Defendants were each charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, based on evidence recovered when a vehicle in which they were passengers was stopped for speeding.Ample justification existed for officers to order the occupants out of the vehicle solely as a safety measure; stop was at 1:45 a.m., a shooting had occurred, and a vehicle with an armed subject had been seen nearby. Even if there was an impermissible detour from mission of stop, it did not unreasonably prolong the stop. (BIRKETT and SPENCE, concurring.)
Defendant, age 18 at time of offenses, was convicted of numerous criminal offenses for which he received the death penalty. While his postconviction petition was pending, his death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant amended his postconviction petition, alleging that Governor violated his constitutional rights by failing to consider his young age and other mitigating factors. Court properly dismissed petition at second stage. Commutation did not violate Defendant's due process rights, state or federal constitutions, or 8th amendment, as Defendant was an adult who acted alone at time of commission of crimes and circumstances do not warrant leniency.(O'BRIEN and WRIGHT, concurring.)
Record contained sufficient evidence to support jury’s guilty verdict on charge of making interstate threats to injure others in violation of 18 USC section 875(c) arising out of series of defendant’s posts on his Facebook page that threatened to kill others in Chicago area that included messages that he underwent “dry runs” that included carrying loaded gun in his car while driving customers for Uber. Instant indictment sufficiently alleged defendant’s intent to transmit threats and provided defendant with specific facts regarding three threats involving claim of intent to commit mass murder in Chicago loop area. Also, instant jury instructions, which distinguished between true threats and mere idle talk accurately stated law, and Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that instruction should have told jury that defendant intended to communicate threat, that he intended that victims receive said threat, and that his communication caused victims to feel threatened. Too, police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s car, where arresting officer received reports from FBI agents who had monitored defendant’s Facebook page containing said threats, and defendant otherwise failed to show that instant stop was excessive in either time or scope, given police investigation into his Facebook posts. Moreover, public safety exception allowed police to question suspect about presence of gun in car without giving Miranda warnings.
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. After jury was chosen, but before jury had been impaneled or sworn, Defendant asked to waive his right to a jury. The point at which the jury is sworn is the point at which a criminal defendant lose his absolute right to waive a jury. Court erred by denying his request to waive a jury trial. (PIERCE and WALKER, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, being an armed habitual criminal, and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. He was sentenced as a habitual criminal to respective concurrent terms of mandatory natural life without the possibility of parole, 20 year, and 5 years. Trial counsel's failure to move to sever the charges was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Counsel was required to take some action to minimize prejudice to Defendant that would arise from the introduction of his prior convictions, especially as he faced a life sentence without the possibility of parole upon conviction of the drug charge.(BURKE, concurring; GORDON, dissenting.)
Defendant was convicted of armed robbery and attempted armed robbery. Defendant appealed, arguing that trial court failed to conduct a Krankel inquiry into his pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; appellate court remanded for a Krankel hearing, but trial court declined to appoint new counsel. Trial counsel's failure to call a witness who Defendant claims could have impeached testimony of State's key witness may have been unreasonable trial strategy. Thus, allegations could support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.(KNECHT and TURNER, concurring.)
Court entered order of protection (OP) against Defendant prohibiting him from sending mail to mother of their daughter. Defendant was convicted of violating the OP after he sent letters to his daughter at her mother's address. As parts of some of the letters clearly indicate that Defendant sent the letters to communicate with child's mother, it was not improper for court to bar testimony from 2 attorneys who had told Defendant that sending letters to his daughter would not violate the OP. Inference that letters were intended as a means of contacting child's mother is bolstered by the fact that their infant daughter was too young to be able to read them herself. (HUTCHINSON and HUDSON, concurring.)
Defendant, age 16 at time of offenses, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder of one man and the attempted 1st degree murder of another man. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of prison, totaling 55 years. As Illinois Supreme Court (in People v. Buffer decision) recently defined a de facto life sentence for juveniles as one of more than 40 years, Defendant's 55-year sentence is a de facto life sentence. Sentence was imposed after an express finding that Defendant possessed rehabilitative potential, and contravenes any conclusion that Defendant was permanently incorrigible or irretrievably depraved. Sentence thus violates the 8th amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment. (HOLDER WHITE and TURNER, concurring.)
Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s three convictions under Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 USC section 924(c), where defendant used firearm during “crime of violence,” and where said convictions were based on defendant’s three convictions under 18 USC section 1952(a)(2), (i.e., travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit crime of violence), which, in turn were based on three armed robberies committed by defendant in violation of Hobbs Act. Defendant’s Hobbs Act armed robberies were crimes of violence for purposes of section 924(c), and defendant’s section 1952 convictions incorporated elements of Hobbs Act robberies. Accordingly, because Hobbs Act robbery is “crime of violence” under section 924(c)(3)(A), defendant’s section 1952 convictions were valid predicate offenses for his three section 924(c) convictions.
Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss charges of failure to yield, driving in the wrong direction, and improper lane usage. Defendant was off duty but in his marked squad car, and was responding to a call for officers to assist searching for a patient missing from a mental health facility. While turning onto a 1-way street, Defendant collided with a motorcycle. Court's determination that Defendant was responding to an emergency call was not against manifest weight of evidence. Section 11-205(c)(4) of Vehicle Code immunizes drivers from prosecution of petty offenses as to direction of movement or turning in specified directions. (O'BRIEN, concurring; McDADE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
