Criminal Law

Record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for use of firearm during crime of violence, even though defendant argued that crime of making ransom demand in violation of 18 USC section 875(a) did not qualify as “crime of violence” so as to support instant firearms conviction. Defendant failed to raise instant issue in Dist. Ct., and Dist. Ct. did not commit plain error in interpreting crime of demanding ransom as necessarily including as element at least implied threat of violence, which qualified said offense as crime of violence under elements clause set forth in section 924(c)(3)(A). Also, defendant could not show any deprivation of substantial rights arising out of retention of instant conviction, where record suggested that Dist. Ct. would impose same within-guidelines, 444-month sentence that defendant received on other charges if cause was remanded for new sentence without consideration of instant firearms conviction.

Dist. Ct. erred in sentencing defendant to below-Guidelines sentence of 36 months on charge of unlawful possession of firearm, where said sentence was based in part on finding that defendant qualified for enhancement under section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) of USSG due to defendant’s possession of firearm in connection with another felony offense, i.e., drug distribution. Incident at issue in enhancement concerned defendant’s sale of synthetic marijuana to buyer, who requested that defendant hold his gun as collateral until buyer could procure sufficient funds to complete drug purchase. However, said incident did not support enhancement finding since: (1) defendant merely secreted gun and then transported gun to different individual who purchased gun; and (2) there was no evidence that defendant would have canceled his drug transaction had it not been for buyer’s tender of instant collateral. Ct. further noted that synthetic marijuana that defendant sold was not scheduled substance at time of said sale.

Dist. Ct. did not err in denying defendant’s habeas petition challenging his murder and aggravated battery convictions on ground that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file motion to suppress his inculpatory statements given to police, where defendant had claimed that said statements were involuntary because he was only 16 years old at time statements were given and because he gave said statements outside presence of any responsible adult. Trial court held hearing and denied defendant’s post conviction petition raising instant ineffective assistance of counsel issue because defendant’s statements to police were actually voluntary. Record showed that Ill. Supreme Ct., which affirmed trial court’s finding that statements were voluntary based on “totality of circumstance” standard, applied correct governing law, and defendant had failed to show that Ill. Supreme Ct. unreasonably applied said governing law, where said Court gave some weight to defendant’s age and lack of adult presence and yet found that defendant had adequately waived Miranda warnings on multiple occasions and was not in coercive environment when statements were made. Moreover, Ct. rejected defendant's contention that Ill. Supreme Ct. reached wrong outcome.

Dist. Ct. did not err in dismissing as untimely defendant’s habeas petition challenging his 1995 murder conviction and sentence based on defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective. Record showed that last day defendant could have filed instant habeas petition was September 28, 1998, which was one year after his murder conviction and sentence became final. Fact that defendant had obtained state-court post-conviction relief on his attempted robbery conviction that formed part of same trial as his murder conviction did not serve to re-start any habeas limitation period with respect to his murder conviction, since state-court post-conviction petition only challenged his attempted robbery conviction. As such, while any habeas petition challenging defendant's attempted robbery conviction might have been timely, instant habeas petition challenging his murder conviction and sentence was untimely.