controlled, regardless of whether that prior conviction is later vacated on procedural ground, there is no basis to vacate his UUWF conviction which was predicated on a prior 1992 conviction under the facially valid 1st degree murder statute. Appellate court cannot consider the certificate of innocence which circuit court granted, as to his 1992 murder conviction, subsequent to the filing of this appeal. When the predicate conviction is based upon a valid statute, it may be voidable by reason of a constitutionally deficient procedure, but it is not void. (DELORT and ROCHFORD, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery for causing bodily harm to another in a public place of accommodation or amusement, allegedly by striking a man in the back of the head with a beer bottle at a bar. Five days before trial, State filed additional charges on Defendant, stemming from incident involving a shooting in parking lot of that same bar, on the same date, which occurred after man was hit with a beer bottle. Neither the physical evidence nor surveillance video indicated that Defendant hit the man. The case depended on witness testimony, and evidence was closely balanced. Court erred in allowing State to improperly elicit testimony regarding Defendant's prior bad acts and other crimes to bolster its witness's credibility. Court erred in allowing State to improperly elicit details about the shooting, including threats made by Defendant, and its use of the shooting as substantive evidence of Defendant's guilt threatened to tip the scales of justice against Defendant. (CATES and WHARTON, concurring.)
In prosecution on drug distribution charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drugs seized during traffic stop, even though defendant argued that officer delayed issuance of traffic ticket in order to allow K-9 dog to arrive at scene and alert to presence of drugs in defendant’s car. Record showed that: (1) prior to instant stop for failure to use turn signal, office had received tip that defendant was selling drugs from his truck; (2) officer followed defendant until defendant failed to use turn signal; (3) by time after officer turned his lights on and stopped his car, defendant had left his car and began to walk away; (4) when defendant returned to his car, officer handcuffed defendant and began to write ticket based on defendant’s oral information; (5) after officer radioed dispatch to verify defendant’s information, he also requested (at six minutes after stop) another officer to bring K-9 dog to test for presence of drugs in defendant‘s car; (6) throughout time officer was writing ticket, officer was encouraging other officer to quickly bring dog; (7) when officer handed ticket to defendant (at 14-minute mark after stop), officer learned that defendant did not have insurance card; and (8) officer with dog arrived and dog alerted to presence of drugs prior to officer’s issuance of second ticket for failure to provide proof of insurance. Dist. Ct. could properly find that officer did not delay stop to allow for presence of K-9, that any delays at issue with instant stop were inconsequential, and that officer’s failure to ask for insurance card at beginning of stop was innocent mistake. (Dissent filed.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss four counts of his indictment alleging use, carrying and brandishing firearm during and in relation to crime of violence, i.e., Hobbs Act robbery offense, even though defendant argued that Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as crime of violence under section 924(c)(3)(A). Hobbs Act defines robbery as taking or obtaining property from another by means of actual or threatened force, violence or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, and Ct. has previously found that committing such act necessarily required use or threat of force, which qualifies Hobbs Act robbery as crime of violence.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 200-year term of incarceration on multiple accounts of sexually exploiting child that involved defendant’s adopted son from Guatemala, as well as possession of child pornography. Record showed that defendant’s offenses concerned anal and oral penetrations that included use of objects, as well as abuse that included urinating on, choking, whipping, and putting collar on victim that began when victim was eight years old and continued until he was fourteen years old. Applicable guideline range was life in prison, but none of 20 counts of sexual exploitation of minor had statutory maximum of life imprisonment. Moreover, probation department recommended 600-year sentence, while government recommended 620-year sentence and defendant recommended 420-month sentence. Dist. Ct., though, explained that de facto life sentence was appropriate and then imposed six 30-year sentences to be served consecutive to each other, to be followed by fifteen 20-year sentences to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutive to instant 30-year sentences. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that Dist. Ct. committed procedural error by failing to first determine overall punishment and then adjusting actual sentences to said determination, since sentencing guidelines do not require Dist. Ct. to undergo defendant’s proposed procedure. Also, record suggests that Dist. Ct. effectively determined that defendant should receive life imprisonment and appropriately followed section 56G1.2 of USSG to impose consecutive sentences to achieve such result.
A Boone County grand jury indicted Defendant on 8 counts of forgery, alleging that he knowingly delivered to the State Board of Elections a Congress Primary Petition containing a fraudulent signature of Boone County residents. Court properly dismissed the indictment on the ground of improper venue, finding no evidence that the named residents suffered any detriment due to the forgery. There is no statutory provision identifying, as the "victim" of forgery, the person whose name is forged. The State may not designate someone as a victim where the elements of the offense do not otherwise require it, merely to establish venue in a particular county. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of murders of 3 people and sentenced to natural life in prison. Court properly exercised its discretion in allowing evidence of other crimes involving 2 illegal narcotics conspiracies with a group of 3 people, including Defendant, whose role was "watchdog"; and evidence of multiple prior drug transactions with that group and 2 of the murder victims. Even if conspiracy is not charged, when a crime is committed in pursuance of a conspiracy, evidence of that conspiracy, including every act of the conspirators is admissible, even though the commission of other crimes is disclosed. Evidence as to the conspiracies was relevant for many other reasons where it tended to establish motive, common plan or design, intent, and identity. Court also admitted cell site location information (CSLI) that was obtained by police without a warrant. Counsel's failure to move to suppress evidence of Defendant's CSLI was not ineffective assistance of counsel, and did not result in prejudice such that if suppressed the outcome of trial would have differed. Admission of the CSLI was harmless as it was cumulative to witness's highly probative testimony. (GORDON and MARTIN, concurring.)
