Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated battery with a firearm, unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon, and reckless discharge of a firearm. During deliberations, jurors asked to listen, again, to the audio recording of victim's statement to officers, to read a transcript of victim's statement, or both. Court allowed jurors to choose between listening to the recording in the courtroom without the parties present, or waiting for a transcript to be created. Jurors chose to listen to the recording. Court did not interfere with jury deliberations by instructing jurors to remain silent while the audio recording played and preventing jurors from controlling the playback of the recording, as deliberations did not place during that time. (DAUGHERITY and O'BRIEN, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant's motion for new trial on charges of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit honest services fraud, arising out of defendant's alleged performance of campaign work on her own behalf during time that she was on clock for government job, where defendant had filed during trial motion to suppress documents that informant had gathered from defendant's office without warrant and at direction of FBI agent. Dist. Ct. erred in finding that defendant did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in her office, where informant had only limited access to defendant's office, where he signed in and out using time sheets located in defendant's office, and record otherwise showed that: (1) informant was acting as government agent when searching defendant's office without search warrant; (2) agent gave informant direction to search based on mistaken belief that informant had right of general access to defendant's office; (3) defendant's office was enclosed with door, which defendant used to exclude co-workers and others from her office; (4) defendant was sole occupant of her office for more than seven years; (5) on at least one occasion, defendant turned papers down so visitor could not see them; and (6) there was no evidence that informant collected documents when he was in defendant's office as business invitee. As such, documents gathered by informant should have been excluded, as well as other evidence obtained pursuant to warrant that was issued in reliance on information contained in documents previously obtained through informant's improper search of defendant's office.
Court granted defense counsel's oral request to withdraw and granted State's motion to dismiss Defendant's postconviction petition in the 3rd stage. The matter was scheduled for a "final status" hearing and Defendant had no notice that his attorney intended to withdraw or his petition was going to be ruled upon. Court erred in granting motion to withdraw and dismissing postconviction petition. Remanded for further 3rd stage proceedings, including reappointing Cook County Public Defender's Office to represent Defendant. (HYMAN and PIERCE, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). The location where a convicted felon possessed a weapon is not an essential element of the UUWF offense. Evidence showed that Defendant knew about and had constructive possession of the guns found behind a dresser, and he exercised immediate and exclusive control over the area where they were found. (MIKVA and ODEN JOHNSON, concurring.)
Defendant, age 22.5 at time of offense, was convicted of 5 counts of 1st degree murder and 1 count of armed robbery. He received a mandatory sentence of natural life in prison. Defendant's postconviction petition did not allege a gist of a constitutional claim that the rationale of U.S. Supreme Court's Miller v. Alabama decision should be applied to Defendant. Defendant did not allege any facts particular to him that rendered him the functional equivalent of a juvenile. Sentence does not violate proportionate penalties clause. Court properly dismissed postconviction petition as frivolous or patently without merit. (CONNORS, concurring; MIKVA, dissenting.)
Defendant, age 24 and suffering from antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and fetal alcohol syndrome at time of offenses, pled guilty but mentally ill to 1st degree murder and robbery. Court sentenced Defendant to an extended term of 90 years for 1st degree murder because victim was over 60 years old, and 15 years for robbery, to be served consecutively. Defendant cannot show prejudice necessary to warrant leave to file a successive postconviction petition, as an intellectually disabled adult defendant's natural life sentence violates neither U.S. nor Illinois Constitutions. (LYTTON , concurring; McDADE, dissenting.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of grooming. He had sent a 16-year-old girl a Snapchat photo of his bare buttocks with the message "Now it's your turn". He then said that he would like her to keep his message secret and said that he would like to "get with" her. A rational trier of fact could determine that Defendant's act was, if not a direct solicitation for a photo of the child's sex organs, at least a first step in a process that Defendant hoped would lead the child to send a photo of her sex organs. It was reasonable to infer that Defendant was grooming child, and thus State proved Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (BRIDGES and BIRKETT, concurring.)
Court denied Defendant's pro se motion for forensic testing as to actual innocence, finding that motion was a duplication of previous motions. With some exceptions, the date an item is metered is the date the item must be deposited or presented for mailing, as postage metering system bears some similarities to a postmark, but metering process is susceptible to defects and delays. Amended Rule 373 eliminates postmarks as proof of mailing entirely, even legible ones. Metering date is not proof of mailing under the rule. Rule 12(b)(6) requires for jurisdiction to be proper a certificate verifying the date, time, and address for delivery. Appellate court is without jurisdiction based on Defendant's failure to comply with Rule 12(b)(6), as he failed to provide requisite verification of certification. (McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring.)
(Court opinion corrected 5/13/21.) Defendant, then age 47, was convicted, after bench trial, of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (age 4) and sentenced to natural life imprisonment because it was his 2nd conviction of that offense (victim was age 8 or 9) . Court properly barred lay opinion testimony of victim's mother on credibility of victim's accusation against Defendant that she was being coached by her sister to say that Defendant also abused another child. Victim's mother has not been qualified as an expert under Rule 702 and this testimony would be an improper attempt to attack victim's credibility. Severity of crime brings mandatory life sentence within established constitutional boundaries. Section 11-1.40(b)(2) of the Criminal Code is not facially unconstitutional. (LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant's habeas petition that challenged his conviction on charge of possession of firearm in furtherance of crime of violence under 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A), where defendant had pleaded guilty to said offense as part of written plea agreement with government. Said agreement waived, among other rights, right to "all appellate issues that might have been available if he had exercised his right to trial." While defendant argued that his relevant murder-for-hire conviction did not qualify as violent felony for purposes of his section 924(c)(1)(A) conviction, Dist. Ct. could properly find that: (1) defendant had waived his challenge to his section 924(c)(1)(A) conviction, where he had voluntarily and unconditionally entered into instant plea agreement; and (2) defendant's contention that his murder-for-hire offense is not crime of violence under elements clause of section 924(c) was precluded from consideration on appeal by instant waiver clause. Also, while defendant alternatively argued that his guilty plea was involuntary due to change of law after defendant had entered guilty plea on section 924(c)(1)(A) offense, change in law after defendant had pleaded guilty does not change voluntariness of plea at time it was entered and does not justify defendant withdrawing his guilty plea.
