Amends the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act
(Cassidy, D-Chicago) removes a list of specified persons who are required to immediately report suspected cases of child abuse or neglect to the Department of Children and Family Services and instead provides that any person, agency, organization, or entity that knows or in good faith suspects a child may be an abused child or a neglected child shall immediately report or cause a report to be made to the Department. Scheduled for hearing in House Human Services March 8.
In prosecution on charge of unlawful possession of firearm by felon, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress firearm seized in plain view from defendant’s car, after police had responded to report that two individuals were sleeping in defendant’s running car that was parked in McDonald’s drive-thru. While defendant argued that police did not discover gun that was lodged between driver’s seat and center console until he had been unlawfully seized, police had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant under Terry, 392 US 1, where officer observed open bottle of vodka and passed-out defendant sitting behind steering wheel. Moreover, firearm would have been admissible under inevitable discovery doctrine, where officer reasonably ordered defendant out of car to pursue investigation for drunk driving or having open container of alcohol, and where officer would have discovered gun once defendant got out of driver’s seat. Ct. further remanded case for limited purpose of re-writing two impermissibly vague conditions of supervised release requiring defendant to remain in unspecified jurisdiction and to notify third parties of unspecified risks.
(Court opinion corrected 2/23/17.) Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of grooming, based on text message he sent to 11-year-old girl, saying that he wanted to commit sexual acts with her. Circuit clerk lacked authority to impose fines, and thus fines must be vacated. in light of Illinois Supreme Court's 2015 decision in People v. Castleberry, the purported fines must be vacated and the appellate court may not provide any further relief, either by imposing the fines or by ordering the trial court to do so. If the State wishes to hold the trial court to its statutory obligation, it must pursue relief in a new proceeding.(BURKE and BIRKETT, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of solicitation of murder for hire and sentenced to 30 years. Postconviction counsel filed statement of compliance with duties stated in Rule 651, and chose not to raise issues Defendant sought to raise in his draft postconviction petition, as counsel found thos issues meritless. No basis to disbelieve counsel's statement that surveillance video, as she had viewed it, did not substantiate defendant's claim. Thus, Defendant failed to show that his postconviction counsel failed to provide reasonable level of assistance. (HYMAN and MASON, concurring.)
Defendant entered blind guilty plea to 2 counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. Amended Rule 604(d), which requires that attorney aver that he or she had examined report of proceedings from sentencing hearing, should be applied retroactively. Remand is necessary for new postplea proceedings and strict compliance with Rule 604(d). (HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, concurring.)
A minor who is tried in adult court under "automatic transfer" provision of Juvenile Court Act but is later not convicted of charges which brought him into adult court is not subject to mandatory adult sentencing under the Act. Defendant, then age 16, was charged with multiple counts of 1st degree murder and tried in adult court, but was convicted only of uncharged offense of 2nd degree murder. Court erred in automatically sentencing Defendant as an adult because 2nd degree murder was not a "charge arising out of same incident" as the 1st degree murder charges. (FREEMAN, GARMAN, and THEIS, concurring; KARMEIER, THOMAS, and KILBRIDE, dissenting.)
Record failed to contain sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction on use or carrying of firearm to commit federal crime of violence under 18 USC section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), where alleged crime of violence was defendant’s crime of kidnapping under 18 USC section 1201(a). Kidnapping under section 1201(a) does not have, as element, use, threatened use or attempted use of physical force, and thus was not crime of violence under force clause of section 924(c)(3)(A). Moreover, kidnapping could not be viewed as crime of violence under residual clause of section 924(c)(3)(B), since said residual clause was found to be unconstitutionally vague under Cardena, 842 F.3d 959.
Defendant, then age 17, was charged with 9 felony counts: 8 aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) counts and 1 unlawful possession of a firearm count. After 402 conference, Defendant, as part of a negotiated plea agreement, pled guilty to count I, and State nol-prossed remaining charges. Court granted Defendant's Section 2-1401 petition to vacate conviction on basis that it was void under Illinois Supreme Court's 2013 People v. Aguilar decision. No provision permits tolling of statute of limitations, and statute of limitations serves as absolute bar to State's motion to reinstate charges it nol-prossed.(FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN, and BURKE, concurring; THEIS, dissenting.)
Defendant's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel in posttrial petition to withdraw guilty plea and vacate sentence triggered circuit court's duty to inquire into factual basis of Defendant's claim. Primary purpose of preliminary inquiry is to give Defendant opportunity to explain and support his claim of ineffective assistance so court can determine whether appointment of new counsel is necessary. (FREEMAN, KILBRIDE, and THEIS, concurring; THOMAS, KARMEIER, and GARMAN, dissenting.)
In prosecution on conspiracy to commit robbery and Hobbs Act charges, Dist. Ct. erred in granting defendants’ motion to suppress certain statements they made after their arrest while sitting in rear seat of police van, where said statements were recorded without their knowledge. Defendants had no reasonable expectation of conversational privacy while seated within clearly-marked police van. As such, police interception and recording of defendants’ conversation in police van did not constitute search for purposes of 4th Amendment. Ct. of Appeals further noted that govt. had legitimate reasons consistent with public interest for monitoring individuals it has taken into custody that precluded finding that defendants had reasonable subjective expectations of privacy regarding their conversations within police van.
