Court erred in allowing State to participate in proceedings on Defendant's motion to reconsider denial of leave to file a successive petition. Appellate court may, but is not required to, conduct an independent review of circuit court's cause and prejudice determination in interest of judicial economy. Appellate court chose to remand for independent determination in circuit court.(O'BRIEN, concurring; WRIGHT, specially concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s second motion to reduce his 240-month sentence under 18 USC section 3582(c)(2) based on retroactive application of Amendment 782 to USSG, even though defendant argued that said Amendment changed his guideline range on drug conspiracy conviction. Dist. Ct. could properly find that drug quantities set forth in presentence report to which defendant did not object supported finding that defendant was responsible for such large quantities of narcotics that his base level and corresponding guidelines range was not reduced by Amendment 782, where quantities set forth in presentence report were at highest levels of current guideline range. Fact that plea agreement set forth smaller drug quantity did not require different result, since Dist. Ct. may make new findings of fact to determine defendant’s base level when retroactive amendment alters relevant drug-quantity thresholds, where, as here, record supported new drug-quantity findings.
Defendant entered into a partially negotiated plea of guilty but mentally ill to various offenses. Court ordered sentences of various lengths, to run concurrent. Defendant failed to show actual innocence or a plausible defense to the charges, and nothing in the record indicates a reasonable probability that Defendant would not have pled guilty but for his claimed errors, or that withdrawal of his plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. (BARBERIS and OVERSTREET, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 20-year term of incarceration on drug conspiracy charge, where said sentence was based, in part, on defendant qualifying for instant enhanced sentence under Controlled Substance Act due to defendant’s prior Texas conviction for unlawful possession of cocaine that qualified as “felony drug offense” under said Act. While defendant argued that his Texas conviction did not qualify as felony drug offense because he had pleaded guilty to said offense under circumstances where prosecutor had agreed to defendant serving only nine-month sentence, and because felony drug offense as defined under Act was offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, Ct. of Appeals found that Texas conviction was felony drug offense, since its statutory sentencing range included sentences from six months to two years. Ct. further noted that under Texas law, conviction for state felony remains conviction for state felony, even though sentencing court exercises discretion to impose misdemeanor-length sentence. (Dissent filed.)
In prosecution on bank fraud charge under 18 USC section 1344(1), defendant waived any argument that jury instructions were deficient because they failed to require jury to find that defendant’s bank fraud scheme involved materially false or fraudulent representations, where defendant’s counsel affirmed to Dist. Ct. that defendant had agreed to instruction that omitted instant materiality element. Moreover, submission of instant instruction to jury did not affect defendant’s substantial rights given evidence that defendant’s false representations to bank and others about state of his financial status were capable of influencing bank’s decision to loan defendant money. Also, defendant failed to establish any ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding counsel’s failure to challenge restitution order, where: (1) defendant claimed that some of bank’s losses were attributable to bank’s own reckless acts of loaning money to defendant knowing that defendant was in financial distress; and (2) record showed that defendant had raised significant funds (by committing fraud on others) that essentially misled bank into believing that risk was manageable. Too, record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on bank fraud charge, where: (1) defendant generated false statements about his financial status in loan application that led to defendant obtaining loan from bank; (2) defendant fraudulently obtained $300,000 from others to pay bank for forbearance agreement; and (3) defendant made false representations about efforts to develop property to obtain another forbearance agreement with bank.
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of criminal sexual abuse, and was required to register as a sex offender. Defendant was given leave to bring an as-applied constitutional challenge to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). Defendant was, at the time, an 18-year-old high school senior who, in a custodial statement to police, admitted to having had sex on multiple occasions with a then-15-year-old student. Conduct of officers was not coercive, and Defendant's confession was not coerced. Appellate court lacks jurisdiction, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court's 2018 Bingham decision, to consider Defendant's as-applied constitutional challenge to SORA on appeal from his sexual abuse conviction. (CARTER, concurring; McDADE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
Defendant was convicted, after stipulated bench trial, of possession with intent to deliver cannabis. Officer's testimony and video show that Defendant was not seized at the time officer requested consent to perform dog sniff. As Defendant was not seized at the time of the dog sniff, because Level 3 inspection of semi-truck Defendant was driving had terminated and he was free to leave, the 4th amendment did not apply. Court did not err in finding that officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to prolong the stop, as he thought it was abnormal for Defendant to have a private seal on his load, place a padlock on the wrong door, and have discrepancies in his logbook. (LYTTON, concurring; SCHMIDT, specially concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of theft and cruel treatment to animals. Defendant did not clearly establish that the Humane Care for Animals Act violates his constitutional rights, and did not show that there is no circumstance in which statute can be validly applied. Evidence was introduced that Defendant painted the dog to conceal its identity. Judge found Defendant guilty of theft on basis that Defendant knew that the dog was stolen. Poor conditions in which dogs were kept along with condition of dogs and the premises, was sufficient to prove that dogs were abused or treated cruelly. (HYMAN and WALKER, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder and home invasion convictions on ground that his trial counsel improperly usurped his personal right to testify at trial. Ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland is appropriate vehicle in which to establish that trial counsel violated defendant’s right to testify, as opposed to harmless-beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard under Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, where defendant has alleged that his counsel, as opposed to trial judge, has usurped said right. Moreover, state court could properly find that defendant failed to establish viable right-to-testify claim under Strickland, where: (1) defendant did not assert at trial any denial of his right to testify; and (2) defendant failed to establish any prejudice where proposed alibi testimony was weak. Ct. further noted that there is no Supreme Ct. precedent regarding whether defendant must assert denial of right to testify at trial to establish viable right-to testify claim, and thus state court did not unreasonably find that, because defendant did not assert said denial at trial, defendant did not meet his burden of showing that his attorney in fact prohibited his testimony.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 188-month term of incarceration on unlawful possession of firearm charge, where said sentence was based, in part, on finding that defendant qualified as career offender under Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on three prior convictions. When one of said convictions was subsequently determined to not qualify as violent felony under ACCA, defendant filed habeas petition seeking reduced sentence. Dist. Ct., though, did not err in denying habeas petition by substituting another of defendant’s prior convictions to re-establish his career offender status under ACCA, where: (1) defendant had mistakenly believed that Dist. Ct. had used substituted conviction when making ACCA finding at original sentencing hearing; and (2) defendant’s mistaken belief that substituted conviction was used by Dist. Ct. to make original ACCA finding precluded any claim of unfair notice when Dist. Ct. substituted conviction to sustain defendant’s sentence in habeas proceeding.
