Criminal Law

Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of 1 count of reckless discharge of a firearm and 2 counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). Legislature intended ter "an individual" to mean someone other than the "person" who is charged with offense of reckless discharge of a firearm. Discharging a firearm in an empty apartment in Chicago, without evidence that other people or homes were in vicinity of discharge, was insufficient to establish that Defendant endangered bodily safety of another individual or others. State failed to meet its burden of proof that Defendant's reckless conduct engangered bodily safety of another person or others. Defendant's convictions for UUWF violate one-act, one-crime rule as both arose out of same physical act--possession of the same loaded firearm.  (CUNNINGHAM and DELORT, concurring.)

After second jury trial, Defendant was convicted of 1st-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years.  During deliberations, jury asked if non-unanimity as to mitigating factor meant that charge would "revert" from 2nd degree murder to 1st degree murder. Court instructed jury only that its verdict must be unanimous. Court erred in refusing to poll jury to specifically determine if any juror believed that a mitigating factor existed.  A criminal defendant has an absolute right to poll a jury. In light of jury's question, it is a distinct possibility that verdict was wrongly the product of a split vote on Defendant's guilt of 2nd degree murder, thus undermining reasonable confidence in verdict. (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

Court erred in denying Defendant, in postconviction proceeding, his right to appointed counsel if his misconduct toward counsel continued, without first warning Defendant. Thus, Defendant's repeated failure to cooperate with his appointed counsel was not a knowing waiver. Although court was within its discretion not to permit defense counsel to withdraw immediately, court erred by permitting counsel to withdraw before warning Defendant that he risked losing his right to appointed counsel if his behavior continud. (McDADE, concurring; SCHMIDT, dissenting.)

(Correcting case link.) Court properly dismissed Defendant's postconviction petition. Although court's order of dismissal was not entered within 90 days after filing of postconviction petition, it was voidable (as court still possessed subject matter and personal jurisdiction) and was not void, and thus was not subject to collateral review. (HOFFMAN and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of delivery of a controlled substance and sentenced to 5 years. Where "some sort of hearing" as to State' motion to recoup public defender fee was held within statutory timeframe, proper remedy is to vacate fee and remand for hearing in compliance with Section 113-3.1(a) of Code of Criminal Procedure.(CONNORS and HARRIS, concurring.)

Court erred in finding Defendant unfit to stand trial. Where a trial court finds bona fide doubt exists as to a defendant's fitness to stand trial, the defendant loses ability to knowingly and intelligently waive right to counsel. To allow the defendant to proceed pro se is thus a violation of 6th amendment right to counsel. Once bona fide doubt is established, court is required, even over defendant's objection, to appoint counsel to represent defendant until defendant regains fitness to stand trial. (STEIGMANN and APPLETON, concurring.) 

(Court opinion modified 2/28/17.) Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of 2 murders and aggravated battery with a firearm. Court properly denied Defendant's motion for leave to supplement successive postconviction petition. Report of Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission constitutes only a reassessment of evidence available to Defendant before he filed his prior postconviction petitions, and thus is not new evidence. Because Defendant has not shown that evidence would probably have changed result of trial, he has not sufficiently shown prejudice needed to add allegation to successive postconviction petition.(PIERCE and MASON, concurring.)