Criminal Law

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s section 2255 petition, alleging that prosecutor committed misconduct in failing to make good on promise to provide defendant with plea agreement limiting sentence to no more than 30 years under circumstances where defendant took case to jury trial, which resulted in his conviction on several racketeering and drug charges and imposition of life sentence. Record showed that defendant had procedurally defaulted said claim by failing to raise it at trial or on his direct appeal, and defendant failed to establish any good cause to excuse said default, where defendant was aware of all relevant facts to raise such claim by time he was at trial. Ct. further rejected defendant’s related claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to secure plea agreement prior to defendant’s trial, where: (1) any plea agreement was premised on defendant’s continued cooperation with govt.; and (2) trial counsel could not be faulted where defendant had failed to continue such cooperation in spite of trial counsel's encouragement of defendant to do so.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s guilty plea to two counts of brandishing firearm in furtherance of crime of violence under 18 USC section 924(c) arising out of defendant’s participation in Hobbs Act robberies that govt. argued qualified as “crimes of violence“ under section 924(c). Ct. rejected defendant’s claim that his Hobbs Act robberies did not qualify as crimes of violence under section 924(c), after it observed that Hobbs Act robbery could not be committed without use or threat of violence.

Dist. Ct. did not err in sentencing defendant to 28-month term of incarceration after revoking defendant’s terms of supervised release that was based, in part, on defendant’s two retail theft convictions that were obtained while defendant was on supervised release. Dist. Ct. adequately addressed defendant’s principal argument in mitigation, which centered on fact that defendant was entitled to lower sentence given fact that she had already served time on her retail theft convictions, and that she had been undergoing successful outpatient drug treatment, where Dist. Ct. acknowledged defendant’s arguments and rejected them after noting defendant’s history of drug use and her prior unsuccessful attempts at receiving drug treatment. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that Dist. Ct. blindly followed recommendation of probation officer in presentence report. Ct. further noted that defendant’s sentence was within applicable guidelines, where Dist. Ct. could properly tack on remaining portion of defendant’s unserved home confinement sentence to high end of applicable guideline range.

Dist. Ct. erred in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder conviction on ground that defendant had procedurally defaulted his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek limiting instruction when evidence of co-defendant’s confession was admitted into evidence in joint trial, even though record showed that defendant had failed to assert said claim in his state-court petition for post-conviction relief. Holding in Martinez, 132 S.Ct. 1309 and Trevino, 133 S.Ct. 1911 applied to Indiana proceedings so as to potentially excuse instant procedural default, such that defendant was entitled to hearing as to whether his post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise instant claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain limiting instruction with respect to co-defendant’s confession. Moreover, while co-defendant’s confession was admissible against co-defendant, it was not admissible against defendant, and Ct. could not conclude, under limited record, that decision not to seek limiting instruction was reasonable where evidence presented by prosecutor did not place defendant at murder scene with co-defendant.

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant-doctor’s conviction under section 841(a) of Controlled Substances Act arising out of claim that defendant prescribed narcotics without legitimate medical purpose. Govt. expert testified that review of defendant’s patient files indicated that defendant prescribed addictive opioids even though: (1) said patients were known to be simultaneously obtaining controlled substances from other sources; (2) said patients sought and received renewal prescriptions from defendant prior to their scheduled renewal date; and (3) said patients had toxicology screens in which they tested negative for presence of prescribed medications but positive for other controlled substances. Fact that said patients suffered from legitimate medical conditions associated with chronic pain did not require different result. Moreover, defendant was not denied fair trial when: (1) defendant was impeached by fact that one of his patients had died of drug overdose, which was contrary to claim made by defendant on his direct examination, since collateral evidence rule to preclude impeachment applies only when defendant’s original claim was made during his cross-examination and when govt. seeks to present documentary evidence to impeach defendant; and (2) govt. presented testimony of expert who could properly testify that defendant’s prescriptions were inconsistent with usual course of professional medical practice.