Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of being an armed habitual criminal. Conviction was based on his possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted of burglary and the manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance. Evidence was not closely balanced. Prosecutor's statement, in closing argument, that Defendant's decision to go to trial was a refusal to take responsibility for his actions as compared to his codefendant who pled guilty was clear and obvious error, but does not rise to level of plain error.(LAMPKIN and REYES, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion for acquittal of attempted aggravated identity theft charges made at close of govt.’s case, even though defendant correctly argued that there is no such federal crime, where Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendant had waived any error by failing to raise issue in pretrial motion under Rule 12(b)(3). However, Dist. Ct. erred in submitting to jury modified instructions on elements of completed crime of aggravated identity theft, since submission of said instruction violated defendant’s 5th Amendment right to be tried only on charges contained in grand jury’s indictment. As such, Ct. of Appeals vacated jury’s guilty finding on aggravated identity theft charges.
Defendant, age 26 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of 1st degree murder for stabbing deaths of his 60-year-old uncle and his 83-year-old grandfather, and received mandatory sentence of natural life. Defendant claimed that he acted in self-defense after his uncle lunged at him with a knife. No abuse of discretion in court barring testimony of Defendant's sister, who Defendant claimed was sexually abused by their grandfather 20 years prior which led to seething family tensions. Defendant's other sister was allowed to testify, and she said that it did not happen and that there was no animosity or anger in the family on the day of the murders. No ineffective assistance of counsel in defense counsel failing to object to State's proposed use of Defendant's void prior conviction for AAUW (aggravated unlawful use of a weapon) to impeach his credibility. The law was in flux at time of conviction, and counsel had a legitimate strategic reason for introducing that prior conviction: to explain why Defendant did not move out if the tension was as bad as he claimed (because of terms of his parole). Defendant's prior AUUW conviction is vacated. (REYES and BURKE, concurring.)
Defendant was charged with 4 counts of various felony offenses, including 1 count of armed violence. Defendant entered a fully negotiated guilty plea to offense of armed violence, but then filed motion to withdraw his plea. Defendant's plea was due to a misapprehension of the facts of his case and the law as to section 33A-2(a) of Criminal Code. Based on discussions with his attorney, Defendant reasonably believed that, if he went to trial, he would be found guilty of armed violence. Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw plea in concluding that the presence of an additional firearm created 2 distinct crimes in the charge. This understanding of section 33A-2(a) is an error of law. (CARTER and WRIGHT, concurring.)
Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing above-guidelines, 78-month term of incarceration on charge of soliciting obscene visual depiction of minor that arose out of defendant’s contact with boy (depicted by FBI agent) in online sting operation, even though Dist. Ct. took into consideration defendant’s conduct that occurred in dismissed charge of attempted enticement of minor. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because it created unwarranted disparities in sentences of individuals who had similar convictions, where: (1) Dist. Ct. could properly deviate above guideline range to account for conduct at issue in dismissed enticement charge that carried 10-year mandatory-minimum sentence; and (2) Dist. Ct.’s 18-month deviation above guideline range did not introduce unwarranted sentence disparities among similar defendants. Also, defendant’s history and characteristics when combined with nature and circumstances of instant offense made it reasonable for Dist. Ct. to fashion sentence to quash any residual impulse to recidivate. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that Dist. Ct.’s consideration of conduct at issue in dismissed charge violated his due process rights.
Defendant waived claim on appeal that Dist. Ct. erred in imposing $100,000 fine as recommended by probation department, as part of his sentence on his embezzlement conviction. Defendant did not object to imposition of said fine at sentencing hearing, and, although defendant asserted that Dist. Ct. committed procedural error by failing to adequately explain basis of instant fine under circumstances where maximum Guidelines fine was $40,000, defendant waived any issue regarding imposition of fine, where record showed that defendant made strategic decision not to raise objection to said fine. Specifically, defendant’s counsel urged Dist. Ct. to impose fine rather than impose sentence of incarceration beyond three months that defendant had already served. Moreover, defendant’s counsel had twice indicated that he was aware of probation department’s recommended $100,000 fine and still suggested to Dist. Ct. to impose fine in lieu of additional prison time. Also, defendant could not complain that Dist. Ct. failed to adequately explain its decision to impose above-Guidelines fine when defendant’s counsel led Dist. Ct. to believe that he had no objection to said fine.
Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 210-month term of incarceration on drug distribution and unlawful possession of firearm charges, even though defendant argued that Dist. Ct. should not have added two criminal history points under section 4A1.1(d) of USSG for committing instant offense while on supervision on drunk driving conviction. Record showed that defendant incurred his 2015 drunk driving conviction during time span when defendant was executing drug sales that formed part of relevant conduct calculation, so as to warrant assessment of instant criminal history points. Moreover, Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing $20,000 fine, even though probation officer did not believe that defendant could pay any fine, where presentence report indicated that defendant’s total assets were well in excess of $20,000. Dist. Ct. erred, though, in imposing as term of supervised release prohibition on defendant meeting with known felons “unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer.” Said term improperly delegated Article III power to probation officer, and Article III does not otherwise confer upon probation officer authority to release convict from component of his or her sentence. (Partial dissent filed.)
Record on direct appeal failed to contain sufficient evidence to support defendant’s argument that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to timely seek withdrawal of defendant’s guilty plea, even though defendant asserted that he communicated his wish to withdraw his guilty plea at time prior to Dist. Ct.’s acceptance of his plea. Ct. could not make determination with respect to defendant’s claim that he expressed desire to withdraw his guilty plea or when such alleged conversation had occurred. Moreover, record did not contain testimony of trial counsel to learn his version of events. Also, defendant could not rebut presumption of regularity with only his own self-serving statements, which Dist. Ct. was not required to credit. Ct. further observed that defendant should have raised instant issue in collateral proceeding, which would have allowed him to present evidence to more fully establish his claim.
Defendant, an inmate, was convicted, after jury trial, of attempted escape from a penal institution. Defendant was pro se during trial. Defendant was shackled throughout his trial without complaint, and nothing indicates the jury heard or observed the shackles. Defendant failed to clearly establish the shackling error (in court failing to hold Boose hearing to determine if shackling was necessary) interfered with his ability to represent himself, diminished his presumption of innocence, or undermined integrity of judicial process. State's comments in closing argument, suggesting that Defendant entered into agreement with witnesses, were improper and unnecessary, but were not so flagrant to deny Defendant a fair trial. Court lacked authority to impose a 2-year MSR (Mandatory Supervised Release) term, as only a 1-year MSR term was statutorily authorized. (TURNER and CAVANAGH, concurring.)
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act
(Martwick, D-Chicago) removes language permitting disclosure of a record or communication without consent to an advocate consulted by a therapist or agency that provides services concerning the therapist's or agency's legal rights or duties about the recipient and the services being provided. Provides that a notation of the information disclosed and the purpose of this disclosure or use is not required to be noted in the recipient's record if disclosed to an attorney consulted by a therapist or agency that provides services concerning the therapist's or agency's legal rights or duties about the recipient and the services being provided. Just introduced.
