(Mayfield, D-Waukegan) provides that in counties with a population more than 1,000,000, judges of the circuit court of the circuit in which the county is located may appoint the public defender and also have the authority to remove the public defender (rather than the board of county commissioners). Makes conforming changes and limits home rule powers. Just introduced.
Dist. Ct. did not abuse its discretion in imposing 27-month terms of incarceration, as well as series of conditions on defendant’s supervised release arising out of defendant’s conviction for failure to register as sex offender, where such conditions: (1) required that defendant inform employers and others of his criminal record and his obligation to register as sex offender; (2) banned meeting/spending time with minors absent permission from minor’s parent and defendant’s probation officer; and (3) banned working in any job or volunteer activity in which he would have access to minors without permission from probation officer. Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that instant conditions were impermissibly vague. Moreover Ct. rejected his argument that none of the instant conditions were warranted because he had no record of engaging in sexual conduct with minors, where: (1) defendant’s discharge summary indicated that he still had sexual interest in children; (2) defendant had history of failing to register as sex offender, and he had been in possession of DVD depicting sexual activity between adults and teenagers; and (3) instant conditions were necessary proactive measures to avoid giving defendant opportunity to abuse minors. Also, instant conditions were appropriate given past incidents, where defendant had lied to his landlord about his sexual offender status and stayed in household with 14-year-old child without disclosing his status.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 188-month term of incarceration in RICO conspiracy charge, arising out of defendant’s leadership position in Latin Kings gang. Record showed that defendant controlled gang’s drug-trafficking activities, insured that gang was well-stocked with guns and required members to participate in “hood” days, where gang members held guns in order to protect gang’s territory. As such, Dist. Ct. could properly use sentencing guideline for conspiracy to commit murder, where defendant’s admitted conduct regarding protection of gang’s territory entailed shooting at rival gang, and where murder was foreseeable part of defendant’s agreement with gang members. Fact that defendant did not kill anyone did not require different result. Also, defendant failed to rebut presumption that instant within-guideline sentence was substantively unreasonable, and Dist. Ct. was not required to give any consideration of defendant’s request to be sentenced similarly to co-defendant, who had not yet been sentenced.
Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on child pornography charges, even though defendant argued that evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt, because jury heard no expert testimony regarding age of girls depicted in images sent from defendant’s cell phone. Jurors were capable drawing on their own perceptions to determine subjects’ age, and Dist. Ct. examined each image and found that based on physical appearance alone, jury was able to determine that instant undeveloped slender girls were not as old as eighteen. Moreover, instant girls’ status as minors found support in context of defendant’s sexual preference.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly sentenced 17-year-old defendant to 55-year term of incarceration on murder charge. Appellate Court, after reversing defendant’s murder conviction, found that Truth-in-Lending Act, which requires certain individuals to serve 100 percent of their sentences, was unconstitutional as applied to defendant and other juveniles, since State must provide meaningful opportunity for juvenile defendants tried as adults to demonstrate their rehabilitation. Appellate Ct. further found that instant sentence was unconstitutional under 8th Amendment and Illinois’s penalties provision, and that new juvenile sentencing provision (725 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(b)) making firearm enhancement applied in instant case discretionary rather than mandatory for juvenile offenders applied retroactively to this case. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that Appellate Ct. should not have made any ruling on defendant’s sentence where it had reversed his murder conviction. It also contended that Appellate Court’s ruling on retroactivity of section 5-4.5-105(b) was contrary to Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, and that Appellate Court's holding on Illinois’s penalties provision conflicted with Hill, 241 Ill.2d 479 (Partial dissent filed.)
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly found defendant to be fit to stand trial, where evaluation report by expert indicating that defendant was fit to stand trial was filed with trial court, and where trial court merely entered order based on submission of said report and on parties’ stipulation as to contents of said report. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s armed robbery conviction, found that trial court erred in failing to affirmatively exercise its discretion in finding defendant fit to stand trial and in failing to indicate that it had actually reviewed contents of report or that it was basing its finding on contents of said report. Appellate Court also rejected State’s proposed remedy of remanding matter for retrospective fitness hearing instead of effectuating outright reversal of defendant‘s conviction. (Dissent filed.)
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly vacated defendant’s guilty plea that had been previously accepted by trial court, where said vacatur came after defendant attempted to say that he did not commit offenses covered in guilty plea during his statement at sentencing hearing. Appellate Court, in reversing defendant’s domestic battery conviction that resulted from subsequent trial, found that double jeopardy had attached to such charge, where: (1) said charge had been nol-prossed by said plea; (2) trial court initially accepted terms of said plea; and (3) said charge was reinstated for instant trial in spite of said plea. In its petition for leave to appeal, State argued that trial court could properly sua sponte reject tentatively accepted guilty plea and proceed to trial on all charges without violating double jeopardy principles, where defendant had subsequently claimed innocence of charges covered by guilty plea, and where no sentence had been imposed pursuant to guilty plea. (Partial dissent filed.)
In prosecution on Hobbs Act robbery and firearms charges, Dist. Ct. erred in imposing in written judgment concurrent supervised-release terms for all seven counts that jury found defendant guilty, where Dist. Ct. mentioned during sentencing hearing only four counts that supervised release terms applied. As such, since there was inconsistency between oral and written sentences, remand was required to adopt language used by Dist. Ct. at sentencing hearing. Also, Ct. rejected defendant’s challenge to his three convictions for brandishing firearm during crime of violence, even though defendant claimed that his Hobbs Act robberies did not qualify as crime of violence, where Ct. observed that it had previously found in Anglin, 846 F.3d 954, that Hobbs Act robbery qualified as crime of violence.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to life imprisonment on kidnapping, attempted murder and use of fire to commit another felony charges arising out of incident where defendant abducted female victim, raped her, set her on fire and left her to die. While defendant argued that Dist. Ct. based sentence solely on aggravating factors and ignored his acceptance of responsibility, Dist. Ct. appropriately discounted defendant’s acceptance of responsibility by noting pattern of defendant minimizing his role in his crimes and exaggerating symptoms of mental illness. Also, instant life sentence was within applicable sentencing guidelines, and defendant failed to show that he deserved second chance, where he was on probation at time he committed instant offenses, and where he had long history of violence against women. Moreover, Dist. Ct. adequately explained various section 3553(a) factors, including defendant’s penchant for targeting women and his use of violence and manipulation in and out of prison.
In prosecution on child pornography and destruction of evidence charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his computer, where defendant asserted that “Network Investigative Technique” (NIT) warrant that was used to identify users of child pornography website and was issued by Magistrate Judge was improper, since Magistrate Judge essentially authorized search of property outside her district in violation of Federal Magistrate Act. While Dist. Ct. agreed that instant warrant was invalid, Dist. Ct. could properly deny motion to suppress, since, under Kienast, 907 F.3d 522, FBI agents had relied in good faith on warrant to search defendant’s computer. Moreover, penalizing officer for Magistrate Judge’s error in issuing warrant could not “logically contribute” to deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations, especilly where warrant permitted FBI agents to obtain information from any computer used to log into child pornography website. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 120-month term of incarceration, and Dist. Ct. could properly reject defendant argument that he was less likely to commit future crimes due, in part, to fact that he is white.