Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of armed violence, possession of heroin with intent to deliver, and unauthorized use or possession of a weapon by a felon. Although record contains Defendant's signed jury waiver, it does not show that Defendant understandingly waived his right to a jury trial, or that court admonished him of his right to a jury trial.Record contains no indication that he was informed he was entitled to choose between a jury or bench trial or that he waived his right to a jury trial on the record. Defendant's right to jury trial was violated. (LAVIN and HYMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of violating Section 3 of Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, ON THE DATE OF HIS ARREST, he was required to register under SORA and that he established a new residence or temporary domicile in Chicago, requiring registration.(PUCINSKI and HYMAN, concurring.)

Defendant, who was serving a 60-year sentence for 1st degree murder of his wife, pro se filed a motion for DNA testing.Defendant fails to show that identity was an issue in the case. Defendant testified in his own defense at trial and did not deny killing his wife.Thus, Defendant failed to state a prima facie case for further forensic testing under Section 116-3 of Code of Criminal Procedure, and court correctly granted State's motion to dismiss. (KNECHT and CAVANAGH, concurring.)

Defendant pled guilty to driving while driver's license suspended, and was placed on 18 months probation and ordered to serve 148 days in county jail as a condition of probation.On appeal, Defendant contends that he is entitled to additional presentence custody credit. At the time Defendant filed his opening brief on appeal he was completely discharged from his sentence. Because Defendant served the entirety of his sentence before his counsel filed his brief, his otherwise meritorious issue was rendered moot. (SCHMIDT and O'BRIEN, concurring; SCHMIDT, also specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated battery. Appellate court reversed his conviction and held that retrial was barred by double jeopardy clause. Defendant was alleged to have caused great bodily harm to his 6-year-old stepson by immersing him in hot water. Physician offered persuasive expert testimony that child's burns resulted from forcible immersion in hot water, and ruled out alternative causes. The evidence was sufficient to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was the offender. The evidence, including child's hearsay statement identifying Defendant as the person who caused his injuries, was sufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution for a rational trier of fact to find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial. Remanded for retrial without the excluded hearsay evidence. (KARMEIER, THOMAS, GARMAN, BURKE, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring.)

Only those weapons that can be licensed under the Firearm Concealed Carry Act are meant to be excluded from the reach of the UUS (unlawful use of weapons) statute.  Stun guns and tasers cannot be carried or possessed "in accordance" with the Carry Act because a concealed carry license cannot be issued for those weapons. Section 24-1(a)(4) of the Carry Act is not a regulation of stun guns and tasers, but sets forth a comprehensive ban that categorically prohibits possession and carriage of stun guns and tasers in public.(KARMEIER, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring.)