Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of armed robbery involving personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily harm. No ineffective assistance of counsel in not presenting an expert witness to support defense that eyewitness identifications were unreliable. There is not a reasonable probability that presentation of such expert would have had any impact on outcome. Counsel filed pretrial motion to suppress identification testimony and did extensive cross-examination and argument at trial. Discrepancies in testimony of eyewitnesses is collateral and not fatal to reliability of their identifications. (LAVIN, concurring; HYMAN, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted of burglary and retail theft. Defendant entered Walmart, a business open to the public, during normal business hours, and as a matter of law he did not enter Walmart without authority. Thus, burglary conviction is reversed. Evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had committed retail theft. Security guard saw him take items out of his clothes and place them into a backpack and then reenter the store. Evidence was not closely balanced. (O'BRIEN, concurring; LYTTON, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Defendant was convicted of criminal sexual assault and sentenced to natural life imprisonment. Defendant was arrested without a warrant in the fenced-in back yard of his home. By the time of his arrest, Defendant had been identified in the photo lineup as the perpetrator, and his phone had been identified as that used to call the victim's grandmother. Either point gave officers probable cause to arrest him for violating his parole. Thus, counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress.Defendant's status as a parolee, along with plain language of his search condition, reduced his expectation of privacy in his residence.(CARTER and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful possession of cocaine and methamphetamine and firearm ammunition by a felon, and unlawful communication with a witness. State presented evidence showing that Defendant offered witness $500 to sign affidavit that indicated she was law enforcements's confidential source and that she planted drugs and ammunition in his home, and that after she signed, Defendant delivered the $500 to her.Defendant's intent to deter witness from testifying freely, fully, and truthfully can be inferred. Evidence was sufficient to support each element of the unlawful-communication-with-a-witness offense.(STEIGMANN and DeARMOND, concurring.)

Defendant was arrested for unlawful possession of a controlled substance. State moved to compel him to disclose the passcode for a cell phone found on him when he was arrested.Court properly denied State's motion, as it would violate Defendant's 5th amendment right against self-incrimination. Passcode is a testimonial communication. State is seeking the information which the passcode would decrypt. State did not establish with reasonable particularity the contents of the phone. (SCHMIDT and WRIGHT, concurring.)

(Modified upon denial of rehearing 3/7/19.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 counts of domestic battery of his live-in girlfriend, who was developmentally disabled. Admission of victim's testimony as to what she told others about the incident was not error. There was no prior consistent statement, and thus victim's credibility was not unfairly enhanced. Admission of case worker's testimony about what victim told him was improperly admitted as an excited utterance, as Illinois Rule of Evidence 613(c) now prohibits admission of a prior consistent statement as substantive evidence under any hearsay exception. As evidence was not closely balance, admission of that statement was not plain error.(BURKE and HUDSON, concurring.)