Criminal Law

In prosecution on drug possession charge, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s request for Franks hearing in his challenge regarding issuance of search warrant. Police officer, who prepared application for search warrant, failed to include negative information about credibility of confidential informant, who was only source of information regarding defendant’s alleged drug trafficking, such as fact that informant was being paid for his services, had two pending criminal charges against him, had 15 prior convictions, had history of opiate and cocaine abuse, and was hoping to receive reduced sentence in exchange for his cooperation. Moreover, Franks hearing was required, where: (1) instant credibility omissions were material; (2) police did not conduct any controlled drug purchases or personally witness any drugs or money change hands; and (3) showing of probable cause to support issuance of warrant depended on credibility of informant. Ct. rejected govt.’s argument that officer’s own observations supplied probable cause to issue warrant, since officer’s credibility could be questioned based on officer’s either deliberate or reckless omission of information about credibility of informant. (Partial dissent filed.)

In prosecution on bank robbery charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress his confession, where said confession came after extended period of time in solitary confinement, and where defendant claimed that his prolonged solitary confinement rendered him incapable of exercising voluntary and knowing waiver of his 5^th Amendment rights. Record showed that: (1) police officials came to prison where defendant was housed; (2) police read defendant his Miranda rights and defendant orally agreed to speak to police officials; (3) defendant agreed in writing to be questioned without attorney being present; (4) defendant confessed to bank robbery after being shown DNA report and picture of dyed money; and (5) defendant consented to DNA cheek swab, which matched DNA found on glove at crime scene. While defendant’s expert stated that defendant was not competent to waive his Miranda rights, three others who were present at time defendant gave confession stated that defendant was competent to waive his Miranda rights. Moreover, defendant had failed to present evidence that govt. obtained his confession through coercion, and record otherwise contained sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction without use of confession.

In prosecution on drug distribution charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting testimony from multiple witnesses indicating that defendant had coordinated with third-party to purchase cocaine from third-party, even though defendant argued that such evidence constituted inadmissible hearsay. Said testimony did not constitute hearsay evidence, where it was presented only to show course of govt. investigation leading up to transaction at issue in charged offense. Also, Dist. Ct. did not violate defendant’s 6^th Amendment rights by limiting defendant’s ability to explore witness’ cooperation agreement with govt., as well as any mandatory minimum sentence witness might have avoided because of said agreement. Such limitation was appropriate where defendant was still able to address witness’ bias against him, and defendant’s suggestion that govt. inappropriately failed to attribute more cocaine to witness and charge him with more serious offense lacked any supportive evidence. Too, Dist. Ct. did not err in giving jury Spanish language audio-recording of drug transaction, where: (1) said recording had been properly admitted into evidence; (2) said recording provided additional information not presented in transcript; and (3) Dist. Ct. gave proper limiting instruction.

Dist. Ct. erred in imposing 10-year mandatory minimum sentence on defendant’s convictions under 18 USC section 924(c) for discharging firearm in furtherance of crime of violence, since defendants’ underlying kidnapping and ransom offenses did not qualify as crimes of violence under elements clause of section 924(c), and since residual clause of said section was unconstitutionally vague. Dist. Ct. did not err in applying 4-level enhancement under section 2A4.1(b)(2)(A) of USSG with respect to two other defendants, where Dist. Ct. could properly find that defendants’ shooting of victim in arm, beating of victim in head repeatedly with firearms, pouring alcohol on gunshot wound and yanking said arm supported finding that victim sustained life-threatening injuries, where defendants denied victim medical care and subsequently beat him. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in imposing $190,000 restitution on all three defendants, even though defendants claimed that their poverty would prevent them from paying said award, where Dist. Ct. could impose substantial, but likely symbolic order of restitution against all three defendants.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to two unlawful possession of firearm charges and drug distribution charge, even though defendant argued that he was actually innocent of possession of firearm in furtherance of drug-trafficking crime, and that his counsel was ineffective because his guilty plea was not voluntary and knowing. While defendant argued that he was actually innocent of firearm charge, since he never completed guns-for-drugs deal, said charge did not require proof of completed drug deal, and record otherwise showed that defendant had briefly handled firearm and constructively possessed it in locked box that rested on his lap. Also, defendant failed to establish any prejudice regarding his claim that his trial counsel did not competently advise him prior to entry of instant guilty plea, where: (1) although trial counsel overstated potential sentencing range, defendant did not indicate that he would not have pleaded guilty but for said overstatement; and (2) Dist. Ct. cured any possible confusion created by counsel’s opinion regarding consecutive/concurrent sentencing treatment by confirming actual sentence sequence prior to accepting defendant's guilty plea.

Defendants waived any appellate challenge to Dist. Ct.’s imposition of nine “administrative conditions” as terms of defendants' supervised release, where record showed that both defendants signed written waiver of their right to Dist. Ct.’s reading of terms and conditions of their supervised release. Written waiver informed defendants that because they registered no objections to terms and conditions of supervised release as contained in presentence report, Dist. Ct. could impose said conditions that it deemed appropriate. Ct. rejected defendants’ contention that instant administrative conditions could be reviewed under plain error standard, where Ct. noted that: (1) defendants had received notice of proposed conditions and had meaningful opportunity to object to said conditions; and (2) defendants ultimately did not object to said conditions and waived reading of said conditions.

In prosecution on armed robbery charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendants’ Batson challenge on govt.’s use of peremptory challenge on black juror, where: (1) govt. explained that it used said challenge because of juror’s negative experience with criminal justice system; and (2) govt. had eventually struck similarly-situated white jurors who had negative experiences with criminal justice system. While defendant argued that Dist. Ct. had impermissibly allowed parties to re-examine jurors after govt. had articulated reason for excluding said juror so as to give govt. opportunity to justify articulation by subsequently using challenges on white jurors, Dist. Ct. could permissibly allow instant “re-do” of jury panel, where Clerk’s office had failed to provide parties with all relevant information about said jurors before jury selection. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in preventing defendants from cross-examining govt. witnesses with respect to specific mandatory minimum sentences they were avoiding by cooperating with govt., since defendants had been allowed to establish that said witnesses had received substantial reduction in their imprisonment.