Criminal Law

In prosecution on robbery charges, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to change venue, where said motion was filed on morning of trial, which was approximately one month after deadline for filing said motion. While plaintiff argued that change in venue was proper, where his jury pool contained only one African-American prospective juror and where his requested venue had better pool of African Americans, voir dire, as opposed to instant motion, was appropriate vehicle to address defendant’s concerns of implicit bias. Moreover, govt. was entitled to conduct trial in instant venue, and defendant failed to show that his venire was not fair cross-section of community where he had committed first robbery. Too, motion to change venue was untimely. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress cell-site data used to establish his presence near site of robberies, where: (1) said data had been collected by T-Mobile and voluntarily tendered to police; (2) instant charges concerned robberies to T-Mobile stores; (3) defendant failed to show that T-Mobile was govt.’s agent, where record showed that T-Mobile acted in its own interests to prevent more robberies of its stores; and (4) defendant consented to T-Mobile collecting and sharing his cell-site information.

In prosecution on drug conspiracy charge, Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his apartment under circumstances, where: (1) defendant was arrested outside of his home and taken to police station; and (2) police subsequently knocked on door of defendant’s home and sleepy-eyed woman in bathrobe answered door and eventually consented to search of defendant’s home. At time of search, it was unreasonable for police to assume that said women in bathrobe had either actual or apparent authority to consent to said search of defendant’s home, since: (1) at time of search, police were unaware as to how said woman was related to defendant or how long said woman had resided at defendant’s home; and (2) fact that said woman appeared in bathrobe at door of defendant’s home was insufficient by itself to establish apparent authority to search defendant’s home. Fact that police became aware after search that woman was mother to defendant’s child did not require different result. Dist. Ct. did not err, though, in denying defendant’s motion to suppress his statements given to police after his arrest, even though defendant had refused to sign Miranda warning form, where record showed that defendant’s willingness to speak to police after he refused to sign Miranda form was course of conduct indicating waiver of Miranda rights, given his education and familiarity with criminal justice system.

Ct. of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider Dist. Ct.’s pre-trial order denying defendant’s motion to have shackles removed from defendant during all pre-trial proceedings, where said order was not final order and defendant’s trial on his charges was still pending. Moreover, said order did not qualify for interlocutory review under collateral-source doctrine, since Dist. Ct.’s denial could be effectively reviewed on direct appeal from final order at completion of case. Ct. similarly found that defendant could not seek mandamus relief from Dist. Ct.’s denial, since defendant had ability to challenge instant shackling order on direct appeal from final judgment. (Dissent filed.)

In prosecution on drug and firearms offenses, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized at home of defendant’s girlfriend, where police made said search pursuant to warrant. While warrant did not establish that defendant lived at girlfriend’s apartment, warrant still contained other facts (i.e. defendant drove girlfriend’s car for each of four controlled drug purchases, girlfriend’s car was parked outside her apartment after three of said controlled drug purchases, defendant exited girlfriend’s car and entered her apartment after one controlled purchase, and defendant drove girlfriend’s car to her apartment after two of four controlled purchases) that established probable that police might find evidence of drug proceeds at girlfriend’s apartment. Ct. further found that good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applied, where police who conducted instant search relied upon issuance of warrant in good faith.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant-car dealer’s conviction on wire and bank fraud counts, arising out of scheme to obtain duplicate car titles and then obtain multiple loans against single vehicles and sell certain vehicles without using proceeds to repay loans. Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that he did not transmit anything by wire and that there was no evidence to establish losses incurred by banks. Also, govt. witness could properly testify as expert on “floor planning” practice in lending industry, even though said witness was employed by one of defrauded banks, since said witness did not describe any special features of defrauded bank or any of defendant’s dealings with said lender, so that jury would understand that witness was expert and not fact witness.