Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 1st degree murder and aggravated battery of a child as to the 4-month-old child of his girlfriend. Court failed to ask potential jurors whether they understood and accepted all 4 of the Rule 431(b) principles, which was clear error. Evidence was not closely balanced based on either alternative theory that he was a principal or a partner with infant's mother in the murder. No ineffective assistance of counsel, as even if defense counsel had moved to suppress statements made by investigating officer during interview with Defendant, the entire interview would have been admitted as relevant and probative. (SCHMIDT, concurring; CARTER, dissenting.)

Defendant was convicted for driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher. Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting electronic certification documents, as State satisfied the foundational requirements necessary for admitting the certification as self-authenticated business records. State's exhibits clearly show that Department of State Police regularly tested the Breathalyzer machine for accuracy and that it worked properly on date Defendant submitted to the test. Results of Breathalyzer test were properly admitted. (CARTER and HOLDRIDGE, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of DUI. Through testimony of arresting officer, State presented ample evidence to support conclusion that Defendant was impaired, and evidence was unrefuted. Court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to instruct jury that it could infer that contents f missing video recording were detrimental to the State. Court did not plainly err when it failed to ask one juror whether he understood and accepted the principle that Defendant was not required to produce any evidence on his own behalf.(JORGENSEN and SCHOSTOK, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance within 10000 feet of a church. State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a church, and that it was functioning as it purported to be, at the location in question at the time of the offense. Detective identified the property in question as First Christian Church and testified that he had personal knowledge and familiarity with the area, and that there was signage with the name of a church, and a cross and a goblet, and that the lantern by the front doors was lit, the grass was mowed, and cars were seen coming and going from the parking lot.(KARMEIER, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, and GARMAN, concurring; BURKE and NEVILLE, dissenting.)

Defendant, who was age 18 years 3 months at time of offense (involving a shooting at a gas station), was convicted after bench trial of 1st degree murder, attempted 1st degree murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm and sentenced to a mandatory minimum aggregate of 76 years. Evidence establishes clearly that Defendant was the person who shot several times at 2 persons as they tried to fix a car, and as 1 person fled. The identification testimony of 2 witnesses was positive and credible. A rational trier of fact could have concluded from evidence that shots fired by Defendant struck victim and caused his death; evidence3 is sufficient to prove Defendant guilty of murder. For the purposes of sentencing, the age of 18 marks present line between juveniles and adults. Defendant's facial challenge to his aggregate sentence under 8th amendment fails. (KARMEIER, THOMAS, GARMAN, and THEIS, concurring; BURKE, specially concurring).

Defendant was charged with 1st degree murder of his former spouse, who died of gunshot wounds. Circuit court granted Defendant's motion to seal 2 of his motions in limine over objection of intervenors, a newspaper, a radio station, and the Illinois Press Association, and sealed the 2 motions until after jury selection, at which time court would revisit the issue. Because the material at issue in the 2 motions was disclosed during discovery, is not otherwise publicly available, is wholly tangential to the criminal case, and will not be admitted at trial, it is not subject to a tradition of access. A 1st amendment presumption of access does not attach to Defendant's motions. Court did not abuse its discretion by denying intervenors access to the motions under a common-law right of access. Circuit court attempted to strike a careful balance among competing interests. Court recognized common-law right of access to court records, and Defendant's right to a fair trial. (KARMEIER, KIILBRIDE, GARMAN, BURKE, and NEVILLE, concurring.)