Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon (AUUW). Court erred in denying Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence because police lacked reasonable suspicion to justify a stop pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio. The now-invalidated portion of the AUUW statute existed at time of Defendant's Terry stop. The stop, initiated on basis of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity pursuant to the now-invalidated portion of AUUW statute, is unlawful and evidence seized as a result of the stop is subject to exclusionary rule.(GORDON and REYES, concurring.)
In prosecution on charge that defendant used extortionate means to collect on $300,000 defaulted loan, Dist. Ct. did not err in admitting recorded telephone calls from three individuals who discussed details about plan to carry out physical assault on individual who had defaulted on loan. Said conversations qualified under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as admissible co-conspirators statements, and Ct. rejected defendant’s argument that govt. had failed to establish that he was member of said conspiracy, where evidence showed that: (1) someone with defendant’s first name (Mikey) wanted victim’s legs broken, and that group had formed to carry out said attack; (2) defendant admitted to losing $200,000 on said loan and that he was “extremely pissed off” about said loss; (3) defendant had confronted victim about defaulted loan and asked personal questions about victim’s family; (4) defendant placed numerous phone calls to group members; and (5) one member of group provided physical description of “Mikey” that matched defendant’s physical appearance. Also, Dist. Ct. did not err in allowing govt. to impeach its own witness with inconsistent statements witness had given to police, since: (1) Rule 607 allows parties to impeach their own witnesses; and (2) defendant failed to show that govt. called said witness in bad faith in effort to expose jury to said statements, where witness had provided other favorable testimony to govt.
In prosecution on unlawful possession of firearm charge, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion challenging issuance of search warrant and requesting Franks hearing to examine police officer’s failure to include confidential informant’s criminal record in affidavit seeking issuance of said warrant. While defendant argued that Franks hearing was required every time where substantial adverse information about informant’s credibility is omitted from affidavit, Ct. found that Franks hearing was not required where instant affidavit contained specific information to establish reliability of informant and others, where: (1) informant, who gave police reliable information in other cases, provided highly detailed accounts of defendant’s criminal activities based upon his personal interactions with him; and (2) defendant’s criminal activities were corroborated by text messages, as well as report of sexual assault by third party and defendant’s own statements to police. Ct. also rejected defendant’s claim that his Colorado convictions could not be used as predicate offenses for his unlawful possession of firearm charge, where defendant claimed that Colorado officials misled him into believing that he could possess firearms after issuance of “unconditional discharge” letter upon his release from prison on said charges, since Ct. noted that actual release document did not mention any restoration of defendant’s rights.
Defendant pilfered $44 in quarters from vending machine on college campus, and was convicted of burglary committed in a school and sentenced, as a Class X offender, to 12 years. Defendant's prior criminal record was for petty nonviolent offenses. Sentence is manifestly disproportionate compared to petty nature of offense, and cost of 12 years of incarceration is excessive given nature of offense and Defendant's nonviolent history. (NEVILLE, concurring; MASON, dissenting.)
In prosecution on charge of being in U.S. without permission after having been deported to Mexico, Dist. Ct. did not err in refusing to exclude evidence of defendant’s seven prior removals from U.S. Defendant had been given written warning in 2011 not to reenter U.S. without permission, and defendant elicited from agent that warning had been written in English. As such, govt. could properly introduce evidence of seven prior removals, where: (1) defendant gave jury impression that he did not know he could not come back to U.S. after prior removal; and (2) govt. could introduce evidence of prior removals to establish defendant’s knowledge that he could not lawfully reenter U.S. without permission. Also, while govt. improperly introduced document that made reference to defendant’s prior class 4 felony drug conviction, Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s motion for mistrial, where reference to prior conviction was not obvious in document, and where Dist. Ct., once alerted to presence of prior conviction, properly ordered it to be redacted.
After Defendant’s Terry stop, portion of the Illinois aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute, which banned the possession of a handgun in public and formed the basis of the officers’ reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify Terry stop, was held facially unconstitutional by Supreme Court decision in Aguilar and void ab initio. After receiving tip, officers did not have enough information for a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would justify a Terry stop today (post-Aguilar). Thus, stop was unreasonable search and seizure. Gun seized as a result of the stop is subject to the exclusionary rule, and thus evidence of it should have been suppressed. (GORDON and REYES, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault of his daughter, then age 7. State produced enough evidence to indict defendant even without detective's false testimony and because the testimony regarding G.G.’s injury was superfluous to actual elements of crime charged, Defendant cannot show that false testimony prejudiced him for purposes of his due process claim. As his due process claim lacks even superficial legal merit, defendant cannot show that he was arguably prejudiced by appellate counsel’s failure to raise this issue on direct appeal. (HOFFMAN and ROCHFORD, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after jury trial, of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Court properly admitted multiple hearsay statements victim made to others pursuant to Section 115-10 of Code of Criminal Procedure, as Defendant did not challenge court's reliability determinations. Courts are not required to narrowly construe Section 115-10. Court's voir dire procedures, which included specific questions court posed to 3 separate panels of venire members, were not deficient. Court balanced dignity of propsective jurors as to their reasonable expectations of privacy with purpose of voir dire to exclude those who are unwilling or unable to be impartial. Remanded for hearing pursuant to Section 113-3.1 of Code to determine whether fee for court-appointed counsel should be imposed. (APPLETON, concurring; TURNER, specially concurring.)
Court advanced Defendant's pro se postconviction petition to second stage and appointed counsel, who filed amended petition. Because State filed answer rather than a motion to dismiss, court erred in dismissing petition and should have advanced it to a 3rd-stage evidentiary hearing. Answer did not request that court dismiss amended petition, and did not argue that petition failed to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, and thus answer was not a motion to dismiss. (LYTTON and WRIGHT, concurring.)
Defendant was convicted, after bench trial, of possession of heroin with intent to deliver and 8 counts of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Court erred in denying Defendant's motion for a hearing based on his challenge to the truth of the allegations in affidavit supporting search warrant. Evidence does not show Defendant's control over the premises. A defendant's possession of keys alone are insufficient proof of constructive possession. Hidden location of gun and State's failure to prove that Defendant ever entered the home creates a reasonable doubt as to Defendant's knowledge of presence of gun. Even assuming Defendant had access to garage, no evidence suggests that he had knowledge of presence of hidden contraband. (HYMAN and PIERCE, concurring.)
