Criminal Law

(Correcting case number and link.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) predicated on not having a FOID card. Defendant's late-night presence in a high-crime area, his retreat upon seeing officers, and his conduct in holding his waistband and jumping onto the hood of the police vehicle all give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State used an Illinois State Police certification to show that Defendant did not have a FOID card. During State's closing argument, defense counsel failed to object when State mentioned certification; and defense counsel failed to mention the certification or dispute whether State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant lacked a FOID card. Thus, Defendant acquiesced in the entry of the certification, and his right to confrontation of witnesses was not violated. (LAVIN, concurring; HYMAN, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of burglary, for stealing items worth a total of less than $300 from retail store, and was sentenced to 8 years. Appellate court reversed Defendant's conviction, holding that, as a matter of law, facts did not support conviction because Defendant entered a retail store during business hours and thus his entry was not "without authority". The crime of burglary was complete upon entry to the building, provided it can be shown that Defendant had the requisite intent to commit a felony or a theft at entry. Evidence was arguably sufficient to prove that Defendant entered the store with intent to commit a theft, which means that his entry was "without authority" within the meaning of Section 19-1(a) of the burglary statute. (KARMEIER, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and BURKE, concurring; THEIS and NEVILLE, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted for armed habitual criminal. Remanded with directions for circuit court to examine court records to determine whether Defendant's 2 prior aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) convictions, in felony cases file in 2006 and 2009, were entered under one of the facially unconstitutional sections of the AUUW statute. If either conviction was, then court is directed to vacate that conviction and the conviction for armed habitual criminal entered in this case. (WRIGHT, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

(Court opinion corrected 7/30/19.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of aggravated discharge of a firearm and 2 counts of attempted murder of a peace officer, and sentenced to 2 concurrent terms of 50 years; and he was also convicted of armed robbery, aggravated vehicular hijacking, and aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle, for which he was sentenced to concurrent 21-year sentences for each offense. Court erred in applying both the 20-year firearm enhancement and the enhanced sentencing range for attempted murder of a peace officer. Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences, given Defendant's criminal history and potential for harm caused by Defendant's conduct. Sentence was not excessive, and court considered aggravating and mitigating factors. (MASON and PUCINSKI, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with threatening a public official, after leaving a voicemail on judge's answering machine. During pendency of that case, court found Defendant in direct criminal contempt. Jury found Defendant guilty of threatening a public official. Court sentenced Defendant to 30 days in county jail for direct criminal contempt. Phone message was rude and insulting, and said that the judge was corrupt and  "will be hearing from someone", but message, and inmate-request slips, contained no "true threat." Court erred in admitting the inmate-request slips into evidence, as court permitted State to argue Defendant's intent at the time of those slips as indicative of his intent 2 months earlier, prior to when he was charged.Defendant had the mental capacity to understand what he was doing when he engaged in the conduce for which court summarily found him in direct criminal contempt. (HARRIS, concurring; TURNER, dissenting.)