Criminal Law

After stipulated bench trial, Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Court properly denied Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, as probable cause for search existed once officer identified odor of burnt cannabis during traffic stop. Knowing possession of cannabis is still a criminal offense and possession of more than 10 grams remains an unlawful act subject ot criminal penalties. Odor of cannabis is indicative of criminal activity notwithstanding decriminalization of possession of a small amount of marijuana. (CARTER and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant, age 16 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and personally discharging a firearm in connection with shooting death of victim. Court sentenced Defendant to 31 years, and exercised its discretion and did not impose the 25-year firearm enhancement based on jury's finding that Defendant personally discharged a firearm causing the victim's death. Court took into full consideration Defendant's youth, its attendant circumstances, and pertinent factors. Court did not err in prohibiting Defendant's identification and memory expert from testifying and rendering her opinion as to the reliability of eyewitness' identification, as such testimony is a function of the jury. Defendant was one of only 3 persons who met eyewitness' pervious description fo the shooter, but Defendant failed to present argument or authority that a 3-person lineup is unduly suggestive. Thus, court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress identification. (McBRIDE and GORDON, concurring.)

Defendant, age 17 at time of offense, was convicted, after jury trial, of murdering his uncle, and was sentenced to 30 years plus a 25-year weapons enhancement. Reversed and remanded for assignment to a different judge due to cumulative effect of court's errors and ineffective assistance of counsel. Sentence is a de facto life sentence that was based on court's erroneous finding that when Defendant joined a gang at age 16, his entire future was "set in stone", even though judge knew that Defendant had left the gang. Sentence violates proportional penalties clause of Illinois Constitution. Sentence relies on an adult sentencing scheme that is impacted by Trust in Sentencing Act, which is unconstitutional as applied to Defendant and similarly situated juvenile defendants. (WALKER, concurring; MASON, concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Court did not commit an abuse of discretion in admitting the other-crimes evidence as some evidence of Defendant's intent to deliver the cocaine, as it had substantial probative value as to element of intent to deliver.Defendant's 2009 DWLR (driving while license revoked) conviction could not be used as a qualifying offense to make him eligible to be sentenced as a Class X offender under Section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections. To constitute a qualifying offense, the prior offense must contain the same elements as an offense now classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater Class felony. Defendant's 2009 DWLR conviction was elevated from a misdemeanor offense to a Class 2 felony based, in part, on his prior convictions for DWLR. Those prior underlying convictions do not constitute elements of the offense. (HOLDRIDGE and O'BRIEN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) and reckless discharge of a firearm. Defendant was sentenced as a Class 3 felon for UUW offense, because incident took place in an apartment used as public housing. The UUW statute survives heightened intermediate scrutiny and thus Defendant's facial challenge to statute fails. There is more than a rational fit between protecting safety of persons on public housing properties and limiting the number of guns on public housing properties to limit potential violence. Defendant claimed that he shot himself accidentally. Evidence is insufficient to prove Defendant acted recklessly beyond a reasonable doubt. No facts from which to reasonably infer that he consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk to bodily safety of a person.(ROCHFORD and HOFFMAN, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 3 counts of offenses as to manufacture, possession, and intent to deliver methamphetamine, and sentenced to 45, 45, and 14 years, to run concurrently.In Rule 402(d) conference, State advised it would agree to 25-year sentence, but court stated it would be included to sentence to 30 years, if not more. Court did not clearly punish Defendant for exercising his right to a trial. No ineffective assistance of counsel; it was reasonable trial strategy for counsel to focus on attacking credibility of witnesses, rather than on weight of drug and distance between residence and school, and whether and how to cross-examine State's witnesses.(HOLDER WHITE and KNECHT, concurring.)

In 2015, Defendant, pursuant to a fully negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to aggravated battery and retail theft. Defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that the did not understand the employment ramifications of pleading to a felony. The 2017 amendment to Section 113-4(c) of Code of Civil Procedure, which requires sentencing court ot admonish that a guilty plea may have an impact on defendant's ability to retain or obtain employment, is substantive and thus cannot be applied retroactively to Defendant's plea. (O'BRIEN, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st-degree murder and mob action, but found not guilty of attempted murders of 2 other people. Prosecutor's examples, in closing argument, which did not describe criminal activity but were intended to explain accountability, were inartful but not reversible error as evidence was not closely balanced, and were not a material factor in convictions. Evidence overwhelmingly supported conclusion that, before or during commission of offenses of murder and mob action and with intent to promote or facilitate commission of those offenses, Defendant aided and abetted 2 other members of street gang by agreeing to be their "wheelman" in shooting. (BURKE and SPENCE, concurring.)

Indictment charged Defendant with possessing cannabis with intent to deliver. Court erred in dismissing indictment on basis of prosecutor presenting grand jury with false or misleading evidence. Under the facts, Defendant's testimony did not warrant dismissing the indictment. The only evidence that sheriff's deputy's grand-jury testimony was false was Defendant's self-serving testimony in which he recalled the conversation with the deputy differently. No admission by State or documentary evidence established that the grand-jury testimony was inaccurate.Prosecutor's leading questions to deputy does not warrant dismissal. (McLAREN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of DUI, after he crashed his vehicle into a guardrail and left the accident scene. Court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. The arresting City police officer had jurisdiction to make the arrest, as annexation ordinance, included as an exhibit to State's response to motion to dismiss, establishes that location of Defendant's accident was within city limits, and thus arrest was not extraterritorial. (CARTER and McDADE, concurring.)