Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. During an argument, victim told her mother that she had been raped by Defendant when she was a young child. Victim's statements to her mother, made 10 years after the incidents, were not excited utterances as the excitement of the incidents no longer predominated when she made the statements, and were not made in the absence of time to fabricate. Statements are inadmissible under the corroborative complaint exception, as that exception allows a witness to testify only to the fact that the complaint was made. Court erred in allowing mother to testify to statements, as they are inadmissible hearsay. No error in court's admission of victim's testimony that she told 2 high school friends what happened in the context of a secret, and officer's testimony that he interviewed those 2 friends in his investigation. Defendant failed to show that court's error was prejudicial. Court found that Defendant's mental limitations did not affect his ability to understand his Miranda rights or his fitness. Defendant cannot be relieved of his obligations to register as a sex offender except if his convictions are reversed. (PIERCE and WALKER, concurring.)

Defendant was charged with 2 counts of criminal sexual assault of his estranged wife. Court granted defense counsel's motion for mental examination to determine Defendant's fitness to stand trial; and court did not conduct a fitness hearing once results of mental examination were communicated to the court. As court never found that a bona fide doubt existed as to Defendant's fitness to stand trial, court was not required to conduct a fitness hearing.Defense counsel provided effective assistance as to wife's mental health and her prescription drug use. Defense counsel examined wife outside presence of jury, and then persuaded court to modify its prior grant of State's motion in limine to allow cross-examination of wife as to how prescription drug use may have affected her ability to perceive events. (HARRIS and KNECHT, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated domestic battery and domestic battery and was sentenced to 3 years. Court did not err in refusing to allow Defendant to use evidence of victim's alleged actions which occurred after the day of the charged incident.Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to prison based on court's determination that a community-based sentence would be insufficient to deter him from committing more acts of domestic violence, would deprecate seriousness of his actions, and would be inconsistent with the ends of justice.(KNECHT and CAVANAGH, concurring.)

Court properly granted State's motion under Section 67(b)(1) of Sexually Violent Persons (SVP) Commitment Act and holding that there was no probable cause for an evidentiary hearing on whether he was no longer a sexually violent person. As Respondent did not petition for conditional release, hearing was limited to evidence of whether, since previous reexamination, his condition had so changed that he was no longer a SVP. There was not sufficient evidence that, since the time of a 2015 report, his condition had so changed as to negate the substantial probability that he would engage in acts of sexual violence, and he refused to engage in sex-offender-specific treatment. (HUDSON and SPENCE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW). Conviction was based on Defendant's brief possession of a handgun legally possessed by his father during an altercation started by other persons. Defendant's actions were reasonably necessary, as men continued to threaten him and his father, and he had a legitimate fear of injury to himself and further injury to his father, who was already immobilized with injuries. It was not unreasonable for Defendant to leave the scene with the weapon rather than leave it there,and he attempted to minimize or eliminate any harm resulting from his continued possession of the weapon. State failed to carry its burden as to negating defense of self-defense or defense of necessity.(PIERCE and GRIFFIN, concurring.)